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economic well-being, economic literacy, confidence in politicians, political ideology, and 
time preference are significantly related to individual attitudes toward public spending, taxes, 
and debt. The magnitude of the effects is particularly large for time preference, economic 
knowledge, and party preference. Third, public preferences for public spending priorities are 
only marginally affected when considering a public budget constraint. 
 
Political Leaders’ Socioeconomic Background and Fiscal 
Performance in Germany 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates whether the socioeconomic status of the head of government helps 
explain fiscal performance. Applying sociological research that attributes differences in 
people’s ways of thinking and acting to their relative standing within society, we test whether 
the social status of German prime ministers can help explain differences in fiscal performance 
among the German Laender. Our empirical findings show that the tenures of prime ministers 
from a poorer socioeconomic background are associated with higher levels of public spending 
and debt financing. Social mobility has an asymmetric influence: social climbers adapt to 
their new class, whereas downwardly mobile prime ministers remain primarily influenced by 
their parents’ upper-class status. 
 
 
JEL:  E61, E62, H11, H72 
Keywords: Leadership, socioeconomic status, fiscal policy, public spending, public deficit. 
 
 
Published in: 
Hayo, Bernd and Neumeier, Florian (2014), Political Leaders' Socioeconomic Background 
and Fiscal Performance in Germany, European Journal of Political Economy 34, 184–205. 
 
Leaders’ Impact on Public Spending Priorities: The Case of the 
German Laender 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We examine determinants of the composition of public expenditure in the German Laender 
(states) over the period 1992–2008, as the Laender exhibit a high degree of institutional and 
political homogeneity and are endowed with extensive fiscal competences. Our prime 
contribution is an investigation into how political leaders’ socioeconomic background 
influences public spending priorities. Applying sociological theory, we link preferences for 
the composition of public spending to social status. In contrast to approaches relying on 
political budget cycles or partisan theory, we find strong and theory-consistent evidence that 
prime ministers tend to favour fiscal policies supporting the social class in which they are 
socialised. Governments led by prime ministers from a poor socioeconomic background 
spend significantly more on social security, education, health, infrastructure, and public 
safety. 
 
 
JEL:  E62, H75, H76 
Keywords: Leadership, socioeconomic status, social rivalry, public expenditure 
composition. 
 
 
Published in: 
Hayo, Bernd and Neumeier, Florian (2012), Leaders' Impact on Public Spending Priorities: 
The Case of the German Laender, Kyklos 65(4), 480–511. 
 
  
Joint Discussion Paper 
Series in Economics 
by the Universities of 
Aachen ∙ Gießen ∙ Göttingen 
 Kassel ∙ Marburg ∙ Siegen 
ISSN 1867-3678 
 
 
 
No. 08-2013 
 
 
 
Bernd Hayo and Florian Neumeier 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Political Leaders’ Socioeconomic Background and Public 
Budget Deficits: Evidence from OECD Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded from 
http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/index_html%28magks%29 
 
Coordination: Bernd Hayo • Philipps-University Marburg 
Faculty of Business Administration and Economics • Universitätsstraße 24, D-35032 Marburg 
Tel: +49-6421-2823091, Fax: +49-6421-2823088, e-mail: hayo@wiwi.uni-marburg.de 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Political Leaders’ Socioeconomic Background and Public Budget 
Deficits: Evidence from OECD Countries* 
 
 
Bernd Hayo and Florian Neumeier 
Philipps-University Marburg 
 
 
 
 
First draft: 13 February 2013 
This version: 13 February 2014 
 
 
 
 
Corresponding author: 
 
Bernd Hayo 
School of Business & Economics 
Philipps-University Marburg 
D-35032 Marburg 
Germany 
Phone: +49–6421–2823091 
Email: hayo@wiwi.uni-marburg.de 
 
 
* We thank Evelyn Korn, Matthias Neuenkirch, Elisabeth Schulte, Christian Traxler, Matthias 
Uhl, as well as participants of research seminars at the Universities of Aachen, Bamberg, 
Düsseldorf, Kent and Marburg, as well as participants of the ZEW Workshop on ‘Fiscal 
Performance: The Role of Institutions and Politicians’ for their helpful comments on earlier 
versions of the paper. All remaining shortcomings are ours. 
  
2 
 
Political Leaders’ Socioeconomic Background and Public Budget 
Deficits: Evidence from OECD Countries 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper empirically analyses the relationship between political leaders’ socioeconomic 
backgrounds and public budget deficits utilising panel data on 21 OECD countries from 1980 
to 2008. Building on sociological, as well as economic, research, we argue that the 
socioeconomic status of political decision-makers, i.e., presidents or prime ministers, is an 
important determinant of fiscal budget decisions. Our theory-consistent findings show that the 
tenures of lower-class leaders—i.e., leaders of low socioeconomic status—are associated with 
a deficit-to-GDP ratio which is 1.6 percentage points higher than that during tenures of upper-
class leaders. 
 
 
JEL:  E62, H11, H62, Z13. 
Keywords: Budget deficit, political leaders, socioeconomic status, time preference. 
 
Word count:  7029 (excluding references and appendix) 
 
 
  
3 
1. Introduction 
Over the last several years, the world, or at least various regions of it, has experienced three 
crises: a financial crisis, a recession, and a sovereign debt crisis. Some pundits even believe 
that the current sovereign debt crisis in Europe endangers survival of the euro area and may 
seriously undermine European integration. Although financial and real crises contributed to 
the poor state of public finances, it is difficult to argue that these extraordinary events are at 
the root of the sovereign debt crisis. Arguably, public finances were already stretched to the 
breaking point and therefore were unable to bail out financial institutions and stabilise the 
business cycle without significantly raising investors’ concern over the possibility of 
substantial default risk. 
Looking back in time, we find that during the past decades, many OECD countries increased 
public debt even in good economic times. In trying to explain this development, political 
economists typically focus on political actors’ motives and incentives when deciding on fiscal 
policies. Political budget cycle (PBC) theory (e.g., Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; Alesina et al., 
1992), ‘public budget as a common pool resource’ approaches (e.g., Roubini and Sachs, 
1989a, 1989b), as well as models viewing the incurrence of public debt as a strategic 
instrument used to tie successors’ hands (e.g., Persson and Svensson, 1989; Alesina and 
Tabellini, 1990) have one thing in common: they presume that politicians are primarily driven 
by opportunistic motives. However, empirical findings based on these premises are often 
inconclusive and provide only very little evidence in support of them.1 
In recent years, a new and steadily growing literature in economics has emerged which 
emphasises the influence of political leaders’ identity on government performance. Starting 
with the work of Jones and Olken (2005), who find that exogenous leader transitions (i.e., 
leader transitions caused by natural death of the incumbent) induce changes in GDP growth 
rates, economists have become increasingly concerned with the question of whether the 
incumbent political leader makes a difference. The subsequent empirical research documents 
a connection between sociodemographic characteristics of leaders and (i) economic growth 
(e.g., Besley et al., 2011), (ii) institutional framework (e.g., Dreher et al., 2009; Hayo and 
Voigt, 2013), (iii) monetary policy (Göhlmann and Vaubel, 2007), and (iv) fiscal policy (e.g., 
Mikosch, 2009; Hayo and Neumeier, 2011, 2012). Particular attention is paid to the 
association between leaders’ performance and their educational and occupational careers. For 
                                                            
1 With regard to PBC theory, Shi and Svensson (2006) find robust evidence for pre-electoral increases in fiscal 
deficits for developing countries, but not for developed countries. Brender and Drazen (2005) provide similar 
evidence based on a differentiation between new and established democracies: pre-electoral deficit increases are 
found in the former only. The results reported by Roubini and Sachs (1989a, 1989b) are shown to be not robust 
by Edin and Ohlsson (1991) and de Haan and Sturm (1997). 
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example, Besley et al. (2011) provide evidence that countries’ economic growth rates are 
higher when their leaders are more highly educated. Dreher et al. (2009) find that leaders with 
a background in economics are more likely to engage in reforms that lead to a liberalisation of 
the economy (measured in terms of changes in the Economic Freedom Index). Mikosch (2009) 
reports that the tenures of former economists as leaders of OECD countries are characterised 
by higher deficits than are the tenures of leaders who have been politicians most of their 
working life. Moreover, political science research suggests that there is a strong 
personalisation in politics, i.e., a leader’s reputation is important for electoral success even in 
a parliamentary system (cf. McAllister, 2007). 
However, most of the approaches listed above suffer from certain drawbacks. First, some of 
the results are either not robust to variations in the empirical specification or even 
counterintuitive. This may be at least partly because the hypotheses linking certain 
educational or occupational backgrounds to economic performances are often more or less ad 
hoc (for a discussion, see Hayo and Neumeier, 2011). Second, potential concerns of 
endogeneity are usually not addressed.2 Leader transitions as well as the length of leaders’ 
incumbencies likely depend on the government’s economic performance. If the leader 
characteristics of interest are somehow related to unobserved factors affecting the likelihood 
of achieving power or tenure length, the reported estimates could be misleading. 
This paper contributes to the literature by providing a broader social-science-based 
perspective on people’s motives and decision behaviour. Following sociological and 
psychological research, we argue that decisions made by political actors are likely affected by 
specific aspects of their socioeconomic backgrounds. More precisely, we draw a connection 
between the political leader’s socioeconomic status, his or her time preferences, and the level 
of deficit spending. We derive the testable hypothesis that low-status heads of governments 
are more debt tolerant, attach less importance to the future burden which may arise from debt 
accumulation, and, therefore, are more prone to rely on debt financing. Our theory-consistent 
findings reveal that the impact of political leaders’ status on fiscal discipline is statistically 
and economically significant. The tenures of leaders who held blue-collar jobs prior to 
pursuing a political career are associated with an approximately 1.6 percentage point higher 
contemporary deficit-to-GDP ratio than are the tenures of leaders who held academic 
positions. A distinctive feature of our empirical analysis is robustness to a variety of control 
variables and the use of instrumental variable estimation, allowing our estimates to be 
causally interpreted and avoid biases due to selection effects or omitted variables. 
                                                            
2 An exception is the study by Besley et al. (2011), who utilise exogenous leader transitions to circumvent 
endogeneity problems. 
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we introduce the 
status concept and discuss its impact on behaviour and (time) preferences. In Section 3, the 
data and our empirical strategy are described. Results are presented in Section 4 along with 
robustness checks. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. About Status, Habitus, and (Time) Preferences: Some Lessons from Social Sciences 
2.1 Status and its Measurement 
According to sociologists, social stratification is a central feature of modern societies, 
implying that societies must be viewed as hierarchical formations in which individuals and 
groups can be ranked. Decisive for an individual’s rank within this hierarchy is the functional 
importance of the social position he or she occupies, i.e. the position’s particular value to 
society (Davis and Moore, 1945). Status is a reflection of the functional importance of a 
certain position. 
Societies endow those who strive for or hold a social position associated with a higher status 
with certain resources and attributes regarded as valuable (Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992; Ganzeboom et al., 1992). This is done primarily in order to provide people 
with incentives to properly fulfil the tasks connected to the positions they hold. Particularly 
important is the endowment with three types of capital (Bourdieu, 1984, 1986; Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992): economic capital, i.e., income and wealth, cultural capital, especially 
formal and informal education, and social capital, i.e., reputation, prestige, and networks. 
Differences in status lead to an unequal distribution of these types of capital: a higher status 
translates into higher income, a higher level of education, and a higher reputation. People of 
similar status constitute a social class. 
The social position which is commonly regarded as most relevant for an individual’s standing 
and, thus, the crucial determinant of his or her status, is occupation (Treiman, 1977; 
Ganzeboom et al., 1992). Hence, in sociology, occupational status is of particular interest as a 
determinant of an individual’s standing in society. As occupational status is a latent variable, 
sociologists typically measure it by means of indicators. A well-known and frequently applied 
indicator is the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI) introduced 
by Ganzeboom et al. (1992). This index combines information on the average level of 
education and average income in different occupations to create a continuous measure of 
status. Table 1 provides ISEI scores for selected occupations, which range from 0 to 1. 
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Table 1: ISEI Scores for Selected Occupations 
Occupation ISEI score 
Upper-class occupations  
Architects, town planners  0.77 
Lawyers 0.85 
Judges 0.90 
Middle-class occupations  
Bank teller 0.47 
Bookkeeper 0.56 
Middle-rank civil servant 0.59 
Lower-class occupations  
Bricklayers 0.32 
Carpenters 0.31 
Farmers 0.26 
Unskilled construction and factory workers 0.24 
Note: Original ISEI scores are divided by 100. The categorisation of occupations with regard 
to the three social classes is done by the authors. 
 
2.2 Status and Time Perspective 
Important aspects of individual decision-making, such as attitudes, preferences, and abilities, 
vary with status. People of similar standing have similar codes of conduct and lifestyles, share 
certain perceptions and attitudes, and engage in similar activities (e.g. Bourdieu, 1977; Elias, 
1994). Sociologists and psychologists attribute this behavioural similarity to the similar life 
conditions encountered by people within the same social class. In the course of their lifetimes, 
people acquire a set of dispositions reflecting their cumulative experience as well as the 
socioeconomic conditions to which they are exposed. These dispositions, commonly referred 
to as habitus, are believed to serve as a matrix of perception, appraisal, and practice which 
steers cognition and action below the level of consciousness (Bourdieu, 1977, 1984; Crossley, 
2001; Pickel, 2005). Since people of similar standing face similar life conditions and meet 
similar fates, these dispositions happen to be homogenous for members of the same social 
class, constituting a class habitus. 
One well-documented difference between people of different social classes concerns time 
perspective and intertemporal decision-making. There is overwhelming empirical evidence in 
the sociology literature that status affects a person’s orientation toward the future as well as 
the willingness to delay gratification. People of low status anticipate future consequences of 
their actual behaviour to a lesser degree, attach less importance to future events, reveal shorter 
planning horizons, and are less willing to delay rewards (e.g., LeShan, 1952; Schneider and 
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Lysgaard, 1953; O’Rand and Ellis, 1974; Martineau, 1977; Trommsdorf, 1983).3 Several 
explanations have been offered for this relationship between social class and future 
orientation or reward delay. The social science literature suggests that the association is 
mediated by cognitive, motivational, and affective components (e.g., Trommsdorf, 1983). 
Ainslie (1975, 1992) states that ‘living mostly for the present is our normal state of 
functioning, and that consistent behavior is sometimes acquired, to a greater or lesser extent, 
as a skill’ (Ainslie, 1992: 57). A greater capacity to consider future needs is posited to be 
strengthened by higher levels of formal and informal education, as abstract thinking is 
regarded as a prerequisite for future orientation. However, several psychological and social 
factors related to social class are found to be at least as important as education. People of low 
status not only experience comparatively poorer socioeconomic conditions, they also face 
manifold forms of social deprivation (e.g., Agarwal et al., 1983; Bourdieu, 1984), tend to 
compare themselves unfavourably to others (e.g., Lunt and Livingston, 1991; Walker, 1996), 
are more exposed to the risk of undesirable life events such as financial distress and social 
exclusion (e.g., Breen, 1997), encounter more obstacles in reaching a goal, and have a more 
pessimistic future outlook and uncertain expectations (e.g., Shannon, 1975; Lamm et al., 1976; 
Trommsdorf, 1983; Loudon and Della Bitta, 1993). All these factors are found to facilitate a 
greater present orientation, avoidance of future expectation formation, and lower aspirations. 
In contrast, economic research on the causes of heterogeneous time perspectives is scarce. 
Becker and Mulligan (1997) model the determination of discount rates as endogenous, 
suggesting that both the level of education and the level of income enhance future orientation 
by shifting people’s attention away from their present situation to their future needs, making 
more highly educated and well-to-do people more patient and less myopic. 4  Empirical 
evidence is provided by Leigh (1986), Lawrance (1991), and Harrison et al. (2002). Leigh 
(1986) analyses determinants of future orientation by means of individual answers to several 
questions which were part of a survey carried out in the United States in 1972. His findings 
suggest that schooling, wages, and being brought up in a wealthy family, as well as having a 
highly educated father, facilitate forward-lookingness. Lawrance (1991) estimates individual 
                                                            
3 Many behavioural patterns considered to be perfect examples of a lack of future orientation are also shown to 
be connected to status: obesity, the use and abuse of alcohol and tobacco, drug addiction, and so on. For a review, 
see Bradley and Corwyn (2002). 
4 With regard to education, the authors claim that ‘schooling focuses students’ attention on the future. Schooling 
can communicate images of the situations and difficulties of adult life, which are the future of childhood and 
adolescence. In addition, through repeated practice at problem solving, schooling helps children learn the art of 
scenario simulation. Thus educated people should be more productive at reducing the remoteness of future 
pleasures’ (Becker and Mulligan, 1997: 735–736). With respect to income, they state that financial distress 
increases the desire for current income and, citing Irving Fisher, ‘blinds a person to the needs of the future’ 
(Becker and Mulligan, 1997: 732). 
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discount rates utilising data from the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics, whereas Harrison 
et al. (2002) apply experimental methods to a random sample of Danish households. Both 
studies find that discount rates are higher the lower the levels of income and education. 
 
2.3 Time Perspective and Fiscal Deficits 
There is substantial economic literature arguing that lack of future orientation and reward 
delay are likely determinants of private debt incurrence and saving behaviour (e.g., Thaler and 
Shefrin, 1981; Angeletos et al., 2001; Laibson, 1997). People who are less forward-looking 
are shown to be more debt tolerant, more likely to incur debts, and to cope less well with 
financial strain (e.g., Lea et al., 1995; Walker, 1996; Webley and Nyhus, 2001). There is far 
less theoretical and empirical research into how lack of future orientation influences public 
budget policy. We follow sociologists and assume that (i) social experiences gathered 
throughout life are inscribed into a person’s cognition and thereby steer thinking and acting 
below the level of consciousness (e.g., Berger and Luckmann, 1966) and that (ii) these 
experiences are structure induced, i.e., they depend on the individual’s rank within the social 
stratification system. Consequently, we expect that the intertemporal choices made by 
political decision-makers will reflect the socially constituted dispositions—i.e., the habitus—
of the social class in which they were socialised. 
Public debt is an important link between past, present, and future (fiscal) policies via the 
government’s intertemporal budget constraint. Ever since Barro’s (1979) seminal work, 
deficit policies are often viewed as a matter of intertemporal optimisation: benevolent 
governments use public borrowing as a financing device in times of economic hardship in 
order to minimise the net present value of the excess burden of taxation. However, as 
emphasised in the public choice literature (e.g., Buchanan and Tullock, 1962), running a 
public deficit can also serve as a way to enjoy welfare gains from public goods and services 
and postpone the burden associated with rising tax rates or cuts in government spending for 
the future. In fact, a lack of future orientation and deficient anticipation of the future costs of 
public debt frequently are considered to be likely causes of public debt accumulation and one 
of most important arguments put forward in favour of balanced budget rules (e.g., Alesina and 
Perotti, 1994; Poterba, 1997). Huber and Runkel (2008) set up a model in which a present-
oriented government chooses tax rates designed to minimise the excess burden of taxation. 
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They show that a myopic government accumulates public debt, irrespective of whether it is 
naïve or experienced.5 
Thus, empirical evidence supports the notion of an association between attitudes toward 
public indebtedness, time preferences, and factors related to a person’s status. Based on 
survey data from Austria, Stix (2013) finds that respondents with low levels of income and 
formal education as well as high discount factors are much more likely to oppose public debt 
reduction. Hayo and Neumeier (2013) report similar evidence for Germany. Blinder and 
Krueger (2004) and Blinder and Holtz-Eakin (1984) analyse survey data from the US and find 
that people with higher income and education are more concerned about fiscal deficits and 
more likely to favour a balanced budget amendment, respectively. 
 
3. Data and Empirical Approach 
Following our theoretical discussion, we now test empirically whether a government’s debt 
performance is affected by the socioeconomic status of its incumbent leader (i.e., depending 
on the form of government, the prime minister or president). For practical reasons, we 
concentrate on the heads of governments, as they are the most individually powerful decision-
makers in the executive branch of government and, as shown in the literature discussed above, 
appear to exert a significant influence on government performance. We test our hypothesis 
utilising data from 21 OECD countries from 1980−2008. Our research question is addressed 
in two ways. 
First, we apply a two-step approach. In Step 1, we estimate the following dynamic panel 
model: 
ሺ7ሻ	݂݀݁݅ܿ݅ݐ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߤ௧ ൅ ߩ	݂݀݁݅ܿ݅ݐ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ′݁ܿ݋݊݋݉݅ܿ	ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ௜,௧
൅ ߛᇱ݌݋݈݅ݐ݈݅ܿܽ	ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߜ ′݀݁݉݋݃ݎܽ݌݄݅ܿ	ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ
൅ ߝ′	݈݁ܽ݀݁ݎ	݀ݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ	௜,௧ ൅ ߞ௜,௧ 
The dependent variable is the primary deficit in relation to GDP (in percentage points). αi is a 
country-specific intercept, μt a time-fixed effect. ζit is an error term. Since the lagged 
dependent variable causes the OLS estimator to be biased, we apply GMM estimation 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991), employing up to five valid lags of the dependent variable (i.e., 
lags 2–6) as instruments for the deficit in t-1.6 We account for country-fixed effects by 
                                                            
5 The difference between a naïve and an experienced actor is that the latter anticipates that his or her ‘future self’ 
desires to deviate from the initial choice and, thus, behaves in a time-consistent manner, whereas the former does 
not. 
6 Simulation studies reveal that a trade-off occurs when choosing the number of instrument lags in dynamic 
GMM models: a higher number of lags increases both estimation efficiency and the finite sample bias (Judson 
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applying a within transformation. 
We basically follow extant political economy literature when it comes to choice of control 
variables. As economic variables, we include the interest payments on government bonds (in 
percentage points of GDP) to account for the policy-invariant part of the budget, the real GDP 
growth rate and the unemployment rate as business cycle indicators, the log of real per capita 
GDP, and a variable measuring trade openness (value of imports plus exports in relation to 
GDP, measured in percentage points). 
The political variables include a dummy for left-wing governments to control for partisan 
effects, a dummy for election years accounting for the potential influence of political budget 
cycles, and a Maastricht dummy to reflect the impact of the European monetary union, which 
is a step dummy that takes on the value 1 starting in the year a country committed to the 
Maastricht criteria. We account for possible constraints on the head of government’s power to 
manipulate the public budget and control for measures of political dispersion. Therefore, we 
add a dummy indicating whether the political leader’s party has a majority in all houses with 
law-making power, a variable that captures the degree of government fractionalisation, and a 
veto-player index (variable checks).7 
We also add two variables depicting the demographic situation of a country’s population: log 
population size, since this variable is found to influence the level of public spending in many 
empirical applications (for an overview, see Shelton, 2007), and the dependency ratio, defined 
as the share of people aged above 65 or less than 15 to the total working-age population. The 
share of dependent people tends to influence the level of public spending upward and tax 
revenues downward. 
Finally, we construct dummy variables for each individual political leader and add these to 
our specification. As a country’s reference, we choose the political leader with the fewest 
observations. 
In Step 2, we take the estimated coefficients ߝ̂ of the leader dummies obtained in Step 1 and 
employ them as dependent variables in an OLS regression: 
ሺ8ሻ	ߝ௝̂ ൌ ߙ෤ ൅ ߚ෨ᇱ݈݁ܽ݀݁ݎ	ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ௝ ൅ ߞሚ௝ 
The left-hand-side variable ߝ௝̂	can be interpreted as the average public deficit run by the head 
of government j during his or her incumbency, conditional on all other regressors employed in 
Equation (7) (and compared to a country’s reference leader). The explanatory variables 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
and Owen, 1999). Hence, we restrict the number of instruments to five. Note that with respect to our main 
variables of interest, we find no significant changes when varying the number of lags over a range of 1 to 10. 
7 These variables are from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI). Government fractionalisation measures 
the probability that two randomly picked deputies of the government are from different parties. The variable 
checks is a discrete variable with higher values indicating a larger number of balances and veto-players. 
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considered in Step 2 are characteristics describing the respective political leader, i.e., age at 
the beginning of the first term and total number of years in office, a dummy for female leaders, 
and the leader’s personal status. We also control for a leader’s parental status in order to 
capture potential socialisation effects. Note that we have to compute deviations from a 
country’s reference leader for all explanatory variables. The advantage of this two-step 
approach is that it allows disentangling the questions of whether (i) leader identity matters at 
all and (ii) if so, which leader characteristics make a difference. The first question can be 
addressed by testing the joint significance of all leader dummies employed in Step 1. The 
answer to the second will be revealed by the results of Step 2. 
However, the two-step approach may suffer from inefficient estimation, since noisy estimates 
obtained in Step 1 are used as endogenous variables in Step 2 and the number of observations 
in Step 2 is notably lower than in Step 1. Thus, we also use an alternative approach to test our 
hypothesis: we replace the leader dummies in Equation (7) with the leader characteristics of 
interest and in this way directly assess the impact of leader characteristics on the current 
deficit, i.e.: 
ሺ9ሻ	݂݀݁݅ܿ݅ݐ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߤ௧ ൅ ߩ	݂݀݁݅ܿ݅ݐ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ′݁ܿ݋݊݋݉݅ܿ	ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ௜,௧
൅ ߛᇱ݌݋݈݅ݐ݈݅ܿܽ	ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߜ ′݀݁݉݋݃ݎܽ݌݄݅ܿ	ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ
൅ ߝ′	݈݁ܽ݀݁ݎ	ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ	௜,௧ ൅ ߞ௜,௧ 
The vector leader variables contains characteristics describing the incumbent head of 
government in state i in period t. We consider the same characteristics as in Equation (8), but 
age now refers to a leader’s age at the end of period t and years in office to the total number of 
years in office completed by the end of period t. 
Data on the deficit-to-GDP ratio are from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics. 
Unfortunately, there are missing values for some countries for certain periods, so that our 
panel models are unbalanced. In the Appendix, we report the data coverage for each country 
(see Table A1), provide the data sources as well as descriptive statistics (see Table A2), and 
explain how the status variables were constructed. 
 
4. Estimation Results 
4.1 Basic Specifications 
We commence our empirical analysis with the results of the two-step approach. Estimates of 
Equation (7) are omitted to save space, but they are available on request. To illustrate the 
impact of individual leaders, we derive rough proxies for politicians’ debt propensity by 
adding the country-specific average deficit-to-GDP ratios to the leader-dummy coefficients 
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obtained from Equation (7). Since our empirical model includes country fixed effects, the 
numbers thus derived can be interpreted as the expected deficit-to-GDP ratio the respective 
leader would have chosen had his or her country faced average economic, political, and 
demographic conditions during his or her incumbency.8 We then ranked all political leaders 
according to their debt propensity, starting with the most debt-tolerant leader.9 Table A3 in 
the Appendix presents the debt-propensity scores (i.e., the hypothetical deficit-to-GDP ratios) 
for all political leaders in our sample as well as their ranks. 
The hypothetical deficit-to-GDP ratio of the median political leader (George W. Bush Jr.) is 
roughly 2.6. Our results show that only 21 out of 100 political leaders would have run a 
surplus under average economic, political, and demographic conditions. This suggests that the 
increase of public debt in many countries is partly due to fiscal policy decisions by political 
leaders. If we test the joint significance of all leader dummies using a Wald test, we obtain a 
χ2 value of 1254, which is significant at all reasonable levels of significance. Thus, leader 
identity is statistically associated with government budget balance. 
The results for Step 2 based on estimating Equation (8) are presented in Table 2. First, we 
estimate a general model containing all the leader characteristics listed in Section 4. Then, we 
eliminate insignificant regressors by applying a consistent general-to-specific reduction 
approach (Hendry, 2000). We thus enhance estimation efficiency and reveal which 
characteristics have significant explanatory power, taking into account potential multi-
collinear relationships between the regressors. 
A political leader’s age at the beginning of his or her first term and personal status are 
significant at the 5% level and are the only variables to survive model reduction. The 
dependent variable represents the average conditional public deficit run by the respective 
political leader during his or her incumbency (compared to a country’s reference leader). 
Accordingly, the coefficient of personal status can be interpreted to mean that the tenures of 
political leaders who were engaged in blue-collar occupations before taking up politics 
(lower-class leaders; average status score 0.3) are associated with a deficit-to-GDP ratio 
which is on average about 2.3 percentage points (pp) higher than that during the tenures of 
leaders with an academic background (upper-class leaders; average status score 0.8). In the 
long run, this effect increases to 4 pp. This finding supports our hypothesis and is not only 
statistically significant, but highly relevant economically as well. Regarding a leader’s age, 
                                                            
8 Note that caution is required in interpreting these hypothetical deficit-to-GDP ratios. Differences in countries’ 
average deficit-to-GDP ratios can also result from unobserved heterogeneity. As a consequence, variations 
across leaders in different countries with respect to debt-propensity scores could be partly driven by country-
specific effects. 
9 Our sample is comprised of 100 political leaders. 
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our results suggest that if entry age increases by one year, the expected deficit-to-GDP ratio 
will increase by 0.07 pp. In comparison to the social status effect, this is quite modest. 
Roughly 17% of the variation among leaders’ debt performance can be explained by personal 
status and age, which is remarkably high. 
 
Table 2: Estimation Results for Equation (8) 
Variables General Model  Reduced Model 
Coefficient Stand. error  Coefficient Stand. error 
Constant 0.014 0.228  0.019 0.201 
Parental status –0.221 1.274    
Personal status –4.234* 2.008  –4.676 * 1.823 
Years in office –0.002 0.062    
Age 0.068* 0.031  0.068 * 0.032 
Female –0.680 1.322    
        
R2 0.179    0.171   
Observations 100    100   
Parameters 6    3   
Testing-down restriction     F (3, 94) = 0.13 
Notes: Results are based on OLS estimation. White (1980) robust standard errors are reported. 
* and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Table 3 shows the estimates of Equation (9), where the leader variables are inserted directly 
into the dynamic panel model (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Again, we apply a consistent 
general-to-specific reduction approach so as to arrive at a more efficiently estimated model. 
Focusing on the economic variables in the reduced model, we find a counter-cyclical 
movement of the primary deficit. A 1 pp decrease in the real GDP growth rate triggers an 
increase in the deficit-to-GDP ratio of 0.25 pp. The unemployment rate also remains in the 
reduced model, exhibiting a positive sign, but is individually insignificant due to collinearity. 
Only one political variable survives model reduction. Election years are associated with a 
significantly higher deficit-to-GDP ratio than non-election years, providing evidence for the 
existence of political budget cycles in OECD countries. This finding supports the implication 
of political budget cycle theory and thus may be interpreted as evidence for the conjecture that 
political decision-makers are driven by opportunistic motives. Given the short-term nature of 
fiscal manipulation aimed at enhancing re-election prospects, the effect is quite modest: the 
deficit-to-GDP ratio rises by roughly 0.5 pp in election years. 
A glance at the leader variables shows that only personal status remains in the reduced model, 
with the expected negative sign. Comparing leaders who held blue-collar jobs (lower-class 
leaders) to those with an academic background (upper-class leaders), the findings from Table 
14 
3 suggest that the former have a 1 pp higher deficit-to-GDP ratio. In the long-run, this effect 
grows to over 7.5 pp, which is economically substantial. In contrast, a leader’s age exerts no 
statistically significant influence, contradicting the finding from Equation (8). 
 
Table 3: Estimation Results for Equation (9) 
Variables General Model  Reduced Model 
Coefficient Stand. error  Coefficient Stand. error 
Deficit/GDP (-1)  0.819** 0.052  0.871 ** 0.033 
Economic variables        
Real GDP growth –0.242** 0.040  –0.252 ** 0.042 
Unemployment rate 0.016 0.047  0.021 0.034 
Interest/GDP 0.035 0.127    
Log(GDP per capita) –2.042 1.520    
Trade openness 0.008 0.011    
Political variables        
Leftist government  0.047 0.197    
Election year 0.411** 0.106  0.524 ** 0.138 
Gov. fractionalisation  0.218 0.674    
Checks 0.004 0.060    
Allhouse –0.212 0.399    
Maastricht 0.367 0.431    
Demographic variables       
Dependency ratio –0.008 0.022    
Log(Population) 6.009* 2.411  3.952 * 1.975 
Leader variables        
Parental status –0.083 0.448    
Personal status –2.336** 0.908  –1.991 ** 0.752 
Years in office 0.028 0.031    
Age  –0.022 0.016    
Female  0.137 0.564    
Leader transition 0.302 0.214    
        
R2 0.645    0.645   
Observations 503    512   
Parameters 69    55   
Testing-down restriction     χ2(14) = 10.9 
Notes: Results are based on GMM estimation. Lags 2–6 of the dependent variable are used as 
instruments. The models include cross-section and time fixed effects. Panel-robust standard 
errors are reported. * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
In summary, the estimation results of our two alternative specifications suggest that the higher 
the incumbent leader’s personal status, the less the government’s reliance on debt financing. 
This finding supports our hypothesis that leaders of low status are more impatient or debt 
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tolerant and thus run higher government deficits. The effect is not only statistically significant, 
but also economically relevant. However, the point estimates vary considerably across the 
specifications. The average difference between lower-class leaders and their upper-class 
counterparts with respect to the deficit-to-GDP ratio is 1.0 pp or 2.3 pp, depending on the 
estimation strategy. The long-run effects are 4 and 7.5 pp, respectively. Other leader 
characteristics do not reveal a robust impact on the primary deficit. 
 
4.2 Robustness Checks 
We conduct several robustness tests, the detailed results of which are available on request. 
First, we test whether our results are robust to the estimation method. Instead of using a GMM 
approach, we now rely on the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator, which may 
not suffer as much from poor finite sample properties if the number of cross-sections is small 
(Kiviet, 1995). Consistent with results reported by Judson and Owen (1999), we find that 
most coefficients increase when relying on the LSDV estimator. The coefficient of personal 
status, for example, grows to roughly –2.7 but remains significant at the 1% level.10 
Second, we test whether our results are affected by specific individual political leaders or 
countries. We systematically exclude each individual leader and country, respectively, from 
our analysis. Our results remain unchanged. 
Third, we allowed for clustered standard errors at the leader level in the context of LSDV 
models. The impact of political leaders’ status on the public budget deficit remains significant 
at the 1% level. 
Fourth, we investigate whether our results are driven by non-randomly missing data. As 
discussed earlier, we have to estimate unbalanced panel models since data on the deficit-to-
GDP ratio are missing for some countries in certain years. Excluding data on the Greek, 
Japanese, and New Zealand deficit, which are missing for roughly one-third of the sample 
period, reveals that our prior findings do not change notably. 
Fifth, we examine how political constraints affect a leader’s power to influence the public 
deficit. We would expect leader effects to be more pronounced when there are few political 
constraints, as such a situation makes it is easier for the incumbent to pursue his or her 
preferred policies. Investigating this issue, we estimate separate coefficients for country/year-
                                                            
10 We also compute the bias-corrected LSDV (LSDVc) estimator suggested by Bruno (2005) to ensure the 
robustness of our results. The application of the LSDVc estimator requires the choice of a consistent estimator in 
a first-stage regression in order to obtain a bias approximation. We initialise the estimator using the Arellano-
Bond (1991) GMM-approach and base the bias correction on a bias approximation up to order O(1/T). As 
suggested by Kiviet and Bun (2001), the variance-covariance matrix is estimated using a parametric bootstrap 
procedure employing 200 repetitions. Our core result remains remarkably robust: the estimated coefficient of 
personal status is –2.4 and its p-value is 0.02.  
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observations in which there were only few veto players compared to times in which the 
number of veto players was large. For this purpose, we construct two dummy variables 
indicating whether the number of political checks is high or low, respectively.11 We then let 
these dummies interact with the leader characteristics. Results for this modification support 
our intuition: leader effects seem to be more pronounced when veto players are less important. 
The coefficient of personal status is –2.7 if checks are low, compared to –1.9 if checks are 
high.  
Finally, we perform the same exercise for country/year-observations reflecting low or high 
government fractionalisation based on the median of the fractionalisation index. We obtain a 
coefficient for personal status of –3.6 in the case of low government fractionalisation and –1.1 
in case of high government fractionalisation. Thus, we conclude that the influence the head of 
government can exert on the public budget depends on the degree of political dispersion. This 
further supports our conjecture that individual leaders’ policy decisions are important for 
budgetary outcomes. 
 
4.3 Addressing Endogeneity Concerns 
Leader transitions are not random, and the chance of winning high political office is likely 
affected by the aspirant’s characteristics, too (cf. Jones and Olken, 2005). If there are certain 
unobserved factors which are related to the likelihood of taking or staying in office and affect 
the country’s debt performance, then the findings from our basic specifications may be 
biased.12 In this section, we address such endogeneity concerns in two ways. 
First, we combine the two estimation approaches applied in Section 4.1 by including both the 
leader dummies and the leader characteristics in a nested model. This specification allows 
assessing the impact of leader characteristics on the deficit while controlling for any 
unobserved leader-specific characteristics which may be correlated with the status. In Table 4, 
to save space, we report only the estimates of the leader variables. 
Focusing on the leader variables, we find that our previous conclusions remain qualitatively 
unchanged. The point estimate of personal status is slightly smaller than in Table 2, but nearly 
twice the estimate set out in Table 3. This suggests that omitting leader-specific effects results 
in underestimation of the association between leader status and deficit spending. 
                                                            
11 ‘High’ and ‘low’ refers to values above and below the median, respectively.  
12 Another concern is that those who carry people into office (e.g., political officials or swing voters) may select 
a leader of high status if they prefer a lower level of deficit financing and a leader of low status if they prefer 
higher deficits. Note, however, that such a scenario would imply that these people are aware of the relationship 
between status and debt performance, which would further support our hypothesis. 
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Second, we apply an instrumental variable (IV) estimation approach to circumvent any bias 
caused by endogenous leader selection and transition. To this point, all our findings suggest 
that personal status matters, but parental status does not. However, we observe a notable 
correlation between political leaders’ parental and personal status, indicating that status 
inheritance appears to play a role. Future heads of governments who grow up under poor 
socioeconomic conditions are more likely to exhibit impatience or debt tolerance because they 
are more likely to remain in the lower class. Social stratification research suggests that 
parental status is generally a good predictor of personal status (cf. Breen and Jonsson, 2005, 
for a literature overview). Parents’ income, education, and occupation appear to have a great 
influence on their children’s careers and thus their personal status. Taking these 
considerations into account, leaders’ parental status appears to be a good instrument for 
personal status. 
 
Table 4: Combining Specifications (7) and (9) 
Variables Coefficient Stand. error  
Parental status 0.565 1.372  
Personal status –3.716** 1.006  
Years in office 0.143 0.160  
Age  –0.084 0.110  
Female  0.583 0.515  
Leader transition 0.395 0.264  
     
R2 0.757    
Observations 503    
Parameters 171    
Notes: Results are based on GMM estimation. Lags 2–6 of the dependent variable are used as 
instruments. Coefficients of the lagged dependent variable, economic variables, demographic 
variables, political variables, and leader dummies are omitted. The model includes cross-
section and time fixed effects. Panel-robust standard errors are reported. * and ** indicate 
significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Using parental status as an instrument for personal status helps assess the causal impact of 
political leader status on deficit financing. We start from Equation (9), in which the leader 
characteristics are directly inserted into the dynamic panel model, but now use parental status 
as an instrument for personal status. We integrate the instrumental variable approach in our 
dynamic panel GMM estimation by adding GMM-type instruments for personal status. An 
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auxiliary regression of personal status on parental status reveals that parental status is a strong 
instrument for personal status (Staiger and Stock, 1997).13 
 
Table 5: Instrumenting Personal Status by Parental Status 
Variables General Model  Reduced Model 
Coefficient Stand. error  Coefficient Stand. error 
Deficit/GDP (-1)  0.815** 0.055  0.859 ** 0.030
Economic variables        
Real GDP growth –0.245** 0.043 –0.258 ** 0.044
Unemployment rate 0.010 0.051 0.034 0.034
Interest/GDP 0.072 0.144    
Log(GDP per capita) –2.081 1.650    
Trade openness 0.005 0.011    
Political variables        
Leftist government  0.143 0.202    
Election year 0.406** 0.104 0.519 ** 0.137
Gov. fractionalisation  0.391 0.686    
Checks –0.005 0.059    
Allhouse –0.310 0.446    
Maastricht 0.388 0.474    
Demographic variables       
Dependency ratio 0.011 0.020    
Log(Population) 7.040** 2.627 4.704 * 2.128
Leader variables        
Personal status –4.328** 1.458 –3.308 ** 0.901
Years in office 0.037 0.031    
Age  –0.028 0.016    
Female  0.211 0.468    
Leader transition 0.266 0.214    
        
R2 0.642    0.644   
Observations 503    512   
Parameters 68    55   
Testing–down restriction     χ2 (13) = 10.2 
Notes: Results are based on GMM estimation. Lags 2–6 of the dependent variable are used as 
instruments for its first lag, and parental status as an instrument for personal status. The 
models include cross-section and time fixed effects. Panel-robust standard errors are reported. 
* and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Table 5 shows that the negative relation between political leaders’ personal status and 
governments’ deficit-to-GDP ratio remains statistically and economically significant. The 
                                                            
13 Staiger and Stock (1997) propose that an instrument can be considered sufficiently strong if the F-statistic of a 
regression of the instrumented variable (here, personal status) on the instrument (here, parental status) is larger 
than 10. In our case, the F-statistic is 11.5. 
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coefficient of personal status derived from this IV estimation is similar to the point estimate 
set out in Table 4, which indicates that the findings from Table 3 based on Equation (9) are 
biased toward zero. Using the more efficiently estimated coefficients from the reduced model, 
in the short term, the tenures of lower-class leaders are associated with a deficit-to-GDP ratio 
which is 1.6 pp lower than that of upper-class leaders. In the long run, this effect increases to 
almost 12 pp. 
Altogether, it appears that the connection between political leaders’ personal status and public 
deficit is not due to leader selection or transition effects. Neglecting such endogeneity 
concerns may even lead to an underestimation of leader impacts on debt performance. Thus, 
the IV estimation result supports our interpretation of a causal effect running from personal 
status to fiscal policy behaviour. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Political economists typically assume that politicians behave purely opportunistically, in a 
narrow sense, when deciding on fiscal policies. However, several implications derived from 
this conjecture—such as political budget cycle theory or approaches viewing the public 
budget as a common pool resource—find only little empirical support. 
The approach applied in this paper is different. Combining insights provided by sociology 
with economic research on intertemporal decision-making, we draw a connection between 
political leaders’ socioeconomic backgrounds, their time preferences or future orientation, 
respectively, and the public budget balance. We hypothesise that political leaders with low 
socioeconomic status may be more prone to rely on deficit financing. 
We test our hypothesis empirically using data on fiscal deficits from OECD countries over the 
period 1980 to 2008. As fiscal policy decision-makers, we choose the leading politicians of 
these countries, that is, either prime ministers or presidents. The results of our panel analysis 
are theory consistent and suggest that the tenures of lower-class leaders are associated with a 
deficit-to-GDP ratio which is roughly 1.6 percentage points higher than that of upper-class 
leaders. Since our estimations take place in a dynamic model, we can compute the impact in a 
long-run equilibrium: over time, this effect increases to almost 12 percentage points. Thus, the 
impact of personal status on fiscal deficits is not only statistically significant but also 
economically substantial and econometrically robust. Moreover, we find that in political 
systems characterised by stronger constraints on policy-makers in the form of checks and 
balances or government fractionalisation, the impact of personal status on fiscal deficit 
declines. However, it continues to be statistically significant and economically relevant. 
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We interpret our findings as a causal relationship, as we start from a clearly formulated theory 
to the empirically testable hypothesis. This interpretation is further supported by estimates 
based on instrumenting the personal status variable, which could be endogenous, by parental 
status, which, almost by definition, cannot be linked to current fiscal deficits and is, therefore, 
uncorrelated with the error term. If anything, instrumenting personal background increases its 
impact on fiscal deficits. 
Our findings contribute to a growing branch in the economics literature showing that political 
leaders can have a significant influence on their countries’ economic performances. Given 
that our results are much stronger than those derived by applying common economic models 
of behaviour suggests that economics may benefit from integrating social science research. 
For example, in the area of behavioural economics, where economists have already started 
incorporating psychological research, the result has been that we now have a much better 
understanding of economic behaviour. Given the size of the field, there is as yet very little 
economic research utilising insights from sociology, and this primarily involves literature on 
happiness (for a survey, see Frey and Stutzer, 2002) or the ‘identity economics’ approach put 
forward by Akerlof and Kranton (2000). The results presented in this paper suggest that 
integrating sociological research into an analysis of economic problems has the potential to 
improve our explanations of important real-world phenomena. 
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Appendix 
Data Availability, Description, Descriptive Statistics, and Sources 
Table A1: Availability of Data on the Primary Deficit in Relation to GDP. 
Country Years with missing data 
Australia — 
Austria — 
Belgium — 
Canada 1980–1989 
Denmark — 
Finland — 
France 1998 
Germany — 
Greece 1991–2000 
Ireland 1998 
Italy 1981–1985, 1990–1994 
Luxembourg 1998 
Japan 1994–2004 
Netherlands — 
New Zealand 1989–2001 
Norway — 
Portugal 1991–1998 
Spain 1998 
Sweden — 
UK — 
USA — 
Data source: IMF Government Finance Statistics (online edition). 
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Table A2: Descriptive Statistics. 
Variable # Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Deficit/GDP 523 1.76 4.52 –20.00 22.88 
Real GDP growth 588 2.69 2.13 –5.98 11.49 
Unemployment rate 588 7.33 3.76 1.02 24.12 
Interest/GDP 542 3.49 2.33 0.10 11.87 
Log(GDP per capita) 588 10.20 0.30 9.27 11.41 
Trade openness 588 65.87 49.20 11.75 324.31 
Leftist government 588 0.41 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Election year 588 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Gov. fractionalisation 588 0.27 0.26 0.00 0.83 
Checks 587 4.37 1.42 2.00 16.00 
Allhouse 582 0.21 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Maastricht 588 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Dependency ratio 588 50.29 3.97 43.08 69.51 
Log(Population) 588 16.55 1.46 12.81 19.53 
Parental status 588 0.57 0.21 0.17 0.90 
Personal status 588 0.73 0.12 0.29 0.85 
Years in office 588 4.29 3.16 0.00 16.00 
Age 588 56.58 8.10 38.00 86.00 
Female 588 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Leader transition 588 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
 
 
Economic Variables 
Data on the primary deficit and interest payments are from the IMF’s Government Finance 
Statistics (online edition). Data on real GDP growth, unemployment rate, and interest 
payments are from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database. Real per capita GDP (in 
purchasing power parities) and trade openness are taken from the Penn World Tables. 
 
Political Variables 
Data on most political variables are from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI; cf. Beck 
et al., 2001). 
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The variable Leftist government is based on the DPI variable EXECRLC. Leftist government 
takes the value 1 if EXECRLC is equal to 3 (i.e., the party of the prime minister or president is 
leftist), and 0 otherwise. 
The variable Election year corresponds to the DPI variable LEGELEC (i.e., dummy for years 
in which legislative elections took place) if a country’s political system is a parliamentary one. 
In presidential systems, it corresponds to the DPI variable EXELEC (i.e., years in which 
executive elections took place). 
Government fractionalisation corresponds to the DPI variable GOVFRAC and equals the 
probability that two deputies picked at random from among the government parties will be of 
different parties. 
Checks corresponds to the DPI variable CHECKS. It accounts for the competitiveness of 
legislative and executive elections as well as for the number of veto players within a 
government (the higher the value of CHECKS, the greater the dispersion of political power). 
The variable Allhouse corresponds to the DPI variable ALLHOUSE. It takes the value 1 if the 
party of the executive controls all houses that have law-making powers. 
 
Demographic Variables 
All demographic variables are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
 
Leader Variables 
Information on political leaders’ age, years in office, and year of entering office are identified 
using the Archigos dataset of political leaders (cf. Goemans et al., 2009). 
Information on political leaders’ occupational histories as well as the occupational histories of 
their parents comes mainly from the online edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica and the 
Munzinger Online biography. Both provide brief biographies of public figures, especially 
politicians. In a few cases, we also rely on information provided on personal homepages of 
(former) political leaders or other online sources. 
The variable Parental status measures the occupational status score of political leaders’ 
parents. To construct this variable, we coded the occupations of political leaders’ parents 
according to the ISCO–68 and then applied the ISEI scores. When both parents were working 
or when a parent engaged in than one occupation during his or her career, we decided to 
employ the highest ISEI score. In cases where a political leader was raised entirely by one 
parent only (due to divorce or death of the other parent), we decided to take only the status 
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score of that parent into account. Moreover, we do not differentiate between biological and 
stepparents. 
For the variable Personal status, we focus on the positions political leaders held before 
embarking on a political career, which we defined as first membership in a party executive 
committee or ministry. In cases where political leaders engaged in more than one occupation 
during their career, we chose the occupation with the highest ISEI score. 
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Table A3: Hypothetical Deficit-to-GDP Ratios for Political Leaders (a lower Rank indicates lower Deficits) 
Leader Legislation period 
Debt–
propensity 
National 
Rank 
Global 
Rank 
 Leader Legislation period 
Debt–
propensity 
National 
Rank 
Global 
Rank 
Australia  Denmark (cont.) 
Keating 1991–96 0.4 1 76  Rasmussen A.F. 2001–09 –2.6 3 91 
Hawke 1983–91 –0.5 2 81  Schlüter 1982–93 –4.2 4 95 
Howard 1996–07 –0.9 3 85       
Fraser 1975–83 –2.2 4 87  France 
      Mitterand 1981–95 4.0 1 25 
Austria  Chirac 1995–07 3.8 2 27 
Sinowatz 1983–86 5.2 1 11  Sarkozy 2007–12 3.4 3 34 
Klima 1997–00 4.3 2 22  d’Estaing 1974–81 2.7 4 49 
Vranitzky 1986–97 4.3 3 23       
Kreisky 1970–83 3.6 4 28  Finland 
Schüssel 2000–07 3.4 5 33  Sorsa 1982–87 1.9 1 58 
Gusenbauer 2007–08 3.0 6 44  Holkeri 1987–91 1.1 2 69 
      Aho 1991–95 0.8 3 75 
Belgium  Koivisto 1979–82 0.2 4 79 
Martens 1979–92 6.0 1 4  Lipponen 1995–03 –2.1 5 86 
Verhofstadt 1999–08 5.0 2 15  Vanhanen 2003–10 –2.2 6 88 
Dehaene 1992–99 4.4 3 21       
      Germany 
Canada  Schröder 1998–05 2.8 1 47 
Chretién 1993–03 1.8 1 60  Kohl 1982–98 2.2 2 56 
Martin 2003–06 1.6 2 62  Schmidt 1974–82 1.8 3 59 
Mulroney 1984–93 1.0 3 71  Merkel 2005–today 1.2 4 67 
           
Denmark  Greece 
Jørgensen 1975–82 –0.2 1 80  Zolotas 1989–90 8.6 1 3 
Rasmussen P.N. 1993–01 –0.8 2 84  Papandreou A. 1981–89, 1993–96 5.7 2 7 
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Table A3 (continued) 
Leader Legislation period 
Debt-
propensity 
National 
Rank 
Global 
Rank 
 Leader Legislation period 
Debt–
propensity 
National 
Rank 
Global 
Rank 
Greece (cont.)  Japan (cont.) 
Rallis 1980–81 4.6 3 19  Abe 2006–07 5.5 2 9 
Karamanlis K. 2004–09 2.4 4 54  Takeshita 1987–89 5.3 3 10 
Simitis 1996–04 1.6 5 63  Suzuki 1980–82 5.0 4 14 
      Fukuda Y. 2007–08 3.9 5 26 
Ireland  Kaifu 1989–90 3.2 6 40 
Ahern 1997–08 10.0 1 1  Koizumi 2001–06 3.1 7 43 
Bruton 1994–97 5.9 2 5       
FitzGerald 1981–87 3.0 3 46  Netherlands 
Reynolds 1992–94 2.2 4 57  Kok 1994–02 4.7 1 18 
Haughey 1987–92 1.5 5 64  Lubbers 1982–94 3.3 2 39 
      Balkenende 2002–10 3.2 3 41 
Italy  van Agt 1977–82 2.8 4 48 
Craxi 1983–87 9.0 1 2       
De Mita 1988–89 4.7 2 17  New Zealand 
Goria 1987–88 3.5 3 31  Muldoon 1975–84 4.6 1 20 
Berlusconi 1994–95, 2001–06 3.4 4 35  Lange 1984–89 3.6 2 29 
D’Alema 1998–00 3.3 5 38  Clark 1999–08 0.8 3 74 
Prodi 1996–98, 2006–08 3.1 6 42       
      Norway 
Luxembourg  Brundtland 1986–89, 1990–96 –2.2 1 89 
Juncker 1995–today –2.4 1 90  Jagland 1996–97 –4.1 2 94 
Santer 1984–95 –3.3 2 92  Syse 1989–90 –4.5 3 96 
Werner 1979–84 –4.0 3 93  Willoch 1981–86 –5.5 4 97 
      Nordli 1976–81 –6.8 5 98 
Japan  Bondevik 1997–00, 01–05 –6.9 6 99 
Nakasone 1982–87 5.6 1 8  Stoltenberg 2000–01,05–today –10.5 7 100 
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Table A3 (continued) 
Leader Legislation period 
Debt–
propensity 
National 
Rank 
Global 
Rank 
 Leader Legislation period 
Debt–
propensity 
National 
Rank 
Global 
Rank 
Portugal  Sweden (cont.) 
Lopes 2004–05 5.1 1 13  Palme 1982–86 3.0 2 45 
Guterres 1995–02 4.9 2 16  Fälldin 1979–82 1.7 3 61 
Sócrates 2005–11 3.6 3 30  Persson 1996–06 1.0 4 70 
Soares 1983–85 3.4 4 37  Carlsson 1986–91, 1994–96 0.3 5 78 
Barroso 2002–04 2.4 5 53  Reinfeldt 2006–today –0.6 6 82 
Silva 1985–95 1.5 6 65       
Balsemão 1981–83 0.9 7 72  UK 
      Blair 1997–07 2.6 1 51 
Spain  Major 1990–97 2.4 2 55 
Rodríguez Zap. 2004–11 5.9 1 6  Thatcher 1979–90 –0.6 3 83 
Aznar 1996–04 5.2 2 12       
Calvo–Sotelo 1981–82 3.5 3 32  USA 
González 1982–96 3.4 4 36  Bush Jr. 2001–09 2.6 1 50 
Suárez 1976–81 2.5 5 52  Clinton 1993–01 1.3 2 66 
      Reagan 1981–89 1.2 3 68 
Sweden  Bush Sr. 1989–93 0.9 4 73 
Bildt 1991–94 4.3 1 24       
Notes: The debt-propensity score is the hypothetical deficit-to-GDP ratio a leader would have been expected to run if his or her country was facing 
average economic, political, and demographic conditions during his or her incumbency. The global rank refers to a leader’s debt propensity 
compared to all other political leaders, i.e., 1 means the leader is the most debt-tolerant leader in our sample, 100 that the leader is the most debt-
averse one. The national rank refers to a leader’s debt propensity compared to the other leaders in his or her country. 
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Do Businessmen make Good Governors? 
 
Abstract 
This paper empirically evaluates the economic performance of U.S. state governors with a 
business background, focusing on their influence on the growth rate of real personal income 
per capita and the unemployment rate. Methodologically, we apply nearest neighbor matching 
to account for the endogeneity of political selection. We identify credible counterfactuals for 
CEO governors, i.e. governors without a business background who took office under similar 
economic and fiscal situations. We find, first, that business persons tend to take office in 
times of economic pressure and fiscal strain. Second, tenures of CEO governors are 
associated with a 0.8 percentage point higher annual income growth rate and a 0.6 percentage 
point lower unemployment rate than tenures of non-CEO governors. Third, the positive effect 
of having a CEO governor increases with her time in office. Fourth, politically inexperienced 
CEO governors perform slightly better than their politically experienced colleagues. 
 
Keywords: U.S. Governors, U.S. politics, U.S. states, economic growth, unemployment, 
businessmen, CEO, nearest neighbor matching.  
JEL:  C21, E24, E60, O47  
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1. Introduction 
The typical high-ranking U.S. politician holds a law degree, turned to politics at a rather 
young age, and successively climbed the political career ladder. Ten out of the past 20 U.S. 
presidents, 55 out of 100 current U.S. senators, and 21 out of 50 current state governors are 
law graduates with extensive public sector experience and almost no private sector practice 
(as of mid-2014).1 From time to time, though, business persons who made a fortune in the 
private sector enter the political stage and become elected to high political offices. Mitt 
Romney, cofounder of the private equity firm Bain Capital and former governor of 
Massachusetts, Jon Corzine, former CEO of Goldman Sachs and later U.S. senator as well as 
governor of New Jersey, and current Florida governor Rick Scott, formerly CEO of 
Columbia/HCA, the largest private health care company in the U.S.A., are only a few 
examples. 
The opinions about business persons in politics are divided, though. In the aftermath of the 
recent global financial and economic crisis, the idea to leave politics in the hands of 
economics and business experts in order to boost the economy has gained popularity. The 
‘technocrats’ Mario Monti, who became prime minister of Italy in 2011, and Lucas 
Papademos, who was elected prime minister in Greece in the same year, may serve as 
prominent examples. With regard to the U.S., the public dispute seemed to have reached a 
climax in 2012 after the Republican National Convention’s nomination of Mitt Romney as 
candidate for the presidency. In their political campaigns, business person candidates refer 
heavily to their business background and private sector success arguing that the skills and 
experiences they acquired will make them successful in politics as well. However, their critics 
argue that these candidates neglect exactly that promise by referring to the examples of 
former businessmen and U.S. Presidents Warren G. Harding, Herbert Hoover, and George W. 
Bush who are believed to have steered the U.S. economy into crises. To date, though, the 
performance of business persons in U.S. politics has not been studied empirically. 
This paper aims at filling this gap by investigating the impact U.S. state governors with a 
business background–to which we refer to as CEO governors–exert on a state’s economic 
performance. In particular, we focus on the influence CEO governors exert on a state’s 
growth rate of real personal income per capita as well as on the unemployment rate. For this 
purpose, we collected a dataset containing information on the occupational backgrounds of 
                                                        
1 According to Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011), this appears to be a global rather than a U.S. phenomenon, as 
between 1848 and 2004, roughly 30% of all democratic leaders were law graduates. 
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the governors of 48 states between 1960 and 2010. Our analysis covers 446 U.S. state 
governors of which 50 were business persons before taking up politics. 
With respect to the empirical approach, the biggest challenge is related to the political 
selection process. Governors are selected in several stages, as they first compete against 
fellow party members in primaries and then against one or more opponents from different 
parties in the gubernatorial election. It seems rather unlikely that the chances of taking office 
are unrelated to a candidate’s characteristics. For instance, both the pool of candidates as well 
as voters’ choice between particular candidates with certain characteristics and experiences 
may depend on a state’s economic situation. In econometric terms, the election of a candidate 
of a certain ‘type’ is likely endogenous. 
To solve the identification problem we rely on a nearest neighbor matching approach, which 
is frequently applied to study the outcome after some sort of intervention or treatment when 
units are not randomly assigned to the treatment group.2 The intuition behind nearest neighbor 
matching is to mimic randomization with respect to selection into treatment by constructing a 
control group which is as similar as possible, regarding all relevant characteristics, to the units 
exposed to treatment. These nearest neighbors represent credible counterfactuals for the 
treated units. In our analysis we consider the tenure of a CEO governor as a treatment; 
accordingly, state-year observations in which a CEO governor holds office represent the 
treatment group. In order to disentangle the treatment effect from the selection effect, we 
match CEO governors with non-CEO governors with similar characteristics and who took 
office under comparable conditions.3 
Our paper contributes to two strands in the economic literature. First, we contribute to a 
growing branch of empirical economic studies which examine the influence that heads of 
governments exert on a country’s economic and political performance. Following the work by 
Jones and Olken (2005), who investigate the association between exogenous leader 
transitions–i.e. leader transitions due to natural death of the incumbent–and countries’ GDP 
growth rates, economists have detected relationships between various characteristics depicting 
the incumbent political leader and their policy stance. Besley et al. (2011), for instance, find 
that tenures of more educated leaders are associated with higher GDP growth rates, using the 
                                                        
2 Some empirical economic studies applying matching estimators are briefly described in Caliendo and Kopeinig 
(2008). 
3 Matching approaches are applied in similar contexts by Neuenkirch and Tillmann (2013) as well as 
Malmendier and Tate (2009). Neuenkirch and Tillmann (2013) study the influence of central bankers receiving 
top grades by the international financial press on a country’s output and inflation. Malmendier and Tate (2009) 
analyze the impact award winning CEOs have on firm performance. 
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same identification strategy as put forward by Jones and Olken (2005).4 Other studies 
document relationships between leaders’ educational and occupational backgrounds on the 
one hand and fiscal policies (e.g., Hayo and Neumeier, 2014, 2013, 2012) as well as 
countries’ constitutional and institutional frameworks (Hayo and Voigt, 2013; Dreher et al., 
2009) on the other hand.5 However, these approaches typically neglect the possibility that the 
selection of a leader of a particular ‘type’ may be related to a country’s economic and political 
situation.6 Our analysis differs from the aforementioned studies mainly in that we take the 
endogeneity of leader selection seriously. Unlike most of the works listed, we explicitly 
account for the fact that characteristics depicting a political leader are related to (economic) 
conditions current before the leader took office.  
Second, by accounting for the endogeneity of electoral choices and by relating the ‘type’ of 
governor to a state’s economic and fiscal situation, we contribute to the literature on political 
selection. This literature strand comprises both theoretical (e.g., Besley and Coate, 1997; 
Caselli and Morelli, 2004) and empirical analyses (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999; Besley and 
Reynal-Querol, 2011) that study how institutional and political features affect the quality of 
elected politicians. In this regard, our paper relates to recent work by Gehlbach et al. (2010) 
and Li et al. (2006) who examine the influence of political as well as market-supporting 
institutions like, for instance, government transparency, media freedom, and market 
regulation on participation of businessmen in Russian and Chinese politics, respectively. 
However, as our objects of analyses–i.e. the U.S. states–are characterized by strong and 
homogenous institutional frameworks and credible legal systems, we focus primarily on 
economic and fiscal variables to explore under which conditions voters may prefer business 
person candidates over career politicians. 
Our main findings are as follows. First, descriptive statistics suggest that business person 
candidates take office especially during times of economic pressure and fiscal strain. More 
precisely, CEO governors tend to become elected when income growth rates are particularly 
low, unemployment is high, and the level of public debt as well as the state’s reliance on 
deficit spending is large. Second, we find that CEO governors exert a statistically significant 
and economically relevant impact on a state’s economy. Incumbencies of CEO governors are 
                                                        
4 However, whereas the timing of leader transitions caused by the incumbent’s natural death are exogenous 
without much doubt, the characteristics of a deceased leader’s successor may not be, casting doubt on the 
validity of this identification strategy in this particular context. 
5 Another literature strand investigates the association between characteristics of central bankers and their 
monetary policy stance. See, for instance, Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2013) and Göhlmann and Vaubel (2007). 
6 An exception is the study by Hayo and Neumeier (2013), who examine the influence of political leaders’ social 
status on public deficits in a sample of OECD countries using the social status of leaders’ parents as an 
instrument. 
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associated with a 0.8 percentage point (pp) higher annual growth rate of personal income per 
capita and a 0.6 pp lower unemployment rate. Third, our results indicate that the positive 
influence of CEO governors increases over their tenure. Forth, we find that political novices, 
i.e. CEO governors who have never held a political office before, perform slightly better than 
politically experienced CEO governors. Tenures of novices are associated with an annual 
income growth rate which is roughly 0.4 pp larger as compared to tenures of politically 
experienced CEO governors and about 1.1 pp larger as compared to governors without a 
business background. Our results remain robust when excluding the best performing 
governors from our sample and when several modifications to our empirical approach are 
applied. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes to what extent 
business person candidates differ from career politicians and why CEO governors can be 
expected to make any difference at all. For this purpose we discuss some anecdotal evidence 
and show some stylized facts. In Section 3, we introduce our data, explain and motivate our 
empirical approach, present the results of our empirical analysis, and test the robustness of our 
empirical findings. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Can businessmen make good governors? Some considerations and stylized facts 
There is growing economic literature on political selection which studies how political 
structures and institutional features, for instance, affect the quality of elected politicians. This 
strand of literature is committed to the idea that the quality of politicians is key to a country’s 
economic success. As Besley (2005: 44) put it: “Almost every major episode of economic 
change […] has been associated with key personalities coming to power with a commitment 
to these changes.”  
Empirical findings appear to support this conjecture. The empirical economic literature has 
only recently started to analyse the influence of policy-makers on a country’s economic 
performance, providing strong evidence that the identity of a political leader matters. In a 
large sample of countries, Jones and Olken (2005) find that exogenous leader transitions, i.e. 
transitions due to the natural death of the incumbent, are associated with significant changes 
in GDP growth rates. The literature that followed focused on particular characteristics of 
political leaders as potential correlates of their quality or policy stance, respectively. For 
instance, Besley et al. (2011) find that a leader’s educational attainment is significantly 
related to GDP growth, i.e. the more educated a leader is, the stronger a country’s economic 
growth.   
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Can business persons be expected to make a difference when elected as governors? One 
argument in favour of this notion is that previous private sector success indicates a governor’s 
quality, which would imply that success in the private sector carries over to politics.7 The 
skills and experiences gathered in the business world, their connections to the business 
community as well as their expertise in managing businesses and practical economic 
knowledge may enable CEO governors to improve the efficiency of economic policies and to 
create an environment that attracts new businesses and jobs and in which the state’s economy 
can prosper. Moreover, business persons, by reputation and experience, may be able to 
commit to economic reforms more credibly than any ‘career politician’ is able to. In fact, their 
expertise appears to be an omnipresent theme in the political campaigns of business person 
candidates; they often try to create a Midas-like image, asserting that they can turn anything 
they touch into success. 
 
Being a successful CEO, where I’ve driven a bottom line, assembled teams, 
driven results, that’s a critical benefit to running the state government. A CEO’s 
job is leadership, problem solving, and team building. I’ve done that my whole 
career. 
Bruce Rauner, elected Governor of Illinois in 2014 
 
Our economy is in shambles and there is no doubt we are heading in the wrong 
direction. The economic problems in this state started long before the economic 
meltdown hitting the rest of this country due, in large part, to the lack of 
leadership and vision of the professional politicians in Lansing. 
Rick Snyder, Governor of Michigan since 2011 
 
I want to get Arizona back on top again in the next few years. I maintain that the 
skills that it takes to do that, to be a good chief executive officer, are found in the 
private sector, not in the ranks of the professional politicians. 
J. Fife Symington III, Governor of Arizona from 1991 until 1997 
 
Arguably, business person candidates do not only differ from career politicians with respect 
to their professional background, but also with regard to their policy objectives and their 
degree of political independence. As the quotes indicate, business persons also refer to their 
extensive private sector expertise in order to dissociate themselves from the political elite. 
Likewise, when running for political offices, candidates with a business background tend to 
rely on party networks to a much lesser extent than career politicians and often even lack 
support from political parties throughout the primaries. Rick Scott, who was elected Governor 
of Florida in 2010, for example, only narrowly won the Republican primaries against Bill 
                                                        
7 Mattozzi and Merlo (2008), for example, set up a dynamic equilibrium model to evaluate the career paths of 
politicians, presuming that market ability and political skills are positively correlated. 
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McCollum, former member of the U.S. House of Representatives for the Republican party 
and Attorney General of Florida, despite the fact that the Florida Republican elite “rallied to 
repel”8 Scott’s bid. Rick Snyder, Governor of Michigan since 2010, is believed to have won 
the Republican primaries only because he had Democrats and Independents voting for him. 
The reasons could be related to the incentives party leaders may have. The literature on 
political selection assumes that the party elite is primarily concerned about maximizing its 
own power and, thus, prefers obedient candidates with a strong ideological leaning (Galasso 
and Nannicini, 2011; Besley, 2005).9 On the contrary, as they are ‘socialized’ in the business 
world, business persons may be committed to economic imperatives rather than ideologies. In 
fact, candidates with a business background typically campaign intensively on economic 
issues and appear to pay only little attention to topics with ideological connotations. Spurring 
the economy, creating jobs, and improving public sector efficiency are often the main themes 
of their political campaigns. 
In addition, business person candidates often make use of their private fortunes and, to a 
large extent, self-finance their political campaigns. For instance, Meg Whitman, Republican 
gubernatorial candidate for California in 2010, spent $140 million of her private funds on her 
political campaign with total funds amounting to $177 million. Rick Scott spent about $60 
million of his own funds in Florida in 2010 (total: $67 million); Jon Corzine $38 million in 
New Jersey in 2006 (total: $45 million); Dick DeVos $35 million in Michigan in 2006 (total: 
$42 million).10 In consideration of the role of campaign contributions as a potential vehicle 
for special interest groups to wield political influence, one could be tempted to conclude that 
the election of a CEO governor minimizes the danger of state politics being in the hands of 
lobbyists and rent-seekers. Both economists and political scientists view campaign funds as a 
form of investment for which the investor expects a favour in exchange (e.g., Coate, 2004; 
Snyder, 1990; Welch, 1974). Given the detrimental economic impact rent-seeking activities 
and special interest group oriented policies are believed to have (e.g., Becker, 1983; Murphy 
et al., 1993), the excessive reliance on self-financing may be a strong credential. 
                                                        
8 The quote is taken from an online article published by the Orlando Sentinal. See 
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2010-08-25/news/os-gop-gubernatorial-primary-results-20100824_1_rick-
scott-high-unfavorable-ratings-primary-fight (accessed on 11/13/2014). 
9 Besley (2005: 56) notes that “[i]n many party structures, candidate selection is structured to maximize the 
power of party elites, with candidate selection being a highly secretive procedure where personal connections 
could play a large role. This process could allow bad candidates, intent on using political office for private ends, 
to use their influence”. 
10 Detailed figures on campaign contributions for gubernatorial candidates are provided by the National Institute 
on Money in State Politics. See http://www.followthemoney.org/ (accessed on 11/13/2014). 
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However, as it concerns both the quality and independence of CEO governors, there may be 
opposing views as well. When business persons try to wield political influence from a 
backseat, e.g. via campaign contributions and party donations, they are thought to primarily 
have their own welfare or the benefit of their business in mind (e.g., Snyder, 1990; Welch, 
1974). Accordingly, taking a high political office may be just another way for an 
opportunistic business person to extract political rents and to ensure a favourable policy 
stance, which could or could not be for the benefit of the whole business community and a 
state’s economy. Also, CEO governors likely maintain connections to former fellows in the 
business community, fostering the establishment of informal ties between politics and the 
business world. Hence, when having a governor with a business background, the 
independence of politics from the influence of special interest groups may be rather more at 
risk than guarded. However, the considerations by Gehlbach et al. (2010) and Fisman et al. 
(2012) cast doubt on this view. Gehlbach et al. (2010) argue that in mature democracies, the 
incentives for business persons to run for public office in order to extract rents are small due 
to the high levels of government transparency and accountability. Fisman et al. (2012) 
estimate the market valuation of personal ties to former U.S. Vice-President Richard Cheney, 
who served as CEO of the oil service company Halliburton before becoming Vice-President, 
to be zero, concluding that institutions are effective in impeding rent-seeking activities in U.S. 
politics. 
Moreover, business person candidates’ lack of political experience may be disadvantageous, 
as the ‘art’ of policy-making differs from the ‘art’ of running a business. Companies are 
hierarchical organizations in which CEOs can issue directives and expect them to be carried 
out by subordinates. The power of a governor, however, faces many constraints. Governors 
need to form majorities and cope with diverging interests and different ideological leanings. 
Thus, even if a CEO governor may have favourable qualities, it is not sure that she can 
overcome political obstacles and impose her preferred policies. As Jon Corzine, former CEO 
of Goldman Sachs and Governor of New Jersey from 2006 to 2010 put it: “The idea that 
you’re accountable to a bottom line and to a payroll in managing a business–it gives voters 
the confidence that you have the right skills. But it’s 20,000 people versus 9 million. I don’t 
think candidates get the scale and scope of what governing is. […] There’s no exact 
translation”. 
Interestingly, recent experience suggests that candidates with a business background find it 
easier to be elected to political offices during times of economic pressure. Mitt Romney, 
Governor of Massachusetts between 2003 and 2007, Philip Bredesen, Governor of Tennessee 
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between 2003 and 2011, Jack Markell, Governor of Delaware since 2009, and Rick Snyder, 
Governor of Michigan since 2011, are only a few examples of business persons who took the 
Governor’s office at the peak of a fiscal or economic crisis. Arguably, during times of fiscal 
strain and economic hardship, frustration about career politicians may be high and the 
distinguished skills and experiences business persons have may appeal to voters. 
Figures 1 and 2 provide descriptive statistical evidence that CEO governors indeed make a 
difference. The figures show average growth rates of real personal income per capita (Figure 
1) and the unemployment rate (Figure 2), respectively, during incumbencies of CEO 
governors, their predecessors, and successors, as well as during tenures of all non-CEO 
governors. Moreover, the figures contain overall national income growth and unemployment 
rates over the same period in which CEO governors, their predecessors, and successors held 
office, which allows us to compare their performance with the national average. 
 
Figure 1: Average annual growth rates of real personal income per capita in U.S. states during 
incumbencies of CEO governors, their predecessors, and successors (1960–2010). 
 
 
Figure 2: Average unemployment rates in U.S. states during incumbencies of CEO governors, 
their predecessors, and successors (1977–2010).  
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The figures reveal some interesting stylized facts. First, on average, there are only negligible 
differences between the tenures of CEO governors and those of all non-CEO governors with 
regard to income growth and unemployment. Second, the growth rate of real personal income 
per capita is somewhat larger in states in which a CEO governor holds office, whereas the 
unemployment rate is notably lower, as compared to the national figures over the same 
period. The difference is 0.32 pp with respect to the growth rate and 0.25 pp with regard to 
the unemployment rate. Third, CEO governors perform remarkably better than their 
predecessors, as the income growth rate is 0.4 pp larger and the unemployment rate 0.41 pp 
lower during tenures of business persons. Also, incumbencies of CEO governors’ 
predecessors are associated with lower income growth rates as compared to the national 
growth rate (difference: 0.18 pp). These findings are in line with the notion that business 
persons may have better chances of being elected during times of economic pressure. 
 
3. Do businessmen make good governors? 
3.1. Data and empirical approach 
The aim of this paper is to study whether CEO governors exert a positive impact on a state’s 
economic performance. The performance measures considered in this paper are a state’s (i) 
annual growth rate of real personal income per capita and (ii) its unemployment rate (both in 
percentage points). The problem is that the election of a CEO governor is, in econometric 
terms, most likely endogenous. As anecdotal evidence and stylized facts presented in Section 
2 suggest, the likelihood that a business person becomes governor may be related to a state’s 
economic and fiscal situation. 
Our analysis is based on the idea that the incumbency of a CEO governor can be considered 
as a treatment. The units of analysis are state-year observations; state-year observations with 
CEO governors represent the treatment group, while observations without CEO governors 
represent a potential control group. The measure of interest is the so-called average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT), which is defined as follows: 
ሺ1ሻ ߬஺்் ൌ ܧሾܻሺ1ሻ|ܶ ൌ 1ሿ െ ܧሾܻሺ0ሻ|ܶ ൌ 1ሿ 
where ܻሺ∙ሻ is the outcome variable, i.e. the growth rate of real personal income per capita or 
the unemployment rate, and ܶ is a variable indicating whether a unit is exposed to treatment 
(ܶ ൌ 1) or not (ܶ ൌ 0). Accordingly, ܧሾܻሺ1ሻ|ܶ ൌ 1ሿ is the expected outcome after treatment 
and ܧሾܻሺ0ሻ|ܶ ൌ 1ሿ the counterfactual outcome, i.e. the outcome a unit exposed to treatment 
would have achieved if it had not received treatment. As the counterfactual outcome is not 
observable, ones needs a proper substitute for it to identify the ATT. If the treatment is 
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randomly assigned, the average outcome of units not exposed to treatment represents a 
suitable substitute. However, as discussed before, electing a CEO governor and, thus, 
selection into treatment could be endogenous.  
To solve the identification problem, we rely on a nearest neighbor matching approach. The 
idea of nearest neighbor matching is to mimic randomization with regard to the assignment of 
the treatment and control group. The missing counterfactual outcome is imputed by matching 
the treated units with untreated units which are as similar as possible with regard to relevant 
characteristics. All pre-treatment characteristics which (i) are associated with selection into 
treatment and (ii) influence the outcome of interest are relevant. The realisations of the 
outcome variables of these nearest neighbors are then used as an empirical proxy for the 
counterfactual. 
Formally, the estimate of the ATT based on nearest neighbor matching is defined as 
follows: 
ሺ2ሻ ߬̂஺்்ሺݔሻ ൌ ܧሾܻሺ1ሻ|ܶ ൌ 1, ܺ ൌ ݔሿ െ ܧሾܻሺ0ሻ|ܶ ൌ 0, ܺ ൌ ݔሿ 
where ݔ is a vector of relevant pre-treatment characteristics, ܧሾܻሺ1ሻ|ܶ ൌ 1, ܺ ൌ ݔሿ the 
expected outcome for the units that received treatment, and ܧሾܻሺ0ሻ|ܶ ൌ 0, ܺ ൌ ݔሿ the 
expected outcome for the treated units’ nearest neighbors. The nearest neighbors are 
determined using a distance measure which is a weighted function of the covariates contained 
in the vector ݔ. The distance between any two units i and j is calculated as follows: 
ฮݔ௜ െ ݔ௝ฮ ൌ ሾ൫ݔ௜ െ ݔ௝൯ᇱܵିଵ൫ݔ௜ െ ݔ௝൯ሿଵ ଶൗ  
where ܵ is a scaling matrix used to standardize the realisations of the covariates. 
Applied to the topic of the paper at hand, the intuition behind nearest neighbor matching is 
to compare the performance of CEO governors to that of non-CEO governors who took office 
under similar conditions. The average difference in performance between CEO governors and 
the ‘nearest’ non-CEO governors must then be due to treatment, i.e. the incumbency of a 
business person as governor. In this sense, the empirical approach mimics a randomized 
experiment by balancing the treatment and the control group according to observable 
characteristics. Another advantage of the nearest neighbor matching approach is that it is non-
parametric in that no empirical model for either the outcome or selection into treatment needs 
to be specified. Thus, potential types of misspecification like those, for instance, regarding the 
empirical model’s functional form which likely leads to biased estimates, are ruled out. The 
price of this flexibility is that, if more than one continuous covariate is used for matching, the 
estimate of the ATT is √݊-consistent only if a bias adjustment is applied (Abadie and Imbens, 
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2006, 2011). We apply nearest neighbor matching with replacement meaning that an 
untreated unit can be used multiple times as a match, which improves the quality of the 
matching (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). 
In our analysis we consider the following pre-treatment characteristics.11 As economic 
variables, we include real per capita personal income (in US-$) as well as the share of 
personal income from different sources to account for a state’s economic structure, i.e. (i) 
personal income from farming, (ii) personal income from mining (coal, gas, oil, and other 
natural resources) to control for states’ abundances of natural resources, and (iii) personal 
income from government transfers to assess the population’s dependence on the government. 
Further, we include the average growth rate of personal income per capita during the tenure of 
the incumbent’s predecessor when estimating the ATT for personal income growth and the 
average unemployment rate during the predecessor’s incumbency when estimating the ATT 
for unemployment, respectively. Further, we employ several fiscal variables, namely state 
government spending on education and capital outlays, as these spending categories are 
typically considered as particularly productive and growth promoting, as well as the level of 
public debt, public borrowing, and tax revenues. All fiscal variables are standardized by 
dividing them by the state level of personal income (in $1,000). We also control for state 
population. All economic and fiscal variables as well as population figures refer to the year 
before a governor took office which typically corresponds to the election year, at least when a 
governor took office by regular means, and remain constant throughout the incumbency of a 
particular governor.12 Thus, our covariates depict the information set voters had when 
gubernatorial elections were held and on which their electoral choice might be based.  
Moreover, we add several variables depicting the incumbent governor. We include a 
dummy which takes the value 1 for democratic governors (0 otherwise) and control for the 
governor’s age and years in office. These variables increase the likelihood that a CEO 
governor is matched with a non-CEO governor from the same party, of similar age, and who 
has already spent a similar amount of time in office. Also, we employ a dummy variable 
which takes the value 1 if the incumbent governor is politically experienced (0 otherwise), 
which we define as having held any political office at the local, state, or federal level before 
her incumbency. Finally, we add year dummies to control for nationwide time-specific effects 
                                                        
11 Data sources are described in the Appendix. 
12 Note that state fiscal years differ from calendar years, i.e. the fiscal year t lasts until the end of the first quarter 
of calendar year t in the state New York, until the end of the third quarter of calendar year t in Alabama, 
Michigan, and Texas, and until the end of the second quarter of calendar year t in all other states covered in our 
analysis. 
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such as economic shocks which hit the whole country or changes in federal laws that affect all 
states at the same time.13 
Our main variable of interest is the treatment variable which is a dummy variable taking 
the value 1 if the incumbent governor was a business person before taking up politics and 0 
otherwise.14 As a business person, we define all those governors who ran a private corporation 
before turning to politics, that is, founders and owners of private businesses (entrepreneurs) as 
well as governors who were employed as presidents or chief executive officers. We believe 
that this definition is the least arbitrary one, as only those to which the label undoubtedly 
applies are labelled as business persons. A full list of governors classified as business persons 
is provided in Table A1 of the Appendix. We exclude from our definition working proprietors 
in retail trade, the catering and hotel industry, as well as self-employed physicians, 
pharmacists, lawyers, farmers, etc., as we believe that these professions do not correspond to 
the common sense of a business person. Examples for governors who fall into the latter 
category and, due to that, are not labelled as business persons are William O’Neill, former 
governor of Tennessee (1980-1991), who ran a tavern, Don Samuelson, former governor of 
Idaho (1967-1971), who owned a sporting goods store, and Jimmy Carter, former U.S. 
President and governor of Georgia (1971-1975), who ran a peanut farm. 
Our analysis covers the governors of 48 states, i.e. from all states except for Alaska, Hawaii, 
and the District of Columbia. The sample period is 1960 to 2009 when estimating the ATT for 
the growth rate of real personal income per capita and 1977 to 2009 for the estimation of the 
ATT with regard to the unemployment rate.15 However, for some states, data on personal 
income from mining is missing for certain years because this information is classified as 
confidential by the federal government which is why our panel is slightly unbalanced.   
Table 1 shows the average realisations of the pre-treatment and governor characteristics 
across tenures of CEO governors (T=1) and non-CEO governors (T=0). The figures reveal 
that CEO governors tend to take office under very different conditions than non-CEO 
governors.  
                                                        
13 Technically, the inclusion of year dummies makes it more likely that CEO governors are matched with non-
CEO governors who hold office in the same year. 
14 In our analysis, we can take into account only one governor per state-year. In most instances, this is 
unproblematic, since new governors typically enter office at the beginning of a year and leave office at the end 
of a year. In few cases, though, governor transitions occur mid-year, involving coding problems. In such 
instances, we decided to include the governor who held office when the budget was passed. Dates when state 
budgets were passed are provided by Carl Klarner from Indian State University 
(http://www.indstate.edu/polisci/klarnerpolitics.htm). 
15 The difference concerning the sample period across both specifications is due to the fact that data on state 
level unemployment rates are available only from 1977 onwards.  
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Table 1: Average realisations of pre-treatment and governor characteristics across tenures of 
CEO governors (T=1) and non-CEO governors (T=0).  
Variable Obs. Mean | T=1 Mean | T=0 Diff. 
Avg. growth predecessor 2,352 2.00 2.52 −0.51 **
Avg. unemployment predec. 1,460 6.52 6.12 0.40 **
Real personal income p.c. 2,352 25,036 23,355 1,681 **
Population size 2,352 4,613,939 4,830,025 −216,086
Income farming 2,352 1.65 2.62 −0.97 **
Income transfers 2,352 12.29 10.68 1.61 **
Income mining 2,223 1.46 1.45 0.01 
Capital outlays 2,352 13.45 15.09 −1.63 **
Education spending 2,352 44.11 40.74 3.36 **
Public borrowing 2,352 11.22 9.74 1.48 *
Public debt 2,352 69.43 62.31 7.12 *
Taxes 2,352 60.93 60.58 0.34 
Years in office 2,352 6.81 6.99 −0.18 
Age 2,352 55.63 52.23 3.41 **
Previous political offices 2,352 0.64 0.95 −0.31 **
Democrats 2,352 0.40 0.57 −0.17 **
Notes: Units of analysis are state-years. Real personal income per capita is reported in US-$. 
Figures of income from farming, transfers, and mining represent shares of total personal state 
income (in percentage points). Fiscal variables are divided by total state personal income in 
$1,000. * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.    
 
Tenures of the predecessors of CEO governors are associated with a significantly lower 
growth rate of personal income per capita and a significantly larger unemployment rate, 
indicating that CEO governors tend to take office during times of economic pressure. Also, 
the share of personal income from government transfers is notably larger in years before a 
business person becomes governor, implying that the state’s citizens depend on the 
government to a larger extent. Moreover, the levels of public borrowing and public debt are 
larger in years in which a business person candidate is elected, supporting the conjecture that 
business persons find it easier to become elected in times of fiscal strain. Concerning 
governor characteristics, the descriptive statistics indicate that a CEO governor is, on average, 
older when holding office, more likely to lack political experience when entering office, and 
more likely to be a Republican than the average non-CEO governor. 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of CEO governors over our sample period. We see a 
noticeable increase in the number of CEO governors starting at the end of the 1980’s. Since 
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then, the number of CEO governors has been relatively stable and remarkably high. On 
average, between 1960 and 2009, roughly 6 out of 48 states have had a CEO governor in a 
particular year. Altogether, our sample comprises 446 governors of which 50 were business 
persons before taking up politics. We have a total of 294 state-year observations in the 
treatment group and 2106 state-years in the (potential) control group. 
 
Figure 3: Number of CEO governors per year between 1960 and 2009. 
 
 
3.2. Results 
The results of the nearest neighbor matching approach are presented in Table 2. The left 
panel shows the estimate of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for the growth 
rate of real personal income per capita and the right panel shows the ATT for the 
unemployment rate.  
 
Table 2: Estimated average treatment effects on the treated 
Growth rate real personal income p.c.  Unemployment rate 
߬̂஺்் Std. error  ߬̂஺்் Std. error 
0.802** 0.136  −0.602** 0.117 
No. of treated units: 262  No. of treated units: 216 
No. of control units: 234  No. of control units: 186 
No. of total obs.: 2223   No. of total obs.: 1435 
Notes: Bias adjustment as suggested by Abadie and Imbens (2011) is applied to estimate the 
ATTs. Abadie/Imbens (2006) standard errors are reported. * and ** indicate significance at 
the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Both estimates appear to be statistically significant at every reasonable level of significance. 
Economically, our findings suggest that the annual growth rate of personal income is, on 
average, 0.8 pp larger during the tenures of CEO governors as compared to non-CEO 
governors who took office under similar conditions. At the same time, in an average year, the 
unemployment rate is 0.6 pp lower during the incumbency of a CEO governor. Put 
differently, states which elected a CEO governor would have had an average annual income 
growth rate which is 0.8 pp lower and an unemployment rate that is 0.6 pp larger if they 
would have decided to go for a non-CEO governor. Thus, the effects are not only statistically 
significant, but also economically highly relevant. 
To glean further insights, we decompose the ATTs along various dimensions. First, we 
compute average ATTs for politically experienced CEO governors and CEO governors who 
are political novices. We consider CEO governors as politically experienced if they were 
elected to a political office on the local, state, or federal level before. The results are 
illustrated in Figure 4. Interestingly, we find that the tenures of CEO governors who are 
political novices are associated with higher income growth rates than the tenures of politically 
experienced CEO governors, the difference being 0.42 pp. Arguably, business persons who 
spent time in politics before being elected as governors tend to adjust, i.e. they become more 
like career politicians and act less like CEOs when in office. What is more, this finding 
challenges the notion that political experience is valuable (at least with regard to a governor’s 
economic performance). However, with regard to the unemployment rate, the difference 
between politically experienced CEO governors and novices is negligible. 
 
Figure 4: Average ATTs for politically experienced CEO governors and political novices 
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Next, we study the development of the impact CEO governors exert on a state’s economic 
performance over their years spent in office. To do so, we compute ATTs for (i) the first and 
second year in office, (ii) the third and fourth year in office, (iii) the fifth and sixth year in 
office, and (iv) for the years in office beyond the sixth year.16 Results are presented in Figure 
5. It appears that the effect of having a CEO governor on both income growth and 
unemployment increases steadily over the first six years in office. This finding seems 
plausible as it indicates that it takes some time until a CEO governor exerts the maximum 
possible influence on a state’s economic activity. The fact that the unemployment rate 
decreases by many times over between the first two years on the one hand and years five and 
six on the other hand implies that CEO governors create a certain amount of new jobs 
throughout every year during their incumbency.  
 
Figure 5: Average ATTs decomposed by the number of years in office 
 
 
Finally, we investigate whether the political party matters, i.e. whether the influence of a 
CEO governor on a state’s economic performance varies between republican and democratic 
CEO governors. As Figure 6 reveals, republican CEO governors appear to notably outperform 
democratic CEO governors. The average annual income growth rate during the tenure of a 
republican CEO governor is 0.34 pp larger than during the tenure of a democratic CEO 
governor; the unemployment rate in an average year is 0.52 pp lower when a republican CEO 
governor holds office. Arguably, this finding may be due to differences with regard to the 
ideological leanings across CEO governors from different parties, i.e. republican CEO 
                                                        
16 We compute average ATTs for two consecutive years to increase the number of observations in each category. 
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governors could have an even stronger liberal leaning than democratic CEO governors, who 
may put a greater emphasis on employee protection and labour market regulation. 
 
Figure 6: Average ATTs for Democratic versus Republican CEO governors 
 
 
3.3. Checks for robustness 
We check the robustness of our findings in several ways. First, we test whether our results 
are driven by outliers. To do so, we identify the three, four, and five best performing CEO 
governors and successively drop the corresponding state-years from our sample.17 The results 
are outlined in Table A2 in the Appendix. We find that the estimates of the ATTs for both 
income growth and unemployment remain statistically significant, indicating that our 
previous findings are not driven by a few ‘outstanding’ CEO governors. 
Second, we investigate whether our findings remain robust if we employ a different strategy 
to identify the nearest neighbors of the units exposed to treatment. Instead of using a weighted 
function of covariates, one can also use so-called propensity scores, i.e. estimated treatment 
probabilities, to find non-treated units which are as similar as possible to the treated units. To 
obtain these probabilities we run a probit estimation with the treatment variable–i.e. the 
dummy with value 1 if a CEO governor is in power and 0 otherwise–as the dependent 
variable and the pre-treatment and governor characteristics introduced in Section 2 as 
covariates. Units exposed to treatment are then matched with units which are as close as 
possible with regard to the treatment probability.18 The results for the propensity score 
                                                        
17 The best performing governors are identified by calculating average ATTs for each single CEO governor in 
our sample. 
18 The idea to match on propensity scores dates back to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). See Caliendo and 
Kopeinig (2008) for a discussion of variants of this estimator. 
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matching approach are outlined in Table A3 in the Appendix. As can be seen, the coefficients 
are only slightly different as compared to the covariate-based matching approach. The 
estimate of the ATT for real personal income growth per capita is 0.70 pp and the ATT 
estimate for the unemployment rate is −0.71 pp. Both estimates are statistically significant.  
Finally, we test whether our results are driven by our choice of the empirical method in 
general. To do so, we evaluate the treatment effect of having a CEO governor using panel 
difference-in-difference estimation, employing the same covariates as in the nearest neighbor 
matching approach. Based on regression analysis, we obtain an ATT of 0.46 pp for personal 
income per capita growth and an ATT of −0.32 pp for the unemployment rate.19 Both effects 
are significant at the 5% level.20  
 
4. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the economic performance of U.S. state governors who 
were business persons before taking up politics. We focus on the influence CEO governors 
exert on a state’s annual growth rate of real personal income per capita as well as on the 
unemployment rate. For this purpose, we collected a dataset comprising information on the 
occupational backgrounds of the governors of 48 states between 1960 and 2010. To account 
for the fact that the election of a business person as governor may be related to a state’s 
economic and fiscal situation and to solve the associated identification problem, we rely on a 
nearest neighbor matching approach. The performance of CEO governors is compared to the 
performance of non-CEO governors with similar characteristics and who took office under 
comparable economic and fiscal conditions. 
The findings presented in this paper form a nice story: descriptive statistics as well as 
anecdotal evidence indicate that business person candidates appeal to voters especially during 
times of economic pressure since business persons appear to find it easier to win gubernatorial 
elections during recessions or periods of fiscal strain. In such times, the skills and experiences 
characterising a successful CEO may be a strong credential. The confidence voters put in 
business person candidates seems to be justified, as CEO governors notably boost the 
economy. An average year of incumbency for a CEO governor is associated with a 0.8 
                                                        
19 Results are available on request.  
20 Arguably, the coefficient estimates based on regression analysis are smaller as compared to the nearest 
neighbor matching approach (in absolute terms) because in a regression based approach, we need to impose a 
restriction regarding the functional form of the empirical model. If, for instance, it is harder for a governor to 
stimulate the economy during a recession and, at the same time, CEO governors tend to be elected in times of 
economic hardship, as the descriptive statistics in Section 2 indicate, we may underestimate the true ATT of 
having a CEO governor when relying on difference-in-difference estimation. 
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percentage point (pp) higher growth rate of real personal income per capita and a decline in 
the unemployment rate by 0.6 pp. Moreover, their positive impact on the state’s economy is 
larger the more time they spend in office. 
A word of caution is necessary concerning potential conclusions which may be drawn based 
on our findings. It seems plausible to conclude that CEO governors should be preferred over 
career politicians at the polls since their economic performance is noticeable better. However, 
in our analysis, we solely focus on the influence CEO governors exert on two broad 
macroeconomic aggregates. Our analysis does not reveal, for instance, to which extent 
different groups within a state’s population benefit from the positive economic development. 
Moreover, politics involves trade-offs. Accordingly, the performance of a governor has many 
dimensions, with economic performance being just one of them. Boosting the economy may 
not necessarily translate into higher public welfare or aggregate life satisfaction. Thus, our 
findings pave the way for future research in this area. 
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Appendix 
Data 
All data are at annual frequency. 
The economic variables and population figures are from two different sources. Data on state 
personal income, state personal income per capita, the growth rate of personal income per 
capita, the shares of personal income from farming, mining, and government transfers, as well 
as state population are from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/). 
For price adjustment of state personal income per capita and state personal income per capita 
growth, we use the national personal consumption expenditure price index (PCE; base year is 
2009) since state level price indices are not available for our sample period. PCE data are also 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. State level unemployment rates are from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/). 
The fiscal variables are from the U.S. Census Bureau which also provides the values of 
fiscal variables in relation to $1,000 of state personal income. 
Information on U.S. state governors is collected mainly from the website of the National 
Governors Association (http://www.nga.org/). The website provides detailed information on 
governors’ biographies, including their party affiliation, tenure, year of birth, as well as their 
educational and occupational backgrounds. The information provided there was cross-
checked using the websites of the respective state governments as well as personal websites of 
the governors (when existing).  
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Additional tables and checks for robustness 
Table A1: List of U.S. state governors who were businessmen prior to holding office. 
Governor State Tenure 
Paul Jones Fannin Arizona 1959–1965 
J. Fife Symington III Arizona 1991–1997 
Elbert Nortrand Carvel Delaware 1961–1965 
Jack Markell Delaware 2009–open 
Claude Roy Kirk, Jr. Florida 1967–1971 
John Ellis Bush Florida 1999–2007 
Joe Frank Harris Georgia 1983–1991 
Don William Samuelson Idaho 1967–1971 
C. L. "Butch" Otter Idaho 2007–open 
Robert D. Orr Indiana 1981–1989 
Mitchell Elias Daniels, Jr. Indiana 2005–2013 
John Y. Brown, Jr. Kentucky 1979–1983 
Wallace G. Wilkinson Kentucky 1987–1991 
Paul E. Patton Kentucky 1995–2003 
Charles Elson Roemer III Louisiana 1988–1992 
Mitt Romney Massachusetts 2003–2007 
George Wilcken Romney Michigan 1963–1969 
Elmer Lee Anderson Minnesota 1961–1963 
Daniel Kirkwood Fordice, Jr. Mississippi 1992–2000 
John James Exon Nebraska 1971–1979 
Kenneth C. Guinn Nevada 1999–2007 
Meldrim Thomson, Jr. New Hampshire 1973–1979 
John H. Sununu New Hampshire 1983–1989 
Craig Benson New Hampshire 2003–2005 
John H. Lynch New Hampshire 2005–2013 
Jon S. Corzine New Jersey 2006–2010 
John Burroughs New Mexico 1959–1961 
Gary E. Johnson New Mexico 1995–2003 
Nelson Aldrich Rockefeller New York 1959–1973 
Edward Thomas Schafer North Dakota 1992–2000 
Dewey Follett Bartlett Oklahoma 1967–1971 
Robert William Straub Oregon 1975–1979 
Neil Goldschmidt Oregon 1987–1991 
Milton Jerrold Shapp Pennsylvania 1971–1979 
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Table A1 (continued) 
Governor State Tenure 
Mark S. Schweiker Pennsylvania 2001–2003 
Bruce G. Sundlun Rhode Island 1991–1995 
Donald L. Carcieri Rhode Island 2003–2011 
Ned Ray McWherter Tennessee 1987–1995 
Don K. Sundquist Tennessee 1995–2003 
Philip N. Bredesen, Jr. Tennessee 2003–2011 
William P. Clements, Jr. Texas 1979–1983; 1987–1991 
George W. Bush Texas 1995–2000 
Norman Howard Bangerter Utah 1985–1993 
Michael Okerlund Leavitt Utah 1993–2003 
Jon Huntsman, Jr. Utah 2005–2009 
Richard A. Snelling Vermont 1977–1985; 1991 
Mark R. Warner Virginia 2002–2006 
Booth Gardner Washington 1985–1993 
William Gaston Caperton III West Virginia 1989–1997 
Joseph Manchin III West Virginia 2005–2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2: Estimated average treatment effects on the treated–omitting the 3, 4, and 5 best 
performing CEO governors. 
Growth rate real personal income p.c. 
߬̂஺்்|ିଷ Std. error  ߬̂஺்்|ିସ Std. error  ߬̂஺்்|ିହ Std. error
0.674** 0.137  0.636** 0.139  0.627** 0.141 
        
Unemployment rate 
߬̂஺்்|ିଷ Std. error  ߬̂஺்்|ିସ Std. error  ߬̂஺்்|ିହ Std. error
−0.367** 0.113  −0.276* 0.115  −0.238* 0.109 
Notes: Bias adjustment as suggested by Abadie and Imbens (2011) is applied to estimate the 
ATTs. Abadie/Imbens (2006) standard errors are reported. * and ** indicate significance at 
the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table A3: Estimated average treatment effects on the treated based on propensity score 
matching 
Growth rate real personal income p.c.  Unemployment rate 
߬̂஺்் Std. error  ߬̂஺்் Std. error 
0.700* 0.283  −0.712** 0.261 
No. of treated units: 262  No. of treated units: 216 
No. of control units: 166  No. of control units: 122 
No. of total obs.: 2223   No. of total obs.: 1435 
Notes: Matching is based on treatment probabilities which are estimated based on probit 
estimations. Abadie/Imbens (2006) standard errors which account for the variance in the 
treatment model are reported. * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
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 1. Introduction 
This paper provides background information and basic descriptive statistics for a 
representative survey of the German population conducted on our behalf by GfK in the first 
quarter of 2013. The survey addresses important topics in fiscal policy, including: 1) public 
preferences on the composition of fiscal expenditures; 2) public preferences on public debt 
and different consolidation measures; 3) the effect of tax changes on consumption and 
savings; and 4) the effect of tax changes on labour market activities. The survey data are 
analysed in a series of research papers by the Macroeconomics Group of Marburg 
University, with the purpose of the present paper being to give full documentation of the 
survey. 
Section 2 introduces the survey instrument and Appendix A contains the full 
questionnaire, both in the original German version as well as an English translation. 
Appendix B gives basic descriptive statistics for all survey items. 
 
2. The survey instrument  
The survey was conducted as part of an omnibus survey between February 15th, 2013 and 
March 1st, 2013, and administered by GfK. GfK is one of the largest private research 
companies in Germany, focusing on the fields of market research and public opinion. The 
sample consists of 2,042 representatively selected persons from the German population 
aged 14 or above. Methodologically, the survey is based on quota sampling. Table 1 
compares important characteristics of our survey sample with those of the general 
population. The correspondence level is high, indicating that our survey sample is 
representative of the general population. The survey questions were implemented in face-
to-face interviews using Pen-Pads. The interviewers followed specific instructions as 
described in the survey instrument. Appendix A contains the full text of the questionnaire, 
including comments for the interviewers, both in the original German version as well as an 
English translation. 
The first part of the survey sheds light on the interviewees’ preferences on public 
spending priorities. At the beginning of the survey, six major policy areas are listed and 
briefly described; the current amount of public spending on these areas is then given both in 
euros per capita as well as in relation to total public spending. We believe these relative 
measures to be more comprehensible to the respondents than absolute figures. The policy 
areas listed in the survey are those on which the German government currently spends the 
most: social security, public safety, education, infrastructure, economic development, and 
defence. The interviewees were asked about the policy areas the government should spend 
more (Item 1) or less (Item 2) money on according to their opinion. Multiple answers are 
possible. Interviewees who prefer spending hikes in at least one policy area are then asked 
about how additional spending should be financed (Item 1a), and those who prefer spending 
cuts in any area are asked about how the additional funds should be used (Item 2a). In both 
cases, three options are given: spending hikes (spending cuts) possibly financed through 
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 (used for) a tax hike (tax cut); public borrowing (public debt reduction); or a decrease 
(increase) in public spending in any other policy area. Again, we allow for multiple answers. 
 
Table 1 Comparison of sample to population 
Property Population 
distribution 
in % 
Sample 
distribution 
in % 
Frequency 
in sample 
Property Population 
distribution 
in % 
Sample 
distributi
on in % 
Frequency 
in sample 
Gender    Occupation of head of household 
Male 49 49 996 Blue-collar worker 24 24 494 
Female 51 51 1046 White-collar worker 32 32 653 
    Public servant 4 4 82 
Age    Self-employed 8 8 159 
14 – 15 2 2 39 Non-working 32 32 653 
16 – 19 5 5 104     
20 – 29 14 14 278 State    
30 – 39 13 13 270 Schleswig-Holstein 4 4 74 
40 – 49 19 19 389 Hamburg 2 2 41 
50 – 59 17 17 341 N.sachsen/Bremen 11 11 216 
60 – 69 13 13 265 Nordrhein-Westfalen 22 21 439 
70 +  17 17 356 Hessen 7 7 151 
    R.-Pfalz/Saarland 6 6 127 
Household size B.-Wuerttemberg 13 13 261 
1 22 22 457 Bayern 15 15 312 
2 39 38 784 M.-Vorpommern 2 2 43 
3 18 18 366 Sachsen-Anhalt 3 3 59 
More 21 21 436 Brandenburg 3 3 65 
    Thueringen 3 3 59 
City size Sachsen 5 6 112 
- 4999 15 15 314 Berlin 4 4 82 
5000 – 
19999 
27 27 549     
20000 – 
99999 
28 28 564     
100000 +  30 30 615     
Notes: Table compares the distribution of specific characteristics in the general population with the survey sample. Sample 
distribution is based on a total of 2,042 observations. 
 
By directly relating public spending to public revenues, we compel the interviewees to take 
the public budget constraint into account when giving their answers, so as to circumvent the 
occurrence of the ‘more-for-less paradox’ (Welch, 1985). Note that the questionnaire is 
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 constructed in such a way that interviewees have to answer consistently, e.g. interviewees 
who prefer an increase in public spending in any policy area and believe that the increase 
should be financed through a reduction in public spending in another area are obliged to 
name at least one policy area in which public spending should be cut. Note, however, that 
this set-up does not necessarily result in a balanced budget when considering actual financial 
flows. For instance, cuts in defence spending are unlikely to be sufficient for a notable 
increase in social security spending.  
Item 3 refers to a tax estimation according to which the German government is going to 
increase revenues by €23 billion more than previously expected within the next four years. 
The estimate is provided by the Working Party on Tax Revenue Forecasting (‘Arbeitskreis 
Steuerschätzung’) and was published in October 2012, i.e. roughly four months before the 
survey was conducted (cf. BMF, 2012). The interviewees are asked how the state should use 
these additional revenues. The choice was between nine alternatives: decreasing taxes, 
reducing public debt, or increasing public spending on social security, public safety, 
education, infrastructure, economic development, defence, or other areas. The interviewees 
can voice a maximum of three preferences, which must also be ranked. In this specific 
scenario, money comes ‘out of the blue’, so that respondents do not have to take public 
budget constraints into account. 
Item 4 studies the interviewees’ attitudes toward public indebtedness. First, we asked the 
interviewees whether they think that the state should reduce public debt, keep the level of 
public debt unchanged, or incur additional public debt. Those who opt for a reduction of 
public debt are then asked about their preferred consolidation measure (Item 4a); those 
who favour an incurrence of additional public debt are asked what the additional funds 
should be used for (Item 4c). In both cases, the respondents can choose between eight 
different options: increase (decrease) taxes or decrease (increase) public spending on social 
security, public safety, education, infrastructure, economic development, defence, or other 
areas. Yet again, each interviewee can voice at most three alternatives, which must also be 
ranked. 
Interviewees who state that public debt should be reduced are asked to answer an 
additional question. In Item 4b, we introduce three alternative (hypothetical) debt-reduction 
paths, and ask respondents which path they think the government should adopt. According 
to path A, debt reduction will be distributed evenly over the following years. Path B implies 
that a smaller amount of public debt will be reduced in the near future and a larger amount 
in the far future; according to path C, a larger amount of debt will be reduced in the near 
future and a smaller amount in the far future. The different debt-reduction paths are 
graphically illustrated on the interviewer’s laptop by means of different stacks of money 
coins. The aim of this item is to analyse the intensity of the respondents’ public debt 
aversion. We believe that respondents who chose path C can be considered more debt 
averse than those who prefer path A or B; respondents who chose path A may be considered 
more debt averse than those who opted for path B. 
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 Item 5 elicits the interviewees’ attitudes toward the German ‘debt brake’. In 2009, the 
German constitution was amended, introducing a balanced budget rule. According to this 
rule, the German federal government is not allowed to run an annual structural deficit of 
more than 0.35% of GDP from 2016 onwards. To simplify matters for the respondents, we 
refrain from using the term ‘structural deficit’ along with the measure of 0.35% of GDP in the 
wording of the item. Instead, we state that the government can take on ‘almost no 
additional public debt’ from 2016 onwards. Exemptions are allowed only in case of economic 
crises or natural disasters. Respondents are asked to indicate whether they are (i) against 
the debt brake; (ii) in favour of the debt brake; or (iii) believe that the debt brake does not 
go far enough, i.e. that the government should not be allowed to incur additional public debt 
at all. 
Item 6 is designed to qualitatively evaluate individual consumption responses to the 
accumulation of public debt. All interviewees were asked to indicate whether they (i) spent a 
larger proportion of their income; (ii) a smaller proportion of their income (in reaction to the 
government’s increasing reliance on debt financing); or (iii) their behaviour was not affected 
by the public debt situation at all. 
Items 7 to 9 are included for assessing the interviewees’ risk and time preferences, 
respectively. Within the context of these questions, non-incentivised ‘experiments’ were 
conducted involving financial decisions. All three items emulate incentivised experiments 
conducted within the 2006 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). In particular, 
the wording of the instructions for both the interviewer and the interviewee, the structure 
of the payoff tables, and the sequence of actions is the same as in the SOEP experiments (cf. 
TNS-Infratest Sozialforschung, 2011a; 2011b). We modify the payoffs in column A of Item 7, 
respective column B of Item 8 and 9, to show that, as in the SOEP data, the distribution of 
answers is strongly convex, i.e. only a few people choose small payoffs, while many people 
choose large payoffs. Two experiments are conducted to assess the respondents’ time 
preferences (Items 8 and 9) in order to account for the fact that many people are observed 
to have time-inconsistent preferences, meaning that they are more patient in the long run 
than in the short run. By varying the timing of the payoffs across Items 8 and 9, we allow 
individual discount rates between two equidistant periods to vary with the timing of the 
earliest possible payoff. 
For the remaining items, the laptop is handed over to the interviewee. The interviewer is 
not able to monitor what the interviewee enters, and provides assistance only in the case of 
questions. That way, we want to make sure that each interviewee answers the following 
questions honestly. 
Item 10 contains five couples of contradictory statements. For each couple of statements, 
the interviewee is asked to indicate with which statement he or she agrees. The first four 
statement couples assess different dimensions of (dis)trust in politicians. With the help of 
the last couple of statements, we are able to evaluate whether a respondent holds an 
egalitarian attitude. In Item 11, we ask which political party the respondent would vote for if 
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 elections were held next Sunday. Altogether, we consider seven major German parties. In 
Item 12, respondents are asked to indicate whether they are union members. In Item 13, we 
ask whether the interviewee has children, and if so, how many. Item 14 evaluates the 
interviewees’ satisfaction with their current economic situation. This item is based on a 
question from the German General Social Survey (GGSS/ALLBUS; cf. Terwey and Baltzer, 
2013), the only exception being that we refer to the ‘economic’ situation, whereas 
respondents in the GGSS are asked about their ‘personal’ situation. 
Item 15 is designed for studying the extent of the respondents’ economic knowledge. We 
are particularly interested in their factual knowledge about debt-related economic 
indicators. Using multiple choice questions, we ask about (i) the German federal 
government’s budget deficit in 2012 (correct answer: 1% of GDP); (ii) the current interest 
rate on government bonds with a maturity of 10 years (correct answer: 1.5%); and (iii) the 
inflation rate in 2012 (correct answer: 2%). All figures were released a couple of weeks 
before the survey was conducted and widely reported by the media. 
Items 16 to 24 study consumption and labour supply responses to a recent payroll tax 
change in Germany. Specifically, at the beginning of 2013, contribution rates to the statuary 
pension insurance system in Germany were reduced from 19.6% to 18.9%, thereby lessening 
the overall tax burden for employees and employers. This payroll tax reduction is explicitly 
mentioned at the start of our survey on consumption and labour supply responses to tax 
changes. 
The payroll tax change that forms the basis of our analysis affects only a subsample of the 
general German population. All employees contribute to the statutory pension insurance 
system. In addition, certain employers, freelancers, and the insignificantly employed pay into 
the government’s pension insurance system, some doing so voluntary. The Bundesagentur 
für Arbeit, the German federal job centre, directly pays pension insurance contribution rates 
for the unemployed, whereas public servants and those not part of the labour force – 
including pensioners and inactive working-age population – are not subject to payroll 
taxation. Adequate filtering is in place to ensure that only respondents that are subject to 
payroll taxation are confronted with our questions. Thus, we ask all employees and those 
employers, freelancers, and insignificantly employed who state that they contribute to the 
statutory pension insurance system for their consumption responses. When observing 
labour supply effects, we also add unemployed persons. Items 16 and items 17 contain the 
corresponding filter questions. 
Item 18 is designed for measuring consumption responses. The main references for this 
question are Sahm et al. (2012) and Shapiro and Slemrod (1995, 2003, 2009). We measure 
consumption responses using a qualitative approach, assuming that respondents are more 
likely to accurately answer a qualitative question rather than a quantitative one. Item 19 and 
item 20 are constructed for capturing whether the payroll tax change is perceived to be 
temporary or permanent. Item 21 builds on ideas proposed in Shapiro and Slemrod (2003), 
and is designed to measure the specific budgeting approach taken by the household. Item 22 
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 is a statement battery intended to capture interviewees’ perceptions of the macroeconomic 
environment. Specifically, it measures expectations about the future economic situation, 
inflation expectations, as well as assessments of savings’ security and their profitability. 
Items 23 and 24 measure interviewees’ labour supply responses. In a pretest, many 
respondents were confused by being asked about their labour supply responses, as they 
seemed to think in terms of a fixed labour supply, with work organised in fixed-hour 
contracts. Accordingly, we opt for a two-stage approach, with the aim of reducing 
measurement error. First, we ask all respondents whether taxation matters for their labour 
supply decisions. We then ask the subset of respondents who have indicated that taxation is 
important for their labour supply decisions to state on a five-point scale whether they have 
increased or decreased labour supply following the 2013 payroll tax change. 
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 Appendix A: The survey instrument 
A.1 The questionnaire (German original) 
Die folgende Tabelle zeigt, wie viel Geld der Staat für verschiedene Aufgabenbereiche in der 
Vergangenheit pro Jahr ausgegeben hat und zwar sowohl in Euro pro Einwohner als auch als 
Anteil an den gesamten öffentlichen Ausgaben. Berücksichtigt wurden dabei die 
Aufgabenbereiche, für die der Staat am meisten ausgegeben hat. 
 
Interviewer: Bitte geben Sie dem Befragten Zeit, die Tabelle aufmerksam zu betrachten! 
 
Politikbereich Ausgabenposten Ausgaben 
pro 
Einwohner 
Anteil an 
Gesamtausgaben 
Soziale Sicherung u.a. Arbeitslosenunterstützung, 
Sozialhilfe, Familien- und 
Jugendhilfe 
7.660€ 56,6% 
Bildung u.a. öffentliche Schulen und 
Hochschulen 
1.125€ 8,3% 
Öffentliche Sicherheit 
und Ordnung 
u.a. Polizei, Rechtsschutz 455€ 3,3% 
Infrastruktur u.a. Straßen- und Städtebau 350€ 2,6% 
Wirtschaftsförderung u.a. Mittelstandsförderung, 
Investitionszuschüsse an 
Unternehmen, Finanzhilfen an 
strukturschwache Regionen 
335€ 2,5% 
Verteidigung u.a. Militärausrüstung, Wehrsold, 
Bundeswehrverwaltung 
335€ 2,5% 
Zusammen  10.260€ 75,8% 
 
Angenommen, Sie könnten die öffentlichen Ausgaben und Einnahmen nach Ihren Wünschen 
verändern. Beispielsweise könnten Sie die Ausgaben in einem Politikbereich erhöhen, 
müssten dafür aber entweder zusätzliche Kredite aufnehmen, die Steuern erhöhen, oder 
aber die Ausgaben in einem anderen Bereich senken. Oder aber Sie senken die Ausgaben in 
einem Politikbereich und nutzen die frei werdenden Mittel zum Abbau der öffentlichen 
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 Schulden, zur Senkung der Steuern, oder zur Erhöhung der Ausgaben in einem anderen 
Politikbereich. Geben Sie im Folgenden bitte an, für welche der oben genannten Bereiche 
der Staat in Zukunft mehr und für welche er weniger ausgeben sollte. Geben Sie bitte auch 
an, auf welche Weise gewünschte Ausgabenerhöhungen finanziert werden sollten bzw. was 
mit frei werdenden Mitteln im Falle von Ausgabenkürzungen geschehen sollte. 
 
Interviewer: Bitte klären Sie, ob der Befragte die Aufgabenstellung verstanden hat! Wenn 
nicht, bitte wiederholen und erläutern. 
 
1 Für welche Politikbereiche sollte der Staat Ihrer Meinung nach in Zukunft mehr Geld 
ausgeben? 
Der Staat sollte mehr Geld ausgeben für (Mehrfachnennungen möglich)…  
… Soziale Sicherung □ 
… Bildung □ 
… Öffentliche Sicherheit und Ordnung □ 
... Infrastruktur □ 
… Wirtschaftsförderung □ 
… Verteidigung □ 
… andere, hier nicht genannte Bereiche □ 
Der Staat sollte in Zukunft nicht mehr Geld ausgeben □ 
 
Hinweis: Wird „Der Staat sollte in Zukunft nicht mehr Geld ausgeben“ gewählt ist keine 
weitere Nennung zulässig! 
 
[Automatische Filterung: Die folgende Frage war nur dann zu beantworten, wenn in 
irgendeinem Politikbereich höhere Ausgaben bevorzugt wurden] 
 
1A Die Ausgabenerhöhung(en) soll(en) finanziert werden durch (Mehrfachnennungen 
möglich)… 
… Steuererhöhungen □ 
… öffentliche Kreditaufnahme □ 
… eine Kürzung der Ausgaben in anderen Bereichen (siehe unten) □ 
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 2 Für welche Politikbereiche sollte der Staat Ihrer Meinung nach in Zukunft weniger Geld 
ausgeben? 
Der Staat sollte weniger Geld ausgeben für (Mehrfachnennungen möglich)…  
… Soziale Sicherung □ 
… Bildung □ 
… Öffentliche Sicherheit und Ordnung □ 
... Infrastruktur □ 
… Wirtschaftsförderung □ 
… Verteidigung □ 
… andere, hier nicht genannte Bereiche □ 
Der Staat sollte in Zukunft nicht weniger Geld ausgeben □ 
 
Hinweis: Wird „Der Staat sollte in Zukunft nicht weniger Geld ausgeben“ gewählt ist keine 
weitere Nennung zulässig! 
 
[Automatische Filterung: Die folgende Frage war nur dann zu beantworten, wenn in 
irgendeinem Politikbereich geringere Ausgaben bevorzugt wurden] 
 
2A Die frei werdenden Mittel sollen genutzt werden (Mehrfachnennungen möglich)… 
… für Steuersenkungen □ 
… zum Abbau öffentlicher Schulden □ 
… zur Erhöhung der Ausgaben in anderen Bereichen (siehe oben) □ 
 
 
Interviewer: Bitte auf Konsistenz der Antworten achten! Wünscht ein Befragter 
beispielsweise in einem Bereich zusätzliche Ausgaben und gibt dabei in Frage 1A gleichzeitig 
an, dass diese durch Kürzungen der Ausgaben in anderen Bereichen finanziert werden sollte, 
impliziert das mindestens eine Nennung in den ersten sieben Kategorien bei Frage 2! 
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 3 Die letzte Steuerschätzung hat ergeben, dass der Staat über die nächsten 4 Jahre hinweg 
insgesamt etwa 23 Milliarden Euro mehr einnehmen wird als zunächst erwartet worden war. 
Was sollte der Staat Ihrer Meinung nach mit diesen zusätzlichen 23 Milliarden Euro tun? 
Geben Sie bitte maximal drei Alternativen an, die Sie am stärksten befürworten. 
 Befürworte ich 
am stärksten 
Befürworte ich am 
zweitstärksten 
Befürworte ich am 
drittstärksten 
Die Steuern senken □ □ □ 
Öffentliche Schulden 
abbauen 
□ □ □ 
Die öffentlichen Ausgaben 
erhöhen für… 
   
… Soziale Sicherung □ □ □ 
… Öffentliche Sicherheit und 
Ordnung 
□ □ □ 
… Bildung □ □ □ 
… Infrastruktur □ □ □ 
… Wirtschaftsförderung □ □ □ 
… Verteidigung □ □ □ 
… andere, hier nicht 
genannte Bereiche 
□ □ □ 
Keine Angabe □ □ □ 
 
Hinweis: In jeder Spalte ist jeweils nur eine Nennung zulässig! 
 
 
4 Ende 2012 lag die Staatsverschuldung in Deutschland bei über 2 Billionen Euro. Das sind 
etwa 26.000 Euro pro Einwohner bzw. 80% des Bruttoinlandsprodukts. Wenn es nach Ihnen 
ginge: Sollte der Staat seine Schulden abbauen, sie auf dem derzeitigen Niveau belassen, 
oder sogar noch zusätzliche Schulden aufnehmen? 
Schulden abbauen □ 
Schulden auf derzeitigem Niveau halten □ 
Zusätzliche Schulden aufnehmen □ 
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 [Automatische Filterung: Die folgende Frage war nur dann zu beantworten, wenn angegeben 
wurde, dass der Staat Schulden abbauen sollte] 
 
4A Was sollte der Staat am ehesten tun, um die Schulden abzubauen? Geben Sie bitte 
maximal drei Alternativen an, die Sie am stärksten befürworten. 
 Befürworte ich 
am stärksten 
Befürworte ich am 
zweitstärksten 
Befürworte ich am 
drittstärksten 
Die Steuern erhöhen □ □ □ 
Die öffentlichen Ausgaben 
kürzen für… 
   
… Soziale Sicherung □ □ □ 
… Öffentliche Sicherheit und 
Ordnung 
□ □ □ 
… Bildung □ □ □ 
… Infrastruktur □ □ □ 
… Wirtschaftsförderung □ □ □ 
… Verteidigung □ □ □ 
… andere, hier nicht 
genannte Bereiche 
□ □ □ 
Keine Angabe □ □ □ 
Hinweis: Bei dieser Frage ist in jeder Spalte jeweils nur eine Nennung zulässig! 
 
 
[Automatische Filterung: Die folgende Frage war nur dann zu beantworten, wenn angegeben 
wurde, dass der Staat Schulden abbauen sollte] 
 
4B Angenommen, Sie könnten zwischen drei Strategien zum Schuldenabbau wählen (Stellen 
Sie sich vor, die unten dargestellten Münzstapel verdeutlichen den Schuldenabbau. Ein 
kleiner Münzstapel bedeutet, dass wenige Schulden abgebaut werden, ein großer Stapel 
bedeutet, dass viele Schulden abgebaut werden.): 
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 Option A: Der Schuldenabbau wird gleichmäßig über alle Jahre verteilt, d.h. in jedem Jahr 
wird ein in etwa gleich großer Teil des Schuldenbergs abgetragen. 
 
 
Option B: Das Ausmaß des Schuldenabbaus wird über die Jahre hinweg Stück für Stück 
erhöht, d.h. in naher Zukunft wird ein kleinerer Teil des Schuldenbergs abgebaut und in 
ferner Zukunft ein größerer Teil. 
 
Option C: Das Ausmaß des Schuldenabbaus wird über die Jahre Stück für Stück verringert, 
d.h. in naher Zukunft wird ein größerer Teil des Schuldenbergs abgebaut und in ferner 
Zukunft ein kleinerer Teil. 
 
 
Für welche dieser Optionen würden Sie sich am ehesten entscheiden? 
Option A: In jedem Jahr sollte ein etwa gleich großer Teil des Schuldenbergs abgebaut 
werden 
□ 
Option B: In naher Zukunft sollte ein kleinerer Teil des Schuldenbergs abgebaut werden 
und in ferner Zukunft ein größerer Teil 
□ 
Option C: In naher Zukunft sollte ein größerer Teil des Schuldenbergs abgebaut werden 
und in ferner Zukunft ein kleinerer Teil 
□ 
Keine Angabe □ 
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 [Automatische Filterung: Die folgende Frage war nur dann zu beantworten, wenn angegeben 
wurde, dass der Staat zusätzliche Schulden aufnehmen sollte] 
 
4C Wofür sollte der Staat am ehesten zusätzliche Schulden aufnehmen? Geben Sie bitte 
maximal drei Alternativen an, die Sie am stärksten befürworten. 
 Befürworte ich 
am stärksten 
Befürworte ich am 
zweitstärksten 
Befürworte ich am 
drittstärksten 
Die Steuern senken □ □ □ 
Die öffentlichen Ausgaben 
erhöhen für… 
   
… Soziale Sicherung □ □ □ 
… Öffentliche Sicherheit und 
Ordnung 
□ □ □ 
… Bildung □ □ □ 
… Infrastruktur □ □ □ 
… Wirtschaftsförderung □ □ □ 
… Verteidigung □ □ □ 
… andere, hier nicht 
genannte Bereiche 
□ □ □ 
Keine Angabe □ □ □ 
Hinweis: Bei dieser Frage ist in jeder Spalte jeweils nur eine Nennung zulässig! 
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 5 Ab 2016 tritt auf Bundesebene die Schuldenbremse in Kraft. Diese sieht vor, dass der Bund 
so gut wie keine zusätzlichen Schulden mehr aufnehmen darf. Ausnahmen sind nur bei 
schlechter wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung oder bei Auftreten von Naturkatastrophen zulässig. 
Was ist Ihre Meinung zur Schuldenbremse? 
Ich bin gegen die Schuldenbremse, die Kreditaufnahme des Bundes sollte nicht 
beschränkt werden 
□ 
Ich befürworte die Schuldenbremse in der oben beschriebenen Form □ 
Die Schuldenbremse geht nicht weit genug, der Bund sollte überhaupt keine Kredite 
aufnehmen dürfen 
□ 
Keine Angabe □ 
 
 
6 Der Schuldenstand des Staates ist zwischen 2008 und 2012 deutlich gewachsen. Hat die 
zunehmende Kreditfinanzierung der öffentlichen Ausgaben in den vergangenen Jahren 
etwas an Ihrem Ausgabe- und Sparverhalten geändert? 
Ja, ich gebe einen geringeren Teil meines Einkommens aus und spare dafür einen 
größeren Teil 
□ 
Ja, ich gebe einen größeren Teil meines Einkommens aus und spare dafür einen 
geringeren Teil 
□ 
Nein, ich habe mein Verhalten infolge der wachsenden Staatsverschuldung nicht 
geändert 
□ 
  
17 
 
 7 Als nächstes möchten wir gerne einige kurze Verhaltensexperimente durchführen, bei 
denen es um finanzielle Entscheidungen geht. Beim ersten Experiment treffen Sie Ihre 
Entscheidungen anhand dieser Tabelle (untenstehende Liste vorlegen). In jeder Zeile sehen 
Sie zwei Alternativen. Sie können wählen zwischen einem festen Geldbetrag, den Sie 
„sicher“ ausbezahlt bekommen und einer Lotterie nach dem Prinzip „Alles oder nichts“: hier 
können Sie mit 50% Wahrscheinlichkeit 1.000 Euro gewinnen und mit 50% 
Wahrscheinlichkeit nichts. 
Sie beginnen bitte mit Zeile 1 und gehen dann von Zeile zu Zeile weiter. In jeder Zeile 
entscheiden Sie sich bitte zwischen der sicheren Auszahlung (Spalte A) und der Lotterie 
(Spalte B). Die Lotterie bleibt in allen Zeilen gleich. Nur der Betrag der sicheren Auszahlung 
(links) steigt von Zeile zu Zeile. 
 Sie erhalten…  Sie erhalten… 
 
Sicher 
 
1.000€ oder nichts 
Gewinnchance 50:50 
 A oder B 
1 0 € sicher  Gewinnchance 1.000€ / 0€ 
2 100 € sicher  Gewinnchance 1.000€ / 0€ 
3 200 € sicher  Gewinnchance 1.000€ / 0€ 
4 300 € sicher  Gewinnchance 1.000€ / 0€ 
5 400 € sicher  Gewinnchance 1.000€ / 0€ 
6 500 € sicher  Gewinnchance 1.000€ / 0€ 
7 600 € sicher  Gewinnchance 1.000€ / 0€ 
8 700 € sicher  Gewinnchance 1.000€ / 0€ 
9 800 € sicher  Gewinnchance 1.000€ / 0€ 
10 900 € sicher  Gewinnchance 1.000€ / 0€ 
 
Interviewer: Starten Sie bitte mit Zeile 1 und der Frage: „Wie entscheiden Sie sich? 0€ sicher 
oder Gewinnchance 1.000€ / 0€?“. Entscheidet sich der Befragte für Option B, geht es weiter 
mit Zeile zwei und der Frage „Wie entscheiden Sie sich? 100€ sicher oder Gewinnchance 
1.000€ / 0€?“ usw. Das Experiment ist beendet, sobald der Befragte sich das erste Mal für 
Option A entscheidet. Bitte notieren Sie die Nummer der Zeile, in der sich der Befragte das 
erste Mal für Option A entschieden hat. 
 
Option A wurde gewählt in Zeile Nummer:   
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 8 Im nächsten Experiment treffen Sie Ihre Entscheidungen anhand dieser Tabelle 
(untenstehende Liste vorlegen). In jeder Zeile sehen Sie zwei Alternativen. Sie können 
wählen zwischen einem festen Betrag von 1.000€, den Sie sofort ausgezahlt bekommen und 
einem etwas höheren Betrag, der Ihnen aber erst in 6 Monaten ausgezahlt wird. 
Sie beginnen bitte mit Zeile 1 und gehen dann von Zeile zu Zeile weiter. In jeder Zeile 
entscheiden Sie sich bitte zwischen den 1.000€ sofort (Spalte A) und dem höheren Betrag in 
6 Monaten (Spalte B). Der Betrag links bleibt in allen Zeilen gleich, nur der Betrag rechts 
steigt von Zeile zu Zeile. 
 Sie erhalten…  Sie erhalten… 
 Heute  In 6 Monaten 
 A oder B 
1 1.000 €  1.000 € 
2 1.000 €  1.010 € 
3 1.000 €  1.020 € 
4 1.000 €  1.030 € 
5 1.000 €  1.050 € 
6 1.000 €  1.075 € 
7 1.000 €  1.100 € 
8 1.000 €  1.150 € 
9 1.000 €  1.200 € 
10 1.000 €  1.300 € 
11 1.000 €  1.400 € 
12 1.000 €  1.500 € 
13 1.000 €  1.750 € 
14 1.000 €  2.000 € 
 
Interviewer: Starten Sie bitte mit Zeile 1 und der Frage: „Wie entscheiden Sie sich? 1.000€ 
heute oder 1.000€ in 6 Monaten?“. Entscheidet sich der Befragte für Option A, geht es weiter 
mit Zeile zwei und der Frage „Wie entscheiden Sie sich? 1.000€ heute oder 1.010€ in 6 
Monaten?“ usw. Das Experiment ist beendet, sobald der Befragte sich das erste Mal für 
Option B entscheidet. Bitte notieren Sie die Nummer der Zeile, in der sich der Befragte das 
erste Mal für Option B entschieden hat. 
 
Option B wurde gewählt in Zeile Nummer:   
19 
 
 9 Im letzten Experiment treffen Sie Ihre Entscheidungen anhand dieser Tabelle 
(untenstehende Liste vorlegen). In jeder Zeile sehen Sie wieder zwei Alternativen. Sie 
können wählen zwischen einem festen Betrag von 1.000€, den Sie in 6 Monaten ausgezahlt 
bekommen und einem etwas höheren Betrag, der Ihnen aber erst in 12 Monaten ausgezahlt 
wird. 
Sie beginnen bitte mit Zeile 1 und gehen dann von Zeile zu Zeile weiter. In jeder Zeile 
entscheiden Sie sich bitte zwischen den 1.000€ in 6 Monaten (Spalte A) und dem höheren 
Betrag in 12 Monaten (Spalte B). Der Betrag links bleibt in allen Zeilen gleich, nur der Betrag 
rechts steigt von Zeile zu Zeile. 
 Sie erhalten…  Sie erhalten… 
 In 6 Monaten  In 12 Monaten 
 A oder B 
1 1.000 €  1.000 € 
2 1.000 €  1.010 € 
3 1.000 €  1.020 € 
4 1.000 €  1.030 € 
5 1.000 €  1.050 € 
6 1.000 €  1.075 € 
7 1.000 €  1.100 € 
8 1.000 €  1.150 € 
9 1.000 €  1.200 € 
10 1.000 €  1.300 € 
11 1.000 €  1.400 € 
12 1.000 €  1.500 € 
13 1.000 €  1.750 € 
14 1.000 €  2.000 € 
 
Interviewer: Starten Sie bitte mit Zeile 1 und der Frage: „Wie entscheiden Sie sich? 1.000€ in 
6 Monaten oder 1.000€ in 12 Monaten?“. Entscheidet sich der Befragte für Option A, geht es 
weiter mit Zeile zwei und der Frage „Wie entscheiden Sie sich? 1.000€ in 6 Monaten oder 
1.010€ in 12 Monaten?“ usw. Das Experiment ist beendet, sobald der Befragte sich das erste 
Mal für Option B entscheidet. Bitte notieren Sie die Nummer der Zeile, in der sich der 
Befragte das erste Mal für Option B entschieden hat. 
Option B wurde gewählt in Zeile Nummer:   
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 Für die folgenden Fragen würde ich Ihnen jetzt gerne das Gerät übergeben und Sie bitten, 
die entsprechenden Antworten selbst auszufüllen. Bitte antworten Sie ganz ehrlich. Ich 
versichere Ihnen, dass Ihre Angaben absolut vertraulich und anonym behandelt werden. Die 
Auswertung der Daten wird nur auf Basis aller durchgeführten Interviews erfolgen, eine 
Zuordnung Ihrer Angaben zu Ihrer Person ist nicht möglich. 
 
Bei Fragen stehe ich Ihnen gerne zur Verfügung. 
 
Interviewer: Bitte für diesen Komplex das Gerät zum Selbstausfüllen an die Befragte 
übergeben! 
 
 
10 Sie finden weiter unten eine Gegenüberstellung einiger gegensätzlicher Aussagen über 
Staat und Politik. Bitte geben Sie jeweils an, welcher der Aussagen sie am ehesten 
zustimmen. 
Den Politikern in 
Deutschland kann man im 
Großen und Ganzen 
vertrauen 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Ich habe überhaupt kein 
Vertrauen in die Politiker in 
Deutschland 
Die meisten Politiker in 
Deutschland handeln im 
Sinne des Allgemeinwohls 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Die meisten Politiker in 
Deutschland bedienen 
lediglich die Interessen 
einzelner Gruppen  
Den meisten Politikern 
geht es bei Ihren 
Entscheidungen darum, 
was langfristig am besten 
für das Land ist 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Die meisten Politiker denken 
bei ihren Entscheidungen nur 
bis zur nächsten Wahl 
Der Staat geht 
gewissenhaft mit 
Steuergeldern um 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Der Staat verschwendet 
Steuergelder 
Der Staat sollte für 
gleichwertige 
Lebensverhältnisse sorgen 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Der Staat sollte in die 
Lebensverhältnisse der 
Menschen nicht eingreifen 
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 11 Wenn am kommenden Sonntag Bundestagswahl wäre, welche Partei würden Sie dann 
mit Ihrer Zweitstimme wählen? 
CDU/CSU □ 
SPD □ 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen □ 
FDP □ 
Piraten □ 
Linkspartei/PDS □ 
NPD □ 
Andere Partei □ 
Würde nicht wählen □ 
 
 
12 Sind Sie Mitglied in einer Gewerkschaft? 
Ja □ 
Nein □ 
 
 
13 Haben Sie Kinder? Wenn ja, wie viele? 
Ja □        Bitte Anzahl eingeben:   ____ 
Nein □ 
 
 
14 Wie zufrieden sind Sie, alles in allem, mit Ihrer wirtschaftlichen Situation? 
Ganz und gar zufrieden □ □ □ □ □ Ganz und gar unzufrieden 
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 15 Anschließend würden wir Ihnen gerne einige Wissensfragen stellen. Bitte kreuzen Sie 
diejenige Antwort an, die Sie für richtig halten. 
Wie hoch war 2012 die 
Neuverschuldung des Bundes in 
Prozent des Bruttoinlandsprodukts 
ungefähr? 
1% 
□ 
3% 
□ 
5% 
□ 
7% 
□ 
Wie hoch ist derzeit der Zins auf 
langfristige Staatsanleihen (Laufzeit: 
10 Jahre) ungefähr? 
1,5% 
□ 
3% 
□ 
5,5% 
□ 
10% 
□ 
Wie hoch war die Inflationsrate in 
2012 ungefähr? 
0% 
□ 
2% 
□ 
5% 
□ 
10% 
□ 
 
 
Anfang 2013 wurde der Beitragssatz zur gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung gesenkt. Im 
Ergebnis sinkt dadurch die Abgabenbelastung. Wir möchten Ihnen nun einige Fragen zu Ihrer 
Reaktion auf die Beitragssatzsenkung stellen. 
 
 
16 Um Ihnen im Folgenden die passenden Fragen stellen zu können, benötigen wir eine 
Information zu Ihrer beruflichen Situation. Was trifft auf Sie am ehesten zu?  
Arbeiter(in) oder Angestellte(r) □ 
Auszubildende(r) □ 
Arbeitssuchende(r) □ 
Unternehmer(in), Selbstständige(r) oder Freiberufler(in) □ 
Beamter/in □ 
Schüler(in) oder Student(in) □ 
Geringfügig oder unregelmäßig Beschäftigte(r) □ 
Rentner(in) oder Pensionär(in) □ 
Sonstiges □ 
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 [Automatische Filterung: Die folgende Frage war nur dann zu beantworten, wenn bei Frage 
16 „Unternehmer(in), Selbstständige(r) oder Freiberufler(in)“ oder „Geringfügig oder 
unregelmäßig Beschäftigte(r)“ gewählt wurde] 
 
17 Zahlen Sie zurzeit in die gesetzliche Rentenversicherung ein, um für sich selber 
Rentenversicherungsansprüche zu erwerben?  
Ja □ 
Nein □ 
 
 
[Automatische Filterung: Die Fragen 18 bis 22 waren nur dann zu beantworten, wenn bei 
Frage 16 „Arbeiter(in) oder Angestellte(r)“ oder „Auszubildende(r)“ oder bei Frage 17 mit „Ja“ 
angegeben wurde] 
 
18 Wenn Sie an die Finanzsituation Ihres Haushaltes denken, wofür verwenden Sie das durch 
die Beitragssatzsenkung zusätzlich bereitgestellte Haushaltseinkommen am ehesten? Um 
zusätzliche Ausgaben zu tätigen, um Schulden abzubauen oder um zu sparen? 
Um Ausgaben zu tätigen □ 
Um Schulden abzubauen □ 
Um zu sparen □ 
 
 
19 Was denken Sie, wird die aktuelle Senkung der Rentenversicherungsbeiträge in Zukunft 
zu höheren Rentenversicherungsbeiträgen führen? 
Ja □ 
Nein □ 
 
 
20 Und denken Sie, dass die aktuelle Senkung der Rentenversicherungsbeiträge in Zukunft zu 
niedrigeren Renten aus der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung führen wird? 
Ja □ 
Nein □ 
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 21 Haushalte haben verschiedene Arten, Ihr Haushaltsbudget zu planen. Was würde Ihre 
Vorgehensweise am ehesten beschreiben? 
Ich versuche, monatlich einen festen Betrag zu sparen oder zum Rückzahlen von 
Schulden zu verwenden. 
□ 
Ich versuche, monatlich einen festen Betrag für Ausgaben zu verwenden. □ 
Nichts davon □ 
 
 
22 Wir möchten Ihnen noch einige allgemeine Fragen stellen. 
Was denken Sie, wie wird Ihre eigene 
wirtschaftliche Lage in einem Jahr sein? 
Wesentlich 
schlechter als heute 
   Wesentlich besser 
als heute 
 □ □ □ □ □ 
      
Was denken Sie, wie wird die Inflation 
in Deutschland in den nächsten fünf 
Jahren sein? 
Wesentlich niedriger 
als heute 
   Wesentlich höher 
als heute 
 □ □ □ □ □ 
      
Was denken Sie, wie sicher sind 
Sparanlagen heute in Deutschland im 
Vergleich zu vor zehn Jahren? 
Wesentlich 
unsicherer als vor 
zehn Jahren 
   Wesentlich 
sicherer als vor 
zehn Jahren 
 □ □ □ □ □ 
      
Was denken Sie, wie sehr lohnen sich 
Sparanlagen heute in Deutschland im 
Vergleich zu vor zehn Jahren? 
Wesentlich weniger 
als vor zehn Jahren 
 
   Wesentlich mehr 
als vor zehn 
Jahren 
 □ □ □ □ □ 
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 [Automatische Filterung: Die folgende Frage war nur dann zu beantworten, wenn bei Frage 
16 „Arbeiter(in) oder Angestellte(r)“, „Auszubildende(r)“, „Arbeitssuchende(r)“, 
„Unternehmer(in), Selbstständige(r) oder Freiberufler(in)“ oder „Geringfügig oder 
unregelmäßig Beschäftigte(r)“ angegeben wurde] 
 
23 Wenn Sie über Umfang und Intensität Ihres beruflichen Engagements entscheiden, spielt 
dabei im Allgemeinen die Steuer- und Abgabenbelastung eine Rolle? 
Ja □ 
Nein □ 
 
 
[Automatische Filterung: Die folgende Frage war nur dann zu beantworten, wenn bei Frage 
23 „Ja“ angegeben wurde] 
 
24 Ganz allgemein gesprochen, welchen Einfluss hat die Senkung der 
Rentenversicherungsbeiträge auf Ihr berufliches Engagement? 
Mein berufliches Engagement ist 
jetzt wesentlich kleiner 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Mein berufliches Engagement ist jetzt 
wesentlich größer 
 
 
Bitte übergeben Sie das Gerät wieder an die Interviewerin / den Interviewer! 
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 A.2 The questionnaire (English translation) 
The following table contains information on annual public expenditures by policy areas in 
euros per capita, and also as proportion of total state expenditures. The table focuses on 
important spending categories. 
 
Interviewer: Please give the interviewee sufficient time to study the table attentively. 
 
Policy area Description Spending per 
capita 
Proportion on 
total 
Social security e.g. unemployment 
compensation, social welfare, 
family and youth welfare 
7,660€ 56.6% 
Education e.g. public schools and 
universities 
1,125€ 8.3% 
Public safety e.g. police, justice system 455€ 3.3% 
Infrastructure e.g. road and town construction 350€ 2.6% 
Economic development e.g. promotion of small- and 
medium-sized companies, 
investment allowances, financial 
support for disadvantaged 
regions 
335€ 2.5% 
Defence e.g. military equipment, service 
pay, defence administration 
335€ 2.5% 
Total  10,260€ 75.8% 
 
Assume that you could modify public expenditures and revenues according to your wishes. 
For example, presume that you could increase public spending in any particular policy area. 
In this case, however, you would need either to incur additional public debts, increase taxes, 
or cut public spending in another policy area. Or in order to decrease public spending in a 
policy area, you must either reduce public debts, decrease taxes, or increase public spending 
in another policy area. In the following, please state for which of the aforementioned policy 
areas should public spending be increased or decreased. Also state how a potential increase 
in public spending should be financed or for what the excess funds should be used. 
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 Interviewer: Please make sure that the interviewee has understood the task. Otherwise, 
please repeat and explain. 
 
1 In which policy areas should the state spend more? 
The state should spend more on (check as many as apply)…  
… social security □ 
… education □ 
… public safety □ 
... infrastructure □ 
… economic development □ 
… defence □ 
… other areas □ 
The state should not spend more □ 
 
Note: If ‘The state should not spend more’ is checked then no other option can be mentioned.  
 
[Automatic filtering: The following question is only applicable if the respondent would like to 
increase public spending in at least one policy area.] 
 
1A The increase in public spending should be financed via (check as many as apply)… 
… a tax increase □ 
… incurrence of public debt □ 
… a decrease in public spending in another policy area (see below) □ 
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 2 In which policy areas should the state spend less? 
The state should spend less on (check as many as apply)…  
… social security □ 
… education □ 
… public safety □ 
... infrastructure □ 
… economic development □ 
… defence □ 
… other areas □ 
The state should not spend less □ 
 
Note:  If ‘The state should not spend less’ is checked than no other option can be mentioned. 
 
[Automatic filtering: The following question is only applicable if the respondent would like to 
decrease public spending in at least one policy area.] 
 
2A The excess funds should be used for (check as many as apply)… 
… a tax decrease □ 
… a reduction of public debt □ 
… an increase in public spending in another policy area (see above) □ 
 
 
Interviewer: Please control for the consistency of replies. If a respondent opts for additional 
spending in one area and answers in question 1A that this increase in spending should be 
financed by cutting expenditures in another area, this implies that one of the first seven 
options in question 2 need to be chosen. 
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 3 According to the latest tax estimation, the state is going to increase revenues by a further 
€23 billion within the next four years. In your opinion, how should the state use the 
additional revenues? Please name at maximum those three alternatives you prefer the most. 
 1st choice  2nd choice  3rd choice 
Decrease taxes □ □ □ 
Reduce public debt □ □ □ 
Increase public spending on …    
… social security □ □ □ 
… public safety and order □ □ □ 
… education □ □ □ 
… infrastructure □ □ □ 
… economic development □ □ □ 
… defence □ □ □ 
… other areas □ □ □ 
No response □ □ □ 
Note: Please check only one box per column 
 
 
4 At the end of 2012 the outstanding amount of public debt in Germany was above 
€2 trillion. This equals €26,000 per inhabitant or 80% of gross domestic product (GDP), 
respectively. In your opinion, should the state reduce public debts, keep the amount of 
public debt at its current level, or incur additional public debts? 
Reduce debt □ 
Keep debt at current level □ 
Incur additional debt □ 
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 [Automatic filtering: The following question is only applicable if the interviewed person would 
like to reduce public debt] 
 
4A What should the state do to reduce public debt? Please name a maximum of three 
alternatives you prefer the most. 
 1st choice   2nd choice   3rd choice 
Increase taxes □ □ □ 
Cut public spending on …    
… social security □ □ □ 
… public safety □ □ □ 
… education □ □ □ 
… infrastructure □ □ □ 
… economic development □ □ □ 
… defense □ □ □ 
… other areas □ □ □ 
No response □ □ □ 
Note: Please check only one box per column 
 
 
[Automatic filtering: The following question is only applicable if the interviewed person would 
like to reduce public debt] 
 
4B Assume you could choose between three alternatives for public debt reduction (suppose 
that the reduction of public debt is illustrated by means of the money piles shown below. A 
small money pile means that little debt is reduced, a big money pile means that much debt is 
reduced): 
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 Option A: Debt reduction is distributed evenly over the next years, i.e., in each year a similar 
amount of debt is reduced. 
 
 
Option B: The extent of debt reduction increases over the next years, i.e., in the near future 
a smaller part of debt is reduced and in the far future a larger part of debt is reduced.  
 
Option C: The extent of debt reduction decreases over the next years, i.e., in the near future 
a larger part of debt is reduced and in the far future a smaller part of debt is reduced. 
 
 
For which option would you decide? 
Option A: In each year a similar amount of debt should be reduced □ 
Option B: In the near future a smaller part of debt should be reduced and in the far 
future a larger part of debt should be reduced 
□ 
Option C: In the near future a larger part of debt should be reduced and in the far 
future a smaller part of debt should be reduced 
□ 
Don’t know □ 
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 [Automatic filtering: The following question was only applicable if the interviewed expressed 
that the state should take on additional public debt] 
 
4C What should the state do with the additional funds? Please name a maximum of three 
alternatives you prefer the most. 
 1st choice   2nd choice   3rd choice 
Decrease taxes □ □ □ 
Increase public spending on …    
… social security □ □ □ 
… public safety □ □ □ 
… education □ □ □ 
… infrastructure □ □ □ 
… economic development □ □ □ 
… defence □ □ □ 
… other areas □ □ □ 
No response □ □ □ 
Note: Please check only one box per column 
 
 
5 In 2016 the federal debt brake comes into force. From this moment on, the federal 
government can take on almost no additional public debt. Exemptions are allowed only in 
times of economic crises or natural disasters. What is your opinion on the debt brake? 
I am against the debt brake – the incurrence of public debt should not be restricted □ 
I am in favour of the debt brake in the aforementioned form □ 
The debt brake is still not enough – the government should not be allowed to incur 
public debt at all 
□ 
No response □ 
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 6 Between 2008 and 2012, we have seen a rapid acceleration of public debt. Did this 
increasing reliance on debt financing lead to changes in the way you spend or save? 
Yes, I now spend a smaller proportion of my income and save a larger proportion □ 
Yes, I spend a larger proportion of my income and save a smaller proportion □ 
No, I did not change my behaviour in consequence to the rapid increase in public debt □ 
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 7 Next, we would like to conduct some experiments concerned with financial decisions. In 
the first experiment, you make your decisions according to the following table (Interviewer: 
please show the table below). In each row you see two alternatives. You can choose between 
a certain payoff and participation in a lottery, which follows the principle ‘all or nothing’: You 
have a 50% chance of winning €1,000 and a 50% chance of winning €0. 
You start in row 1 and then proceed row by row. In each row, please choose between the 
certain payoff (column A) and participation in the lottery (column B). The lottery remains the 
same in all rows. Only the certain payoff increases from row to row.  
 
 You get…  You get… 
 
Safe 
 
1,000€ or nothing 
Chance of winning 50:50 
 A or B 
1 €0  Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
2 €100  Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
3 €200  Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
4 €300  Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
5 €400  Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
6 €500  Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
7 €600  Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
8 €700  Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
9 €800  Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
10 €900  Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
 
Interviewer: Please start with row 1 and the question ‘What do you choose? €0 safe or 
chance of winning €1,000/€0?’. If the interviewee chooses option B, please proceed to row 2 
and the question ‘How do you choose? €100 safe or chance of winning €1,000/€0?’. The 
experiment ends when the interviewee chooses option A for the first time. Please write down 
the number of the row where the respondent chose option A for the first time. 
 
Option A was first chosen in row number:  
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 8 In the next experiment you decide according to the following table (Interviewer: please 
show the table below). In each row, you see two alternatives. You can choose between a 
certain payoff of €1,000, which is paid to you immediately and a higher certain payoff, which 
will be paid to you in 6 months.  
You start in row 1 and then proceed row by row. In each row, please choose between the 
payoff of €1,000 to be paid immediately (column A) and the higher payoff to be paid in 6 
months (column B). The payoff on the left remains the same in all rows. Only the payoff on 
the right increases from row to row. 
 
 You get…  You get… 
 Immediately  In 6 month 
 A or B 
1 €1,000  €1,000 
2 €1,000  €1,010 
3 €1,000  €1,020 
4 €1,000  €1,030 
5 €1,000  €1,050 
6 €1,000  €1,075 
7 €1,000  €1,100 
8 €1,000  €1,150 
9 €1,000  €1,200 
10 €1,000  €1,300 
11 €1,000  €1,400 
12 €1,000  €1,500 
13 €1,000  €1,750 
14 €1,000  €2,000 
 
Interviewer: Please start with row 1 and the question ‘What do you choose? €1,000 
immediately or €1,000 in 6 months?’. If the interviewee chooses option A, please proceed to 
row 2 and the question ‘What do you choose? €1,000 immediately or €1,010 in 6 months?’. 
The experiment ends when the interviewee chooses option B for the first time. Please write 
down the number of the row where the interviewee chose option B for the first time. 
 
Option B was first chosen in row number:    
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 9 In the last experiment, you decide according to the following table (Interviewer: please 
show the table below). In each row, you see two alternatives. You can choose between a 
certain payoff of €1,000, which is paid to you in 6 months and a higher certain payoff, which 
will be paid to you in 12 months.  
You start in row 1 and then proceed row by row. In each row, please choose between the 
payoff of €1,000 to be paid in 6 months (column A) and the higher payoff to be paid in 12 
months (column B). The payoff on the left remains the same in all rows. Only the payoff on 
the right increases from row to row. 
 
 You get…  You get… 
 In 6 month  In 12 month 
 A or B 
1 €1,000  €1,000 
2 €1,000  €1,010 
3 €1,000  €1,020 
4 €1,000  €1,030 
5 €1,000  €1,050 
6 €1,000  €1,075 
7 €1,000  €1,100 
8 €1,000  €1,150 
9 €1,000  €1,200 
10 €1,000  €1,300 
11 €1,000  €1,400 
12 €1,000  €1,500 
13 €1,000  €1,750 
14 €1,000  €2,000 
 
Interviewer: Please start with row 1 and the question ‘What do you choose? €1,000 in 6 
months or €1,000 in 12 months?’. If the interviewee chooses option A, please proceed to row 
2 and the question ‘What do you choose? €1,000 in 6 months or €1,010 in 12 months?’. The 
experiment ends when the interviewee chooses option B for the first time. Please write down 
the number of the row in which the interviewee chose option B for the first time. 
Option B was first chosen in row number:    
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 For the following questions I will hand you the console so that you can answer the questions 
on your own. Please answer honestly. I assure you that all your answers are treated 
confidentially and anonymously. Data evaluation will be based on all interviews so that 
nobody will be able to associate your answers with you. 
 
If you have questions, I would be happy to offer my help. 
 
Interviewer: Please hand over the console to the interviewee. 
 
 
10 Below you find a battery of contradictory statements about the state and politics. Please 
indicate with which statement you agree the most.  
All in all, I have confidence 
in politicians in Germany 
□ □ □ □ □ 
I do not have any confidence 
in politicians in Germany 
Most politicians in 
Germany act in line with 
the general public’s 
interest 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Most politicians in Germany 
only serve the interests of 
particular groups 
Most politicians are 
concerned about the 
country’s long-term well-
being 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Most politicians are only 
concerned about the next 
elections 
The government manages 
tax revenues 
conscientiously 
□ □ □ □ □ 
The government wastes tax 
revenues  
The state should ensure 
equal living conditions 
□ □ □ □ □ 
The state should not interfere 
with people’s living 
conditions 
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 11 Which party would you vote for if federal elections were held this Sunday? 
CDU/CSU □ 
SPD □ 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen □ 
FDP □ 
Piraten □ 
Linkspartei/PDS □ 
NPD □ 
Other party □ 
I would not vote □ 
 
 
12 Are you a union member? 
Yes □ 
No □ 
 
 
13 Do you have children? If yes, how many children do you have? 
Yes □        Please state how many:   ____ 
No □ 
 
 
14 How satisfied are you with your overall economic situation? 
Absolutely satisfied □ □ □ □ □ Absolutely dissatisfied 
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 15 We would now like to ask some questions related to knowledge. Please indicate the 
answer you deem correct. 
How large was the budget deficit 
of the federal government in 
2012? 
1% 
□ 
3% 
□ 
5% 
□ 
7% 
□ 
What is the current interest rate 
on long-term government bonds 
(maturity 10 years), 
approximately? 
1.5% 
□ 
3% 
□ 
5.5% 
□ 
10% 
□ 
How large was the inflation rate 
in 2012, approximately? 
0% 
□ 
2% 
□ 
5% 
□ 
10% 
□ 
 
 
 
At the beginning of 2013, contribution rates to the statutory pension system have been 
reduced. In effect, this reduces the overall tax burden. We are interested in your responses 
to the rate cut. 
 
16 To ask you the correct questions, we need information on your employment situation. 
Which answer best applies to you?  
Employee □ 
Apprentice □ 
Unemployed □ 
Employer □ 
Public servant □ 
Pupil □ 
Insignificantly employed □ 
Pensioner □ 
Other □ 
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 [Automatic filtering: the following question is only applicable if question 16 was answered by 
‘Employer’ or ‘Insignificantly employed’] 
 
17 Do you currently contribute to the public pension system in order to acquire your own 
pension entitlements? 
Yes □ 
No □ 
 
 
[Automatic filtering: questions 18 to 22 are only applicable if question 16 was answered by 
‘Employee’ or ‘Apprentice’ or question 17 was answered by ‘Yes’] 
 
 
18 Thinking about your household’s financial situation, will you use the additional budget 
mostly to increase spending, mostly to increase saving, or mostly to pay off debt? 
Increase spending □ 
Repay debt □ 
Increase savings □ 
 
 
19 Will the recent cut in pension insurance contribution rates lead to higher contribution 
rates in the future? 
Yes □ 
No □ 
 
 
20 Will the recent cut in pension insurance contribution rates lead to lower pension 
payments? 
Yes □ 
No □ 
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 21 Some households have different approaches to household budgeting. What best 
describes yours? 
I try to use a fixed amount to save or to repay debt □ 
I try to use a fixed amount for expenditures □ 
Something else □ 
 
 
22 We would now like to ask you some general questions. 
How do you expect your economic 
situation to be in one year? 
Much worse than 
today 
   Much better than 
today 
 □ □ □ □ □ 
      
In your opinion, how will inflation 
develop over the next five years? 
Much lower than 
today 
   Much higher than 
today 
 □ □ □ □ □ 
      
How secure do you think savings are in 
Germany today in comparison to ten 
years ago? 
Much more insecure 
than ten years ago 
   Much more 
secure than ten 
years ago 
 □ □ □ □ □ 
      
How profitable do you think savings 
are in Germany today compared with 
ten years ago? 
Much less than ten 
years ago 
 
   Much more than 
ten years ago 
 □ □ □ □ □ 
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 [Automatic filtering: The following question is only applicable if question 16 was answered by 
‘Employee’, ‘Apprentice’, ‘Unemployed’, ‘Employer’ or ‘Insignificantly employed’] 
 
23 Does the tax burden usually matter for your job-related decisions? 
Yes □ 
No □ 
 
 
[Automatic filtering: The following question is only applicable if question 23 was answered 
‘Yes’] 
 
24 What impact does the contribution rate cut have on your general job-related efforts? 
I substantially decreased my job-
related efforts 
□ □ □ □ □ 
I substantially increased my job-
related efforts 
 
 
Please hand the console back to the interviewer. 
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 Appendix B: Descriptive statistics1 
Item 1: On which policy areas should the state spend more? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Social security 0.427 0.011 [0.406, 0.449] 872 
Education 0.606 0.011 [0.585, 0.627] 1,238 
Public security and order 0.316 0.010 [0.296, 0.337] 646 
Infrastructure 0.179 0.008 [0.162, 0.195] 365 
Economic development 0.208 0.009 [0.190, 0.225] 424 
Defense 0.016 0.003 [0.011, 0.022] 33 
Other areas 0.101 0.007 [0.088, 0.114] 206 
State should not spend more 0.155 0.008 [0.139, 0.170] 316 
No response 0.000   0 
Notes: Multiple answers were possible. Table is based on 2,042 responses. 
 
Item 1A: How should the increase in public spending be financed?  
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Tax increase 0.098 0.007 [0.084, 0.113] 170 
Incurrence of public debt 0.122 0.008 [0.107, 0.138] 211 
Decrease in public spending 0.858 0.008 [0.842, 0.875] 1,481 
No response 0.000   0 
Notes: Multiple answers were possible. Table is based on 1,726 responses. 
 
  
1 Tables report standard errors (S.E.) and confidence intervals (C.I.) for proportions. Confidence intervals are 
based on 95 percent level of confidence. Proportions may not sum to one due to rounding error, or because 
multiple answers were possible. 
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 Item 2: On which policy areas should the state spend less? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Social security 0.120 0.007 [0.106, 0.135] 246 
Education 0.009 0.002 [0.005, 0.013] 19 
Public security and order 0.026 0.004 [0.019, 0.033] 54 
Infrastructure 0.069 0.006 [0.058, 0.080] 140 
Economic development 0.159 0.008 [0.143, 0.175] 325 
Defense 0.615 0.011 [0.594, 0.636] 1,256 
Other areas 0.362 0.011 [0.341, 0.383] 739 
State should not spend less 0.105 0.007 [0.092, 0.118] 214 
No response 0.000   0 
Notes: Multiple answers were possible. Table is based on 2,042 responses. 
 
Item 2A: How should the excess funds be used? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Tax decrease 0.354 0.011 [0.332, 0.376] 647 
Reduction of public debt 0.483 0.012 [0.460, 0.506] 883 
Increase in public spending 0.503 0.012 [0.480, 0.526] 919 
No response 0.000   0 
Notes: Multiple answers were possible. Table is based on 1,828 responses. 
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 Item 3: How should the state use the additional 23 bn €? (Proportions) 
 1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice 
Decrease taxes 0.302 0.137 0.118 
Reduce public debt 0.200 0.203 0.138 
Increase public spending on …    
… social security 0.121 0.136 0.108 
… public safety and order 0.055 0.115 0.103 
… education 0.218 0.211 0.143 
… infrastructure 0.018 0.047 0.079 
… economic development 0.027 0.064 0.080 
… defense 0.006 0.011 0.021 
… other areas 0.021 0.028 0.095 
No response 0.032 0.049 0.115 
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
Item 3: How should the state use the additional 23 bn €? (S.E.) 
 1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice 
Decrease taxes 0.010 0.008 0.007 
Reduce public debt 0.009 0.009 0.008 
Increase public spending on …    
… social security 0.007 0.008 0.007 
… public safety and order 0.005 0.007 0.007 
… education 0.009 0.009 0.008 
… infrastructure 0.003 0.005 0.006 
… economic development 0.004 0.005 0.006 
… defense 0.002 0.002 0.003 
… other areas 0.003 0.004 0.006 
No response 0.004 0.005 0.007 
Total    
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 Item 3: How should the state use the additional 23 bn €? (C.I.) 
 1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice 
Decrease taxes [0.282, 0.322] [0.122, 0.152] [0.104, 0.132] 
Reduce public debt [0.182, 0.217] [0.185, 0.220] [0.123, 0.153] 
Expand public expenditures on …    
… social security [0.107, 0.136] [0.121, 0.151] [0.095, 0.122] 
… public safety and order [0.045, 0.065] [0.101, 0.128] [0.090, 0.117] 
… education [0.200, 0.236] [0.193, 0.228] [0.128, 0.158] 
… infrastructure [0.012, 0.024] [0.038, 0.056] [0.068, 0.091] 
… economic development [0.020, 0.034] [0.053, 0.074] [0.069, 0.092] 
… defense [0.003, 0.009] [0.006, 0.015] [0.014, 0.027] 
… other areas [0.014, 0.027] [0.021, 0.036] [0.082, 0.108] 
No response [0.024, 0.039] [0.040, 0.059] [0.101, 0.128] 
Total    
 
Item 3: How should the state use the additional 23 bn €? (Counts) 
 1st choice   2nd choice   3rd choice   
Decrease taxes 617 279 240 
Reduce public debt 408 414 282 
Increase public spending on …    
… social security 248 278 221 
… public safety and order 113 234 211 
… education 445 430 292 
… infrastructure 37 96 162 
… economic development 55 130 164 
… defense 12 22 42 
… other areas 42 58 194 
No response 65 101 240 
Total 2,042 2,042 2,042 
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 Item 4: What should the state do with public debt? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Reduce debt 0.747 0.010 [0.728, 0.766] 1,525 
Keep debt at current level 0.237 0.009 [0.219, 0.255] 484 
Take on additional debt 0.016 0.003 [0.011, 0.022] 33 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 4A: How should the state reduce public debt? (Proportions) 
 1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice 
Increase taxes 0.049 0.041 0.117 
Cut public spending on …    
… social security 0.110 0.055 0.064 
… public safety and order 0.018 0.040 0.030 
… education 0.023 0.025 0.018 
… infrastructure 0.018 0.066 0.052 
… economic development 0.075 0.138 0.073 
… defense 0.410 0.201 0.058 
… other areas 0.165 0.210 0.161 
No response 0.133 0.224 0.428 
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000 
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 Item 4A: How should the state reduce public debt? (Standard errors) 
 1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice 
Increase taxes 0.006 0.005 0.008 
Cut public spending on …    
… social security 0.008 0.006 0.006 
… public safety and order 0.003 0.005 0.004 
… education 0.004 0.004 0.003 
… infrastructure 0.003 0.006 0.006 
… economic development 0.007 0.009 0.007 
… defense 0.013 0.010 0.006 
… other areas 0.009 0.010 0.009 
No response 0.009 0.011 0.013 
Total    
 
Item 4A: How should the state reduce public debt? (Confidence intervals) 
 1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice 
Increase taxes [0.038, 0.059] [0.031, 0.051] [0.101, 0.133] 
Cut public spending on …    
… social security [0.094, 0.125] [0.044, 0.067] [0.051, 0.076] 
… public safety and order [0.012, 0.025] [0.030, 0.050] [0.021, 0.038] 
… education [0.015, 0.030] [0.017, 0.033] [0.012, 0.025] 
… infrastructure [0.011, 0.024] [0.053, 0.078] [0.041, 0.064] 
… economic development [0.062, 0.088] [0.121, 0.156] [0.060, 0.086] 
… defense [0.386, 0.435] [0.181, 0.221] [0.046, 0.069] 
… other areas [0.146, 0.183] [0.189, 0.230] [0.143, 0.180] 
No response [0.116, 0.150] [0.203, 0.245] [0.403, 0.452] 
Total    
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 Item 4A: How should the state reduce public debt? (Count) 
 1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice 
Increase taxes 74 62 178 
Cut public spending on …    
… social security 167 84 97 
… public safety and order 28 61 45 
… education 35 38 28 
… infrastructure 27 100 80 
… economic development 114 211 111 
… defense 626 307 88 
… other areas 251 320 246 
No response 203 342 652 
Total 1,525 1,525 1,525 
 
Item 4B: How should the burden of debt reduction be distributed over time? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Evenly 0.622 0.012 [0.598, 0.647] 949 
First less, then more 0.108 0.008 [0.092, 0.123] 164 
First more, then less 0.205 0.010 [0.184, 0.225] 312 
No response 0.066 0.006 [0.053, 0.078] 100 
Total 1.000   1,525 
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 Item 4C: For what purpose should the state incur additional debt? (Proportions) 
 1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice 
Cut taxes 0.303 0.061 0.091 
Increase public spending on …    
… social security 0.303 0.212 0.091 
… public safety and order  0.182 0.091 
… education 0.242 0.182 0.152 
… infrastructure  0.091 0.030 
… economic development 0.030 0.121 0.152 
… defense   0.030 
… other areas 0.030 0.061 0.212 
No response 0.091 0.091 0.152 
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
Item 4C: For what purpose should the state incur additional debt? (Standard errors) 
 1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice 
Cut taxes 0.081 0.042 0.051 
Increase public spending on …    
… social security 0.081 0.072 0.051 
… public safety and order  0.068 0.051 
… education 0.076 0.068 0.063 
… infrastructure  0.051 0.030 
… economic development 0.030 0.058 0.063 
… defense   0.030 
… other areas 0.030 0.042 0.072 
No response 0.051 0.051 0.063 
Total    
  
51 
 
 Item 4C: For what purpose should the state incur additional debt? (Confidence intervals) 
 1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice 
Cut taxes [0.138, 0.469] [-0.025, 0.147] [-0.013, 0.194] 
Increase public spending on …    
… social security [0.138, 0.469] [0.065, 0.359] [-0.013, 0.194] 
… public safety and order  [0.043, 0.321] [-0.013, 0.194] 
… education [0.088, 0.397] [0.043, 0.321] [0.022, 0.281] 
… infrastructure  [-0.013, 0.194] [-0.031, 0.092] 
… economic development [-0.031, 0.092] [0.004, 0.239] [0.022, 0.281] 
… defense   [-0.031, 0.092] 
… other areas [-0.031, 0.092] [-0.025, 0.147] [0.065, 0.359] 
No response [-0.013, 0.194] [-0.013, 0.194] [0.022, 0.281] 
Total    
 
Item 4C: For what purpose should the state incur additional debt? (Counts) 
 1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice 
Cut taxes 10 2 3 
Increase public spending on …    
… social security 10 7 3 
… public safety and order 0 6 3 
… education 8 6 5 
… infrastructure 0 3 1 
… economic development 1 4 5 
… defense 0 0 1 
… other areas 1 2 7 
No response 3 3 5 
Total 33 33 33 
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 Item 5: What is your opinion on the debt brake? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
I am against the debt brake 0.081 0.006 [0.069, 0.093] 165 
I am in favor of the debt brake 0.606 0.011 [0.585, 0.627] 1,238 
The debt brake is still not enough 0.170 0.008 [0.154, 0.187] 348 
No response 0.143 0.008 [0.127, 0.158] 291 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 6: Did the recent increase in public induce changes in your spending behavior? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Spend less/save more 0.070 0.006 [0.059, 0.081] 143 
Spend more/save less 0.176 0.008 [0.160, 0.193] 360 
No change 0.754 0.010 [0.735, 0.772] 1,539 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 7: Which safe amount do you require to forego the 50/50 chance to win 1,000 €? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
0 € safe 0.088 0.006 [0.076, 0.100] 180 
100 € safe 0.131 0.007 [0.117, 0.146] 268 
200 € safe 0.067 0.006 [0.056, 0.078] 137 
300 € safe 0.075 0.006 [0.063, 0.086] 153 
400 € safe 0.071 0.006 [0.060, 0.082] 145 
500 € safe 0.177 0.008 [0.161, 0.194] 362 
600 € safe 0.036 0.004 [0.028, 0.044] 74 
700 € safe 0.030 0.004 [0.023, 0.038] 62 
800 € safe 0.019 0.003 [0.013, 0.024] 38 
900 € safe 0.256 0.010 [0.237, 0.275] 523 
Never accept 0.049 0.005 [0.040, 0.058] 100 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
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 Item 8: For which amount paid in six month are you willing to forego payment today? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
1,000 € 0.000   0 
1,010 € 0.034 0.004 [0.026, 0.042] 69 
1,020 € 0.016 0.003 [0.010, 0.021] 32 
1,030 € 0.015 0.003 [0.010, 0.020] 31 
1,050 € 0.025 0.003 [0.019, 0.032] 52 
1,075 € 0.019 0.003 [0.013, 0.024] 38 
1,100 € 0.047 0.005 [0.037, 0.056] 95 
1,150 € 0.019 0.003 [0.013, 0.024] 38 
1,200 € 0.046 0.005 [0.036, 0.055] 93 
1,300 € 0.046 0.005 [0.036, 0.055] 93 
1,400 € 0.030 0.004 [0.023, 0.038] 62 
1,500 € 0.079 0.006 [0.068, 0.091] 162 
1,750 € 0.013 0.003 [0.008, 0.018] 27 
2,000 € 0.413 0.011 [0.392, 0.435] 844 
Never accept 0.199 0.009 [0.181, 0.216] 406 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
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 Item 9: For which amount paid in twelve month would you forego payment in six month? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
1,000 € 0.000   0 
1,010 € 0.025 0.003 [0.019, 0.032] 52 
1,020 € 0.022 0.003 [0.015, 0.028] 44 
1,030 € 0.018 0.003 [0.012, 0.023] 36 
1,050 € 0.022 0.003 [0.016, 0.028] 45 
1,075 € 0.019 0.003 [0.013, 0.025] 39 
1,100 € 0.025 0.003 [0.019, 0.032] 52 
1,150 € 0.020 0.003 [0.014, 0.026] 41 
1,200 € 0.038 0.004 [0.029, 0.046] 77 
1,300 € 0.042 0.004 [0.033, 0.051] 86 
1,400 € 0.026 0.004 [0.019, 0.033] 53 
1,500 € 0.105 0.007 [0.092, 0.119] 215 
1,750 € 0.016 0.003 [0.011, 0.022] 33 
2,000 € 0.449 0.011 [0.427, 0.470] 916 
Never accept 0.173 0.008 [0.156, 0.189] 353 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
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 Item 10: Please rate the following (Proportions) 
 -2 -1 0 1 2  
I have confidence in 
politicians 
0.309 0.298 0.222 0.147 0.024 I do not have confidence in 
politicians 
Most politicians serve 
general public interest 
0.300 0.319 0.216 0.139 0.026 Most politicians only serve 
particular interest 
Most politicians are 
concerned about the 
country’s well-being 
0.369 0.262 0.228 0.119 0.022 Most politicians are only 
concerned about the next 
elections 
The state manages tax 
revenues conscientiously 
0.450 0.302 0.179 0.060 0.008 The state is wasteful with 
tax revenues  
The state should ensure 
equal living conditions 
0.080 0.091 0.245 0.277 0.308 The state should not 
ensure equality 
Notes: Table is based on 2,042 responses. 
 
Item 10: Please rate the following (Standard errors) 
 -2 -1 0 1 2  
I have confidence in 
politicians 
0.010 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.003 I do not have confidence in 
politicians 
Most politicians serve 
general public interest 
0.010 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.004 Most politicians only serve 
particular interest 
Most politicians are 
concerned about the 
country’s well-being 
0.011 0.010 0.009 0.007 0.003 Most politicians are only 
concerned about the next 
elections 
The state manages tax 
revenues conscientiously 
0.011 0.010 0.008 0.005 0.002 The state is wasteful with 
tax revenues  
The state should ensure 
equal living conditions 
0.006 0.006 0.010 0.010 0.010 The state should not 
ensure equality 
Notes: Table is based on 2,042 responses. 
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 Item 10: Please rate the following (Confidence intervalls) 
 -2 -1 0 1 2  
I have confidence in 
politicians 
[0.288, 
0.329] 
[0.278, 
0.318] 
[0.204, 
0.240] 
[0.132, 
0.162] 
[0.018, 
0.031] 
I do not have confidence 
in politicians 
Most politicians serve 
general public interest 
[0.280, 
0.320] 
[0.299, 
0.340] 
[0.199, 
0.234] 
[0.124, 
0.154] 
[0.019, 
0.033] 
Most politicians only 
serve particular interest 
Most politicians are 
concerned about the 
country’s well-being 
[0.348, 
0.390] 
[0.243, 
0.281] 
[0.210, 
0.246] 
[0.105, 
0.133] 
[0.015, 
0.028] 
Most politicians are only 
concerned about the 
next elections 
The state manages tax 
revenues conscientiously 
[0.428, 
0.472] 
[0.282, 
0.322] 
[0.163, 
0.196] 
[0.050, 
0.071] 
[0.004, 
0.012] 
The state is wasteful with 
tax revenues 
The state should ensure 
equal living conditions 
[0.068, 
0.092] 
[0.078, 
0.103] 
[0.226, 
0.264] 
[0.257, 
0.296] 
[0.288, 
0.328] 
The state should not 
ensure equality 
Notes: Table is based on 2,042 responses. 
 
Item 10: Please rate the following (Counts) 
 -2 -1 0 1 2  
I have confidence in 
politicians 
630 609 453 300 50 I do not have confidence in 
politicians 
Most politicians serve 
general public interest 
612 652 442 283 53 Most politicians only serve 
particular interest 
Most politicians are 
concerned about the 
country’s well-being 
754 535 466 243 44 Most politicians are only 
concerned about the next 
elections 
The state manages tax 
revenues conscientiously 
919 617 366 123 17 The state is wasteful with tax 
revenues  
The state should ensure 
equal living conditions 
163 185 500 565 629 The state should not ensure 
equality 
Notes: Table is based on 2,042 responses. 
57 
 
 Item 11: Opinion poll: Which party would you vote for? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
CDU/CSU 0.225 0.009 [0.207, 0.243] 459 
SPD 0.243 0.009 [0.224, 0.262] 496 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 0.137 0.008 [0.122, 0.152] 280 
FDP 0.037 0.004 [0.029, 0.045] 76 
Piraten 0.017 0.003 [0.012, 0.023] 35 
Die Linke 0.059 0.005 [0.049, 0.069] 120 
NPD 0.009 0.002 [0.005, 0.013] 19 
Other party 0.048 0.005 [0.039, 0.057] 98 
I would not vote 0.225 0.009 [0.207, 0.243] 459 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 12: Are you a member of a labor union? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Yes 0.091 0.006 [0.896, 0.921] 186 
No 0.909 0.006 [0.079, 0.104] 1,856 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
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 Item 13: How many children do you have? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
0 0.363 0.011 [0.342, 0.384] 741 
1 0.223 0.009 [0.205, 0.241] 455 
2 0.300 0.010 [0.280, 0.320] 613 
3 0.082 0.006 [0.070, 0.094] 167 
4 0.025 0.003 [0.018, 0.032] 51 
5 0.004 0.001 [0.001, 0.007] 8 
6 0.003 0.001 [0.001, 0.005] 6 
7 0.000 0.000 [0.000, 0.001] 1 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 14: How satisfied are you with your overall economic situation? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Very satisfied 0.071 0.006 [0.060, 0.074] 146 
Satisfied 0.349 0.011 [0.328, 0.157] 712 
Neutral 0.375 0.011 [0.354, 0.396] 765 
Dissatisfied 0.142 0.008 [0.127, 0.157] 290 
Very dissatisfied 0.063 0.005 [0.053, 0.074] 129 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
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 Item 15: Knowledge questions (Proportions) 
How large was the budget deficit 
of the federal government in 
2012? 
1% 3% 5% 7% 
0.090 0.428 0.315 0.167 
What is the current interest rate 
on long-term government bonds 
(maturity 10 years) 
approximately? 
1.5% 3% 5.5% 10% 
0.371 0.375 0.209 0.045 
How large was inflation in 2012 
approximately? 
0% 2% 5% 10% 
0.015 0.636 0.287 0.062 
Notes: Correct answers in bold letters. Table is based on 2,042 responses. 
 
Item 15: Knowledge questions (Standard errors) 
How large was the budget deficit 
of the federal government in 
2012? 
1% 3% 5% 7% 
0.006 0.011 0.010 0.008 
What is the current interest rate 
on long-term government bonds 
(maturity 10 years) 
approximately? 
1.5% 3% 5.5% 10% 
0.011 0.011 0.009 0.005 
How large was inflation in 2012 
approximately? 
0% 2% 5% 10% 
0.003 0.011 0.010 0.005 
Notes: Correct answers in bold letters. Table is based on 2,042 responses. 
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 Item 15: Knowledge questions (Confidence intervals) 
How large was the budget deficit 
of the federal government in 
2012? 
1% 3% 5% 7% 
[0.078, 
0.103] 
[0.407, 
0.449] 
[0.295, 
0.335] 
[0.151, 
0.183] 
What is the current interest rate 
on long-term government bonds 
(maturity 10 years) 
approximately? 
1.5% 3% 5.5% 10% 
[0.350, 
0.392] 
[0.354, 
0.396] 
[0.191, 
0.226] 
[0.036, 
0.054] 
How large was inflation in 2012 
approximately? 
0% 2% 5% 10% 
[0.010, 
0.020] 
[0.615, 
0.657] 
[0.267, 
0.307] 
[0.052, 
0.073] 
Notes: Correct answers in bold letters. Table is based on 2,042 responses. 
 
Item 15: Knowledge questions (Counts) 
How large was the budget deficit 
of the federal government in 
2012? 
1% 3% 5% 7% 
184 874 643 341 
What is the current interest rate 
on long-term government bonds 
(maturity 10 years) 
approximately? 
1.5% 3% 5.5% 10% 
758 766 426 92 
How large was inflation in 2012 
approximately? 
0% 2% 5% 10% 
31 1,298 586 127 
Notes: Correct answers in bold letters. Table is based on 2,042 responses. 
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 Item 16: What is your employment situation? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Employee 0.432 0.011 [0.411, 0.454] 883 
Apprentice 0.019 0.003 [0.013, 0.025] 39 
Unemployed 0.041 0.004 [0.033, 0.050] 84 
Employer 0.077 0.006 [0.065, 0.088] 157 
Public servant 0.023 0.003 [0.016, 0.029] 46 
Pupil 0.063 0.005 [0.053, 0.074] 129 
Insignificantly employed 0.027 0.004 [0.020, 0.034] 55 
Pensioner 0.283 0.010 [0.264, 0.303] 578 
Other 0.035 0.004 [0.027, 0.043] 71 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 17: Do you currently contribute to the public pension scheme? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Yes 0.486 0.034 [0.418, 0.554] 103 
No 0.514 0.034 [0.446, 0.582] 109 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   212 
 
Item 18: How do you use the additional budget? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Spend 0.551 0.016 [0.521, 0.582] 565 
Repay debt 0.179 0.012 [0.155, 0.202] 183 
Save 0.270 0.014 [0.243, 0.297] 277 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   1,025 
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 Item 19: Do you think the current cut will lead to higher contribution rates in the future? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Yes 0.581 0.015 [0.551, 0.612] 596 
No 0.419 0.015 [0.388, 0.449] 429 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   1,025 
 
Item 20: Do you think the current cut will lead to lower pensions in the future? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Yes 0.703 0.014 [0.675, 0.731] 721 
No 0.297 0.014 [0.269, 0.325] 304 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   1,025 
 
Item 21: Approach to household budgeting 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Fixed saving 0.453 0.016 [0.422, 0.483] 464 
Fixed spending 0.331 0.015 [0.302, 0.360] 339 
Other 0.217 0.013 [0.191, 0.242] 222 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   1,025 
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 Item 22: Statement battery (Proportions) 
How do you expect your economic 
situation to be in one year? 
Much worse    Much 
better 
0.033 0.134 0.607 0.194 0.032 
What do you think, how is inflation going 
to be over the next five years? 
Much lower    Much 
higher 
0.025 0.110 0.242 0.489 0.134 
What do you think, how secure are 
savings in Germany today in comparison 
to ten years ago? 
Much more 
insecure 
   Much 
more 
secure 
0.237 0.388 0.252 0.101 0.021 
What do you think, how profitable are 
savings in Germany today compared with 
ten years ago? 
Much less 
 
   Much 
more 
0.411 0.311 0.208 0.060 0.010 
Notes: Table is based on 1,025 observations. 
 
Item 22: Statement battery (Standard errors) 
How do you expect your economic 
situation to be in one year? 
Much worse    Much 
better 
0.006 0.011 0.015 0.012 0.006 
What do you think, how is inflation going 
to be over the next five years? 
Much lower    Much 
higher 
0.005 0.010 0.013 0.016 0.011 
What do you think, how secure are 
savings in Germany today in comparison 
to ten years ago? 
Much more 
insecure 
   Much 
more 
secure 
0.013 0.015 0.014 0.009 0.005 
What do you think, how profitable are 
savings in Germany today compared with 
ten years ago? 
Much less 
 
   Much 
more 
0.015 0.014 0.013 0.007 0.003 
Notes: Table is based on 1,025 observations. 
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 Item 22: Statement battery (Confidence intervals) 
How do you expect your economic 
situation to be in one year? 
Much worse  Much better 
[0.022, 
0.044] 
[0.113, 
0.155] 
[0.577, 
0.637] 
[0.170, 
0.218] 
[0.021, 
0.043] 
What do you think, how is inflation 
going to be over the next five years? 
Much lower  Much higher 
[0.016, 
0.035] 
[0.091, 
0.129] 
[0.216, 
0.268] 
[0.458, 
0.519] 
[0.113, 
0.155] 
What do you think, how secure are 
savings in Germany today in 
comparison to ten years ago? 
Much more 
insecure 
 Much more secure 
[0.211, 
0.263] 
[0.358, 
0.418] 
[0.225, 
0.278] 
[0.083, 
0.120] 
[0.013, 
0.030] 
What do you think, how profitable 
are savings in Germany today 
compared with ten years ago? 
Much less 
 
 Much more 
[0.381, 
0.441] 
[0.283, 
0.340] 
[0.183, 
0.233] 
[0.046, 
0.075] 
[0.004, 
0.016] 
Notes: Table is based on 1,025 observations. 
 
Item 22: Statement battery (Counts) 
How do you expect your economic situation 
to be in one year? 
Much worse    Much 
better 
34 137 622 199 33 
What do you think, how is inflation going to 
be over the next five years? 
Much lower    Much 
higher 
26 113 248 501 137 
What do you think, how secure are savings in 
Germany today in comparison to ten years 
ago? 
Much more 
insecure 
   Much 
more 
secure 
243 398 258 104 22 
What do you think, how profitable are 
savings in Germany today compared with ten 
years ago? 
Much less 
 
   Much 
more 
421 319 213 62 10 
Notes: Table is based on 1,025 observations. 
 
65 
 
 Item 23: Do taxes matter for your general job-related efforts? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Yes 0.406 0.014 [0.567, 0.622] 494 
No 0.594 0.014 [0.378, 0.433] 724 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   1,218 
 
Item 24: Which influence did the recent payroll tax change have on your job-related 
efforts? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
I substantially decreased my job-related efforts 0.034 0.008 [0.018, 0.051] 17 
I decreased my job-related efforts 0.089 0.013 [0.064, 0.114] 44 
Neutral 0.709 0.020 [0.668, 0.749] 350 
I increased my job-related efforts 0.136 0.015 [0.105, 0.166] 67 
I substantially increased my job-related efforts 0.032 0.008 [0.017, 0.048] 16 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   494 
 
Item 25: East/West 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
East 0.222 0.009 [0.204, 0.240] 454 
West 0.778 0.009 [0.760, 0.796] 1,588 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
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 Item 26: State 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Schleswig-Holstein 0.036 0.004 [0.028, 0.044] 74 
Hamburg 0.021 0.003 [0.014, 0.027] 42 
Bremen 0.009 0.002 [0.005, 0.013] 18 
Lower Saxony 0.102 0.007 [0.089, 0.116] 209 
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.186 0.009 [0.169, 0.202] 379 
Hesse 0.083 0.006 [0.071, 0.095] 169 
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.043 0.004 [0.034, 0.051] 87 
Saarland 0.012 0.002 [0.007, 0.017] 25 
Baden-Württemberg 0.121 0.007 [0.107, 0.135] 247 
Bavaria 0.166 0.008 [0.149, 0.182] 338 
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania 0.023 0.003 [0.017, 0.030] 47 
Saxony-Anhalt 0.030 0.004 [0.023, 0.038] 62 
Brandenburg 0.039 0.004 [0.030, 0.047] 79 
Thuringia 0.031 0.004 [0.023, 0.038] 63 
Saxony 0.057 0.005 [0.047, 0.067] 117 
Berlin 0.042 0.004 [0.033, 0.051] 86 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
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 Item 27: Current occupation of interviewed person 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Unskilled labor 0.045 0.005 [0.036, 0.054] 91 
Skilled tradesman 0.097 0.007 [0.084, 0.110] 198 
Employee without managerial authority 0.181 0.009 [0.164, 0.198] 370 
Employee with managerial authority 0.090 0.006 [0.078, 0.103] 184 
Senior executive 0.026 0.004 [0.019, 0.033] 54 
Public servant in the lower grade of the civil service 0.009 0.002 [0.005, 0.013] 19 
Public servant in the middle grade of the civil service 0.006 0.002 [0.003, 0.010] 13 
Public servant in the higher grade of the civil service 0.004 0.001 [0.001, 0.007] 8 
Self-employed 0.052 0.005 [0.043, 0.062] 107 
Self-employed farmer 0.001 0.001 [0.000, 0.003] 3 
Freelancer 0.022 0.003 [0.016, 0.028] 45 
No response 0.465 0.011 [0.444, 0.487] 950 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 28: Current occupation of head of household 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Blue-collar worker 0.163 0.008 [0.147, 0.179] 333 
White-collar worker 0.345 0.011 [0.325, 0.366] 705 
Public servant 0.031 0.004 [0.023, 0.038] 63 
Self-employed 0.101 0.007 [0.088, 0.114] 207 
Farmer 0.002 0.001 [0.000, 0.005] 5 
No occupation/unemployed 0.357 0.011 [0.336, 0.378] 729 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
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 Item 29: Occupational situation of interviewed person 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Full time occupation 0.392 0.011 [0.371, 0.413] 801 
Part time occupation 0.143 0.008 [0.127, 0.158] 291 
Currently unemployed 0.057 0.005 [0.047, 0.067] 117 
Non-working (E.g. pensioners) 0.279 0.010 [0.260, 0.299] 570 
Housewife/househusband 0.044 0.005 [0.035, 0.053] 90 
In apprenticeship/compulsory military service 0.017 0.003 [0.011, 0.022] 34 
Visiting school/university 0.067 0.006 [0.056, 0.077] 136 
No response 0.001 0.001 [0.000, 0.003] 3 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 30: Occupational situation of head of household 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Full time occupation 0.585 0.011 [0.563, 0.606] 1,194 
Part time occupation 0.052 0.005 [0.043, 0.062] 107 
Currently unemployed 0.050 0.005 [0.041, 0.060] 103 
Non-working (E.g. pensioners) 0.287 0.010 [0.267, 0.307] 586 
Housewife/househusband 0.008 0.002 [0.004, 0.012] 17 
In apprenticeship/compulsory military service 0.005 0.002 [0.002, 0.008] 10 
Visiting school/university 0.012 0.002 [0.007, 0.017] 25 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 31: Family status 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Single 0.219 0.009 [0.201, 0.237] 448 
Unmarried, but living together with partner 0.096 0.007 [0.083, 0.109] 196 
Married 0.505 0.011 [0.484, 0.527] 1,032 
Widowed/divorced/separated 0.179 0.008 [0.163, 0.196] 366 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
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 Item 32: Gender 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Male 0.469 0.011 [0.447, 0.491] 958 
Female 0.531 0.011 [0.509, 0.553] 1,084 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 33: Size of household 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
1 person 0.244 0.010 [0.225, 0.263] 498 
2 person 0.400 0.011 [0.378, 0.421] 816 
3 person 0.165 0.008 [0.149, 0.181] 337 
4 person 0.143 0.008 [0.128, 0.159] 293 
5 or more persons 0.048 0.005 [0.039, 0.057] 98 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 34: Is respondent mainly responsible for the household? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Yes 0.610 0.011 [0.589, 0.631] 1,246 
No 0.390 0.011 [0.369, 0.411] 796 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 35: Is respondent head of household? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Yes 0.608 0.011 [0.587, 0.629] 1,241 
No 0.392 0.011 [0.371, 0.413] 801 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
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 Item 36: Internet access 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
At home 0.745 0.010 [0.726, 0.764] 1,522 
At work 0.224 0.009 [0.206, 0.242] 458 
At school/university 0.047 0.005 [0.037, 0.056] 95 
Mobile access 0.152 0.008 [0.137, 0.168] 311 
Other 0.050 0.005 [0.041, 0.060] 103 
No internet access 0.219 0.009 [0.201, 0.237] 447 
No response 0.000   0 
Notes: Multiple answers in row 1 to 5 were possible. Table is based on 2,042 responses. 
 
Item 37: Internet use 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Daily 0.369 0.011 [0.348, 0.390] 754 
More than once a week 0.278 0.010 [0.258, 0.297] 567 
Once a week 0.057 0.005 [0.047, 0.067] 116 
Two- or three times a month 0.028 0.004 [0.021, 0.036] 58 
Once a month 0.006 0.002 [0.003, 0.010] 13 
Less than once a month 0.026 0.004 [0.019, 0.033] 53 
Never 0.236 0.009 [0.217, 0.254] 481 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 38: Children below 15 living in the household 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
1 children 0.136 0.008 [0.121, 0.151] 278 
2 children 0.082 0.006 [0.070, 0.094] 167 
3 or more children 0.019 0.003 [0.013, 0.024] 38 
None 0.763 0.009 [0.745, 0.782] 1,559 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
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 Item 39: Net income of interviewed person 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
0 to 499 € 0.115 0.007 [0.101, 0.128] 234 
500 to 749 € 0.047 0.005 [0.038, 0.056] 96 
750 to 999 € 0.131 0.007 [0.117, 0.146] 268 
1,000 to 1,249 € 0.076 0.006 [0.064, 0.087] 155 
1,250 to 1,499 € 0.159 0.008 [0.143, 0.175] 325 
1,500 to 1,999 € 0.123 0.007 [0.109, 0.138] 252 
2,000 to 2,499 € 0.082 0.006 [0.070, 0.094] 168 
2,500 to 2,999 € 0.024 0.003 [0.017, 0.030] 48 
3,000 to 3,499 € 0.017 0.003 [0.012, 0.023] 35 
3,500 to 3,999 € 0.005 0.002 [0.002, 0.009] 11 
More than 4,000 € 0.017 0.003 [0.011, 0.022] 34 
No response 0.204 0.009 [0.186, 0.221] 416 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 40: Net household income 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
0 to 499 € 0.015 0.003 [0.009, 0.020] 30 
500 to 749 € 0.015 0.003 [0.010, 0.020] 31 
750 to 999 € 0.050 0.005 [0.041, 0.060] 103 
1,000 to 1,249 € 0.035 0.004 [0.027, 0.043] 71 
1,250 to 1,499 € 0.095 0.006 [0.082, 0.107] 193 
1,500 to 1,999 € 0.100 0.007 [0.087, 0.113] 205 
2,000 to 2,499 € 0.143 0.008 [0.128, 0.159] 293 
2,500 to 2,999 € 0.104 0.007 [0.091, 0.117] 212 
3,000 to 3,499 € 0.099 0.007 [0.086, 0.112] 202 
3,500 to 3,999 € 0.040 0.004 [0.031, 0.048] 81 
More than 4,000 € 0.084 0.006 [0.072, 0.096] 172 
No response 0.220 0.009 [0.202, 0.238] 449 
Total 1.000   2,042 
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 Item 41: Town size 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
0 to 1,999 0.058 0.005 [0.048, 0.068] 118 
2,000 to 2999 0.045 0.005 [0.036, 0.054] 91 
3,000 to 4999 0.065 0.005 [0.054, 0.076] 133 
5,000 to 9999 0.113 0.007 [0.099, 0.127] 231 
10,000 to 19,999 0.148 0.008 [0.133, 0.164] 303 
20,000 to 49,999 0.211 0.009 [0.193, 0.228] 430 
50,000 to 99,999 0.069 0.006 [0.058, 0.080] 141 
100,000 to 199,999 0.060 0.005 [0.050, 0.071] 123 
200,000 to 499,999 0.060 0.005 [0.050, 0.071] 123 
More than 500,000 0.171 0.008 [0.155, 0.187] 349 
No response 0   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 42: Education of interviewed person 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
No certified apprenticeship training 0.064 0.005 [0.054, 0.075] 131 
Certified apprenticeship 0.296 0.010 [0.276, 0.316] 604 
Secondary school 0.421 0.011 [0.400, 0.443] 860 
University-entrance diploma 0.104 0.007 [0.091, 0.118] 213 
University degree 0.091 0.006 [0.078, 0.103] 185 
No response 0.024 0.003 [0.017, 0.031] 49 
Total 1.000   2,042 
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 Item 43: Education of head of household 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
No certified apprenticeship training 0.042 0.004 [0.033, 0.051] 86 
Certified apprenticeship training 0.330 0.010 [0.309, 0.350] 673 
Secondary school 0.411 0.011 [0.390, 0.432] 839 
University-entrance diploma 0.093 0.006 [0.080, 0.106] 190 
University degree 0.121 0.007 [0.107, 0.136] 248 
No response 0.003 0.001 [0.001, 0.005] 6 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 44: Social class 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Highest 0.142 0.008 [0.126, 0.157] 289 
2nd highest 0.171 0.008 [0.155, 0.187] 349 
Average 0.459 0.011 [0.437, 0.480] 937 
2nd lowest 0.182 0.009 [0.165, 0.199] 372 
Lowest 0.047 0.005 [0.037, 0.056] 95 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 45: Interest on new trends 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
I am highly interested in new trends  0.236 0.009 [0.217, 0.254] 481 
New trends do not interest me particularly 0.488 0.011 [0.466, 0.509] 996 
I do not care about new trends 0.277 0.010 [0.257, 0.296] 565 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
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 Item 46: Living conditions 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Owner-occupied house 0.457 0.011 [0.436, 0.479] 934 
Owner-occupied flat 0.070 0.006 [0.058, 0.081] 142 
On rent 0.473 0.011 [0.451, 0.495] 966 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 47: Age 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
14 0.011 0.002 [0.007, 0.016] 23 
15 0.009 0.002 [0.005, 0.013] 19 
16 0.007 0.002 [0.004, 0.011] 15 
17 0.010 0.002 [0.006, 0.015] 21 
18 0.008 0.002 [0.004, 0.012] 17 
19 0.008 0.002 [0.004, 0.012] 17 
20 0.006 0.002 [0.003, 0.010] 13 
21 0.006 0.002 [0.003, 0.010] 13 
22 0.013 0.003 [0.008, 0.018] 27 
23 0.012 0.002 [0.007, 0.016] 24 
24 0.011 0.002 [0.007, 0.016] 23 
25 0.015 0.003 [0.009, 0.020] 30 
26 0.011 0.002 [0.006, 0.015] 22 
27 0.012 0.002 [0.007, 0.017] 25 
28 0.010 0.002 [0.006, 0.014] 20 
29 0.012 0.002 [0.007, 0.017] 25 
30 0.015 0.003 [0.009, 0.020] 30 
31 0.012 0.002 [0.007, 0.016] 24 
32 0.010 0.002 [0.006, 0.015] 21 
33 0.008 0.002 [0.004, 0.012] 17 
34 0.011 0.002 [0.007, 0.016] 23 
35 0.012 0.002 [0.007, 0.017] 25 
36 0.015 0.003 [0.010, 0.020] 31 
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  Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
37 0.010 0.002 [0.006, 0.014] 20 
38 0.014 0.003 [0.009, 0.019] 29 
39 0.014 0.003 [0.009, 0.019] 29 
40 0.016 0.003 [0.011, 0.022] 33 
41 0.016 0.003 [0.010, 0.021] 32 
42 0.021 0.003 [0.015, 0.027] 43 
43 0.015 0.003 [0.009, 0.020] 30 
44 0.023 0.003 [0.016, 0.029] 46 
45 0.024 0.003 [0.017, 0.030] 48 
46 0.024 0.003 [0.017, 0.030] 48 
47 0.025 0.003 [0.019, 0.032] 52 
48 0.020 0.003 [0.014, 0.026] 40 
49 0.024 0.003 [0.017, 0.030] 48 
50 0.029 0.004 [0.022, 0.037] 60 
51 0.024 0.003 [0.017, 0.031] 49 
52 0.020 0.003 [0.014, 0.026] 41 
53 0.022 0.003 [0.015, 0.028] 44 
54 0.016 0.003 [0.010, 0.021] 32 
55 0.019 0.003 [0.013, 0.025] 39 
56 0.018 0.003 [0.012, 0.023] 36 
57 0.016 0.003 [0.010, 0.021] 32 
58 0.013 0.003 [0.008, 0.018] 27 
59 0.016 0.003 [0.010, 0.021] 32 
60 0.019 0.003 [0.013, 0.024] 38 
61 0.012 0.002 [0.007, 0.017] 25 
62 0.017 0.003 [0.011, 0.022] 34 
63 0.017 0.003 [0.012, 0.023] 35 
64 0.017 0.003 [0.011, 0.022] 34 
65 0.012 0.002 [0.007, 0.017] 25 
66 0.019 0.003 [0.013, 0.025] 39 
67 0.009 0.002 [0.005, 0.013] 18 
68 0.013 0.002 [0.008, 0.018] 26 
76 
 
  Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
69 0.013 0.003 [0.008, 0.018] 27 
70 0.018 0.003 [0.012, 0.023] 36 
71 0.016 0.003 [0.010, 0.021] 32 
72 0.018 0.003 [0.012, 0.023] 36 
73 0.013 0.002 [0.008, 0.018] 26 
74 0.015 0.003 [0.010, 0.020] 31 
75 0.019 0.003 [0.013, 0.024] 38 
76 0.011 0.002 [0.006, 0.015] 22 
77 0.007 0.002 [0.003, 0.010] 14 
78 0.009 0.002 [0.005, 0.013] 18 
79 0.008 0.002 [0.004, 0.012] 17 
80 0.006 0.002 [0.003, 0.009] 12 
81 0.005 0.002 [0.002, 0.009] 11 
82 0.009 0.002 [0.005, 0.013] 19 
83 0.003 0.001 [0.001, 0.005] 6 
84 0.003 0.001 [0.001, 0.006] 7 
85 0.003 0.001 [0.001, 0.005] 6 
86 0.002 0.001 [0.000, 0.004] 4 
87 0.001 0.001 [0.000, 0.003] 3 
88 0.000 0.000 [0.000, 0.001] 1 
89 0.001 0.001 [0.000, 0.003] 3 
90 0.000 0.000 [0.000, 0.001] 1 
91 0.000 0.000 [0.000, 0.001] 1 
92 0.001 0.001 [0.000, 0.002] 2 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
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Public Attitudes Toward Fiscal Consolidation: 
Evidence from a Representative German Household Survey 
 
 
Abstract 
The poor state of public finances in many countries has led to calls for fiscal consolidation. In 
practice, implementing concrete consolidation measures appears to meet with public 
resistance, suggesting that the success of consolidation efforts strongly depends on the 
popularity of the chosen measures. To identify public attitudes toward fiscal consolidation and 
alternative consolidation measures, we conducted a survey among 2,000 German citizens. 
Applying ordered and multinominal logit models, we test theory-based hypotheses about the 
determinants of individual attitudes toward public debt. We find that, inter alia, personal 
economic situation, time preferences, fiscal illusion, and trust in politicians exert a significant 
impact on attitudes toward fiscal consolidation and preferences for alternative consolidation 
measures. 
 
 
JEL: D72; H31; H63 
Keywords: Public debt; fiscal consolidation; sovereign debt crisis; public attitudes; Germany. 
 
  
3 
1. Introduction 
Over the course of the financial and economic crisis, many countries’ public finances have 
been stretched to the breaking point due to bailing out financial institutions and attempting to 
stabilise the business cycle. The poor state of public finances has raised concerns not only 
about the solvency of sovereigns, but also in regard to the very survival of the euro area itself, 
not to mention the process of European integration. As a consequence, many economists and 
policy-makers are calling for fiscal consolidation, which, in turn, has led to a resurgence of 
macroeconomic research on the effects on fiscal consolidation and determinants of the 
likelihood of its success (e.g., IMF, 2010; Perotti, 2011; Alesina et al., 2012). 
However, in many countries, the implementation of consolidation measures has been 
less than a success, not necessarily due to poorly chosen policies, but because of public 
opposition to the measures. There is a substantial literature emphasising the importance of 
public support for economic reforms, suggesting that the success of fiscal consolidation 
efforts strongly depends on the popularity of the measures to be implemented (see, e.g., the 
surveys by Rodrik, 1996; Drazen, 2000). However, most empirical studies focus on support 
for the introduction of a new economic system or specific economic policies rather than the 
issue of budget consolidation (e.g., Shiller et al., 1991; Fidrmuc, 2000; Warner, 2001; Hayo, 
2004; Valev, 2004). Hence, there is little research into public attitudes toward fiscal 
consolidation and different consolidation measures. 
To address this issue, we use data from a unique survey of German households 
conducted on our behalf by Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung (GfK), one of the biggest 
private German institutes specialising in collecting public opinion data. Fieldwork was done 
in February 2013 and involved completing a structured questionnaire with the help of pen 
pads during face-to-face interviews. Our sample is comprised of 2,042 representatively 
selected German citizens aged 14 or older. 
Interviewees were asked questions about the public debt situation in Germany, in 
particular about their attitudes toward fiscal consolidation, the desired pattern of public debt 
reduction, and their preferences for different consolidation measures. We collected additional 
information about the respondents, allowing us to test several theory-based hypotheses 
concerning determinants of individual attitudes toward fiscal consolidation. The determinants 
we find to be important include personal economic situation, time preferences, fiscal illusion, 
trust in politics, and party preferences. 
We believe that there are two reasons making Germany an especially interesting 
country to study in regard to the topic of this paper. First, Germany is the largest economy 
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within the European Union, which is why its fiscal policy decisions might cause notable 
spillovers to other member countries. Second, of all member countries of the euro area, 
Germany makes the largest contribution to the European Stability Mechanism (roughly 27%). 
Thus, the state of Germany’s public finances is of utmost importance for the whole euro area. 
Survey data are frequently used to elicit public attitudes toward policy measures. 
Alesina and Giuliano (2009), Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003), and Corneo and Grüner 
(2002) evaluate individual attitudes toward political redistribution utilising cross-country data 
from the World Values Survey and the International Social Survey Programme. The authors 
test several hypotheses about preferences for redistribution, especially concerning the impact 
of current and future income as well as absolute and relative personal income. Alesina and La 
Ferrara (2005) study the same topic using data from the US General Social Survey. Huckley 
and Harbour (1983) employ a coupon-scale questionnaire to discover individuals’ preferences 
between public expenditures and tax cuts. By forcing respondents to take both public 
expenditures and revenues into account, the authors circumvent the so-called more for less 
paradox (Welch, 1985). Surveys are also used to assess consumers’ responses to tax policy 
changes (e.g., Shapiro and Slemrod, 2001). 
Blinder and Krueger (2004), as well as Walstad (1997), use survey data from the 
United States to examine individual attitudes toward a variety of economic issues, including 
public deficits. Both studies primarily focus on the role of knowledge and political ideology. 
Their findings suggest that opinions on economic policy are significantly affected by a 
person’s factual economic knowledge. Blinder and Holtz-Eakin (1984) use US opinion poll 
data to elicit individual attitudes toward a proposed balanced budget amendment to the 
constitution. 
To the best of our knowledge, the only survey-based empirical analyses of individual 
preferences toward fiscal consolidation are provided by Stix (2013) and Heinemann and 
Henninghausen (2012). Stix (2013) uses data from a survey conducted in Austria in 2010 to 
evaluate public attitudes toward public debt reduction and different debt reduction paths. 
Heinemann and Henninghausen (2012) utilize data from a telephone survey conducted in 
Germany in 2011 to assess individual support toward the German federal government’s 
intention not to incur any additional debt throughout the coming years. However, there are 
some important differences between these approaches and ours. For example, in the 
questionnaires of both studies, people were asked whether they would support fiscal 
consolidation, assuming that the government will choose the consolidation measures. Given 
this wording, it seems likely that consolidation preferences are influenced by the respondents’ 
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expectations about which measures the government may implement. Thus, the survey 
questions used by Stix (2013) and Heinemann and Henninghausen (2012) mimic a single item 
referendum. In contrast, we designed our survey in such a way that the respondents 
themselves choose the consolidation measures to be implemented. This not only allows us to 
assess the general feasibility of public debt consolidation, but also to shed light on the specific 
course policy-makers should adopt to successfully reduce public debt. Moreover, the number 
of variables employed in our analysis is much larger than in the other two studies. This has 
two important advantages. First, it allows us to test several theoretical conjectures and 
hypotheses, which have not been analysed in the extant empirical literature. Second, it helps 
avoid omitted variable biases.  
Our paper also relates to macro-level studies on the association between governments’ 
fiscal performance and election outcomes. For example, Peltzman (1992) studies voting 
behaviour in US presidential, senatorial, and gubernatorial elections. His findings suggest that 
voters punish increases in overall public spending, but not an increasing reliance on deficit 
spending. On the contrary, Brender and Drazen (2008) find that in developed countries, 
incurring public deficits significantly reduces the incumbent government’s chances of re-
election. 
The main findings of our paper are as follows. Descriptive statistics show that 
although the median respondent is in favour of fiscal consolidation in Germany, no specific 
consolidation measure is supported by a majority. We run (ordered) logit estimations and find 
that individual attitudes toward fiscal consolidation are affected by various factors. People 
who are well-off, forward-looking, informed about the costs associated with deficit spending, 
and who have little faith in the government’s ability to appropriately manage tax revenues are 
significantly more likely to opt for a debt reduction. In contrast, people who regard their 
personal economic situation as poor, reveal high discount rates, and believe in the 
government’s fiscal competence exhibit a larger likelihood of opposing consolidation efforts. 
Preferences for alternative consolidation measures are also systematically related to several 
explanatory variables. Respondents characterised by high income and social class tend to 
favour a tax hike, whereas people who have less or no confidence in the fiscal competence of 
politicians are generally opposed to such a policy measure. Finally, respondents who are 
particularly concerned about the present situation tend to oppose a reduction of public 
spending. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
questionnaire and sets forth some descriptive statistics. In Section 3, we study the 
6 
determinants of individual attitudes toward fiscal consolidation. We discuss our main research 
hypotheses and present the results of our empirical analysis. In Section 4, we examine public 
preferences for alternative consolidation measures. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Individual Attitudes Toward Fiscal Consolidation 
In democracies, elected politicians are supposed to act in the voters’ best interests and 
according to their preferences. This behaviour is facilitated by regularly scheduled, free 
elections. In principle, if politicians have been acting in accordance with the voters’ interests, 
they are re-elected, otherwise they are voted out of office. Thus, the likelihood of successfully 
implementing a political programme is much higher if it matches voters’ preferences (Rodrik, 
1996; Drazen, 2000). 
In light of economic and political developments in Europe within the past years, two 
questions are of particular interest: What is the electorate’s attitude toward (i) fiscal 
consolidation in general and (ii) specific consolidation measures? The answers to these 
questions are important to academic economists, as they may help in formulating and testing 
relevant theories, and they are also crucial for political decision-makers, as the 
implementation of concrete consolidation measures has met with remarkably strong public 
resistance. 
To provide answers to these questions, we designed a survey which was conducted on 
our behalf by Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung (GfK), one of the biggest private survey 
institutes in Germany. Between 15 February and 1 March 2013, 2,042 representatively 
selected German citizens aged 14 or older were interviewed face-to-face by professional 
interviewers with the help of pen pads. Quota sampling was used according to sex, age, 
household size, city size, occupation of head of household, and state of residence.  
The questionnaire contains two questions designed to measure individual attitudes 
toward fiscal consolidation. First, we ask people whether they think the state should reduce 
public debt, keep the amount of public debt at the current level, or incur additional public 
debt. The wording of the question, translated from German into English, is as follows:  
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At the end of 2012 the outstanding amount of public debt in Germany was above €2 trillion. 
This equals €26,000 per inhabitant or 80% of gross domestic product (GDP), respectively. In 
your opinion, should the state reduce public debts, keep the amount of public debt at its 
current level, or incur additional public debts? 
Reduce debt □ 
Keep debt at current level □ 
Incur additional debt □ 
 
Second, respondents who state that public debt should be reduced are then asked to 
choose between three alternative debt-reduction paths:
 
 
  
Option A: Debt reduction is distributed evenly over the next years, i.e., in each year a 
similar amount of debt is reduced. 
□ 
Option B: The extent of debt reduction increases over the next years, i.e., in the near 
future a smaller part of debt is reduced and in the far future a larger part of debt is 
reduced. 
□ 
Option C: The extent of debt reduction decreases over the next years, i.e., in the near 
future a larger part of debt is reduced and in the far future a smaller part of debt is 
reduced. 
□ 
Don’t know □ 
 
In addition to verbally explaining the possible answers, the alternative debt-reduction 
paths were illustrated graphically on the interviewer’s laptop with pictures of stacks of 
money.  
The design of suitable survey items for the purpose of our paper is a challenging task. 
As our respondents constitute a representative sample of the German population, the survey 
questions need to be comprehensible for economic laymen and people with less formal 
education. For that reason, we refrained from defining specific consolidation goals or 
referring to technical measures, such as debt-to-GDP ratios. The wording of our questions was 
chosen in close collaboration with survey experts from GfK and our experience from pre-
testing the questions. We got the impression that our wording provides a good compromise 
between keeping the questions appropriately simple and obtaining informative answers, 
irrespective of whether interviewees have different debt reduction goals or time horizons in 
mind. 
Based on the two aforementioned questions, we construct an ordinal debt-propensity 
score, which is used as a dependent variable in the empirical analysis. Respondents who 
prefer an additional increase in public debt are regarded as the most debt prone and those who 
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opt for an immediate notable debt reduction as most debt averse. Table 1 documents the 
construction and distribution of our dependent variable based on sorting answers according to 
the implied propensity toward fiscal consolidation. 
 
Table 1: Constructing the dependent variable: Distribution of attitudes toward fiscal 
consolidation 
Answer Options Count Proportion 
1 Reducing a larger part of debt in the near future 
and a smaller part of debt in the far future 
312 15.3% 
2 Reducing debt evenly over the years 949 46.5% 
3 Reducing a smaller part of debt in the near future 
and a larger part of debt in the far future 
164 8.0% 
4 Hold amount of debt constant  484 23.7% 
5 Incur additional debt 33 1.6% 
Don’t know/no answer (coded as missing values) 100 4.9% 
Total 2,042 100% 
Note: Answer categories are sorted according to the implied debt propensity. Larger numbers 
indicate a higher propensity toward public indebtedness. 
 
Roughly 70% of interviewees call for a reduction of public debt. One-quarter prefers 
to keep public debt at its current level and only 1.6% supports an increase in public debt. It 
thus appears that fiscal consolidation is supported by a vast majority of the German 
population. This raises the question of which consolidation measure should be implemented. 
The success of any fiscal consolidation effort depends not only on the public’s attitude toward 
public debt reduction in general, but also on the popularity of the specific consolidation 
measures the government plans to adopt. Thus, all respondents who opted for debt reduction 
were asked which consolidation measure they prefer. The choice was between raising taxes or 
cutting public spending in one of seven areas: social security, education, public safety, 
infrastructure, economic development, defence, or miscellaneous. The first six are those on 
which the German government currently spends the most. Each interviewee could voice a 
maximum of three preferences, which were ranked. To ensure that differences in respondents’ 
answers are not driven by differences in their information sets, we listed the current amount of 
public spending devoted to the respective category (in per-capita terms and as a share of total 
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public spending) as well as the most important items in each category measured by the 
amount of money spent.  
Table 2 shows the percentage distribution of answers. Only about 21% of those who 
call for fiscal consolidation prefer tax hikes, whereas 66% favour expenditure-based fiscal 
adjustments.  
 
Table 2: Supporters of fiscal consolidation: Preferences for different consolidation 
measures—distribution of answers 
Consolidation Measure 1
st
 Choice 2
nd
 Choice 3
rd
 Choice Sum 
Tax hike 4.9% 4.1% 11.7% 20.6% 
Cut public spending on …     
… social security 11.0% 5.5% 6.4% 22.8% 
… public safety and order 1.8% 4.0% 3.0% 8.8% 
… education 2.3% 2.5% 1.8% 6.6% 
… infrastructure 1.8% 6.6% 5.3% 13.6% 
… economic development 7.5% 13.8% 7.3% 28.6% 
… defence 41.1% 20.1% 5.8% 67.0% 
… other areas 16.5% 21.0% 16.1% 53.6% 
Don’t know/no answer 13.3% 22.4% 42.8% 78.5% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 300% 
 
This is good news for fiscal stabilisation, since expenditure-based fiscal consolidation 
is associated with lower welfare costs and greater sustainability (Alesina et al., 2012; Alesina 
and Ardagna, 2010). Two-thirds of the consolidation-supporting respondents opt for reducing 
public spending on defence. Preferences for other consolidation measures are more 
heterogeneously distributed. 
Note that the figures in Table 2 are derived only from supporters of fiscal 
consolidation. Policy-makers, however, might also be interested in whether any specific 
consolidation measure is supported by the majority of the population. Table 3 sheds light on 
this issue. The figures in Table 3 represent the share of respondents in favour of the 
implementation of consolidation measure j in relation to all respondents, plus the 95% 
confidence intervals as a measure of the sampling error. The figures reveal what may be the 
most serious obstacle to public debt reduction and why attempts to implement fiscal 
consolidation measures in the past have been so unsuccessful: there is no single consolidation 
measure that achieves majority support.  
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Table 3: All respondents: Preferences for different consolidation measures—distribution of 
answers 
Consolidation Measure Proportion 95% CI 
Tax hike 15.4% 13.8% 16.9% 
Cut public spending on …    
… social security 17.0% 15.4% 18.7% 
… public safety and order 6.6% 5.5% 7.6% 
… education 4.9% 4.0% 5.9% 
… infrastructure 10.1% 8.8% 11.4% 
… economic development 21.4% 19.6% 23.1% 
… defence 50.0% 47.8% 52.2% 
… other areas 40.0% 37.9% 42.1% 
 
Cutting defence expenditures comes close, though, and a simple majority lies within 
the 95% confidence bands. However, since only 2.5% of the public budget is devoted to this 
expense, the potential for reducing public debt by means of cutting defence spending is very 
limited. 
 
3. Eliciting Individual Attitudes Toward Fiscal Consolidation 
This section sheds light on whether differences between peoples’ attitudes toward fiscal 
consolidation can be attributed to specific characteristics. As a starting point, the public 
choice and political economy literature puts forward several theories and conjectures about 
the determinants of individual attitudes toward public indebtedness. However, there is very 
little empirical evidence as to the usefulness of these approaches. In this section, we discuss 
some of these claims and describe how we test them empirically.
1
 
 
3.1. Explanatory Variables and Research Hypotheses 
The extant public choice and political economics literature contains hypotheses intended to 
explain why, or under which conditions, voters may tolerate or even support public debt 
accumulation. Some approaches are well-defined formal theories, others more or less ad hoc. 
In this section, we discuss several of these arguments and relate them to items included in our 
questionnaire. 
                                                        
1
 A description of all questionnaire items is provided in Appendix A.1. 
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Economic well-being: Cukierman and Meltzer (1989) argue that deficit spending can be 
used to reallocate resources over time and even generations. They provide a formal model in 
which people trade off their current living conditions against that of future generations. Their 
main conclusion is that individual attitudes toward public indebtedness depend on personal 
economic situation: People are less reluctant to live at the expense of future generations if 
they are relatively worse off. Even in a neo-Ricardian framework in which individuals care 
about the next generations’ well-being, people facing poorer economic conditions are more 
likely to be in favour of public indebtedness.
2
 
 The questionnaire contains four variables measuring the interviewee’s personal 
economic situation, three objective indicators and a subjective one: (i) net monthly household 
income (in €1,000), (ii) the household’s real assets (i.e., whether the respondent lives in a self-
owned house, self-owned flat, or a rented house/flat), (iii) a social class indicator, i.e., a 
variable combining information about respondents’ relative income and occupational status 
and ranging from 1 (lower class) to 5 (upper class), and (iv) a subjective assessment of the 
interviewee’s personal economic situation, ranging from 1 (absolutely dissatisfied) to 5 
(absolutely satisfied). Our first hypothesis is: 
H1: Relatively well-off people are more debt averse than those who are relatively 
worse off. 
 
Time preference: In Barro’s (1979) tax-smoothing hypothesis, deficit spending helps 
minimise the net present value of the excess burden of taxation. Hence, socially optimal fiscal 
policy is countercyclical, i.e., a benevolent social planner incurs fiscal deficits during 
recessions and consolidates the public budget once the economy recovers. However, whether 
such a course of fiscal policy is in the (representative) voter’s interest strongly depends (inter 
alia) on her time preferences, represented by the shape and parameters of the discount 
function she applies to evaluate the welfare effect of future fiscal policies. The crucial 
assumption here is that the discount function applied by the (representative) individual 
corresponds to the yield curve of government bonds. However, two frequently observed 
anomalies in empirical intertemporal choice research challenge this view. First, people’s 
subjective discount factors between two consecutive periods are typically larger than the 
corresponding interest rate, indicating that they are less forward-looking than they are 
assumed to be. Second, people are especially impatient in the short run, commonly referred to 
as ‘myopia’ (e.g., Thaler and Shefrin, 1981; Ainslie, 1975). These two anomalies are typically 
                                                        
2
 Personal economic situation is also found to be an important determinant of attitudes toward private 
indebtedness. See Lea et al. (1995) and Lunt and Livingston (1991) for a discussion of possible explanations. 
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illustrated by means of a quasi-hyperbolic discount function, with W indicating an 
individual’s welfare and u her utility from consuming good x at time t and in different future 
periods t + i (i = 1,…,N): 
  
   (  )   ∑ 
  (    )
 
   
 
  represents the subjective discount rate between two consecutive future periods, i.e., 
the individual degree of forward-lookingness, and   measures the degree of short-run 
impatience. A quasi-hyperbolic discount function is frequently applied in theoretical and 
empirical setups and describes individual intertemporal decision-making quite well (e.g., 
Angeletos et al., 2001; Laibson, 1997). However, a lack of forward-lookingness and short-run 
impatience could also be an important determinant of public indebtedness. Huber and Runkel 
(2008) show that when hyperbolic discounting is applied in the context of the Barro (1979) 
model, a benevolent social planner will persistently accumulate public debt, and the size of 
the deficit is inversely related to the discount factor. 
We conduct two ‘experiments’ to elicit the interviewees’ time preferences. In the first 
experiment, respondents are asked to choose between a safe payoff of €1,000 paid 
immediately and a higher payoff of €Xi,6 paid in six months. In the second experiment, the 
choice is between a safe payoff of €1,000 paid in six months and a higher payoff of €Xi,12 
paid in 12 months.
3
 The respondents’ choices of Xi,6 and Xi,12 can then be used to calculate   
and   (cf. Angeletos et al., 2001; Laibson, 1997): 
  
     
     
   
     
      
 
Accordingly, our second hypothesis is: 
H2: The smaller an individual’s subjective discount rate ( ) and short-run 
patience ( ), the greater her propensity toward public indebtedness. 
 
Information set: Survey evidence documents that knowledge about economic facts 
shapes a person’s opinion of economic policy (Blinder and Krueger, 2004; Walstad, 1997). 
Hence, factual knowledge may also affect individual attitudes toward fiscal consolidation. 
One of the earliest arguments made in the public choice literature to explain the electorate’s 
apparent debt tolerance is that voters may suffer from ‘fiscal illusion’, i.e., they lack 
                                                        
3
 The setup of our experiment is shown in Appendix A.2. The setup and wording for this experiment are taken 
from the questionnaire of the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP), where the experiment was incentivised. 
However, since the distribution of answers in our data is very similar to the one in the SOEP data, we are 
confident that the lack of a material incentive in our version of the experiment has no notable effect on the 
respondents’ choices. 
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information about the future costs associated with deficit spending (e.g., Buchanan and 
Wagner, 1977). Arguably, being able to accurately assess the costs of deficit financing 
presupposes that voters have sufficient knowledge about the economy. Factual knowledge 
about debt-related economic measures may be a good way of capturing the degree of fiscal 
illusion. We employ three multiple-choice questions in order to test the interviewees’ 
knowledge. We ask about (i) the size of the federal government’s budget deficit in 2012 (in 
relation to GDP), (ii) the current interest rate on government bonds with a maturity of 10 
years, and (iii) 2012’s inflation rate. In each case, respondents can choose between four 
answers. In the subsequent empirical analysis, we employ dummy variables for the number of 
correct answers to assess the influence of factual knowledge on attitudes toward fiscal 
consolidation. We expect that those who are better informed are more debt averse, as they 
have a better understanding of the costs of public debt. 
H3: (Factual) knowledge about the costs associated with deficit spending 
increases public debt aversion. 
 
Believed fiscal position: Subjective assessment of economic conditions by economic 
agents may play an important role as well, as people tend to act on the information set they 
have, at least as long as they perceive it to be reasonably accurate. Thus, on the one hand, if a 
person believes that debt-servicing costs or the previous year’s deficit are low, she may be 
more tolerant of incurring additional public debt. On the other hand, if a person thinks that the 
government is spending beyond its limits, she may be more likely to support fiscal 
consolidation. We use the answers to the knowledge multiple-choice questions as an indicator 
for the respondents’ beliefs about the realisation of debt-related economic measures, 
irrespective of whether they are actually correct. 
H4: The larger a person believes the previous year’s deficit as well as debt-servicing 
costs to be, the greater her public debt aversion. 
 
Trust in politicians: Several political economy approaches assume that public debt is 
used as a strategic instrument by opportunistic policy-makers to pursue selfish interests. These 
approaches include political budget cycle theory and rent-seeking approaches, as well as work 
by Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and Tabellini (1990) in which the government is 
supposed to have time-inconsistent preferences. Arguably, voters who share these critical 
views about politicians’ motives may be more inclined to believe that public debt is a 
consequence of opportunistic political behaviour and, therefore, are more likely to support 
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fiscal consolidation. In contrast, citizens who have great confidence in the elected politicians 
may be less inclined to scrutinise their decisions and, thus, voice stronger support for 
whatever policy is actually implemented. Hence, a person’s view of politicians may influence 
his or her evaluation of public policy. Specifically, voters can either question the motives of 
political actors—e.g., suspect that their decisions reflect self-interest—or their competence. 
To capture different dimensions of trust, we ask the interviewees whether they believe that 
politicians (i) act according to the general public interest vs. only in the interest of particular 
groups, (ii) are concerned about the country’s long-term well-being vs. are concerned only 
about the next election, and (iii) manage tax revenues conscientiously vs. are wasteful with 
tax revenues. In each case, the interviewees are asked with which statement, on a five-point 
scale, they most agree. 
H5: People who lack confidence in politicians’ motives or competence are more 
likely to opt for fiscal consolidation. 
 
Party preference: A widespread conjecture is that public debt incurrence is associated 
with the government’s political ideology—i.e., leftist governments are supposed to be more 
inclined to rely on deficit spending than are their right-wing counterparts (e.g., Buchanan and 
Wagner, 1977). Accordingly, supporters of leftist parties may be more tolerant of public 
indebtedness than supporters of conservative parties. We account for party preferences by 
asking interviewees for which party they would vote if elections were held next Sunday. The 
interviewees choose between the seven most popular parties in Germany. Alternatively, they 
can state that they ‘would vote for a different party’ or ‘would not vote at all’. 
H6: Supporters of leftist parties are more likely to oppose fiscal consolidation 
than are supporters of conservative parties. 
 
3.2. Empirical Approach 
We now conduct an empirical investigation into the determinants of individual attitudes 
toward fiscal consolidation by considering the following model: 
( )  (    )
  (                                                                            ) 
 
The dependent variable is the debt-propensity measure introduced in Section 2.1. To estimate 
Equation (1), we assume that F(.) corresponds to the distribution function of the logistic 
distribution, which yields an ordered logit model. We apply maximum likelihood estimation. 
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The main explanatory variables of interest are the ones described in Section 2.3, 
namely, the indicators capturing the respondent’s economic situation, the time preference 
parameters β and δ,4 indicators reflecting the respondent’s information about public 
indebtedness, i.e., the measures of factual knowledge about the costs of public indebtedness as 
well as the respondent’s subjective assessments of debt-related economic measures (i.e., the 
previous year’s deficit, interest rate, and inflation rate; measured in percentage points), the 
indicators of confidence in government, and party preferences.
5
 We further consider various 
control variables describing respondents’ characteristics: education (dummies for those who 
completed the lower (Hauptschule; reference category), middle (Realschule), and upper 
secondary school (Abitur)), employment status of the household head (regularly employed 
(reference category), unemployed, students, retirees, and those who are jobless for other 
reasons), marital status (singles (reference category), people living together with a partner, 
married people, and those who are widowed or divorced), age, sex, and children (dummy), 
head of the household (dummy), union member (dummy), and living in East Germany 
(dummy). Additionally, we ask all interviewees about their attitudes toward political 
redistribution on a five-point scale, thereby measuring their proximity to an egalitarian 
ideology. Finally, we gauge the respondents’ risk preferences by conducting a simple 
experiment. Respondents are confronted with the choice of either receiving a safe payoff of 
€X or taking part in a lottery in which they could win either €1,000 or nothing (odds are 
50:50). The choice of X is then used to compute an individual’s risk preference parameter, 
which varies between −1 (maximum risk aversion) and +1 (maximum risk propensity).6 
 
3.3. Results 
The estimation results from the ordered logit model explaining individual attitudes toward 
fiscal consolidation are presented in Table 4. The second column contains the estimated 
parameters of the latent variable model; columns 3–7 show the average marginal effects for 
each realisation of the debt-propensity indicator. Our findings are as follows. 
 
                                                        
4
 In our sample, we observe an unexpectedly high number of respondents who choose the immediate payment 
irrespective of what future payoff they are offered. Interestingly, a similar distribution of answers is found in the 
SOEP. A possible explanation for this finding is that respondents who are particularly risk averse chose this 
option. To control for possible spill-over effects and measurement errors, we include additional dummy variables 
for these categories. 
5
 All explanatory variables are described in greater detail in Appendix A.1. 
6
 The risk preference parameter is computed as 
     
   
. The setup of the experiment is described in detail in 
Appendix A.2. 
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Table 4: Determinants of individual attitudes toward fiscal consolidation—ordered logit estimation 
Variables Coefficient 
Average Marginal Effects 
Y = 1  Y = 2  Y = 3  Y = 4  Y = 5  
Economic situation             
HH income 0.004 −0.001 −0.0003 0.0001 0.001 0.0001 
Subjective well-being −0.194 *** 0.025 *** 0.017 *** −0.006 *** −0.033 *** −0.003 *** 
Social class −0.027 0.003 0.002 −0.001 −0.004 −0.0004 
Property −0.234 ** 0.030 ** 0.021 ** −0.007 ** −0.040 ** −0.004 ** 
Time preferences       
β −0.755 *** 0.036 *** 0.024 *** −0.008 ** −0.047 *** −0.005 ** 
δ −0.450 ** 0.029 ** 0.019 ** −0.007 ** −0.038 ** −0.004 ** 
Knowledge       
One correct answer −0.329 ** 0.039 ** 0.034 ** −0.009 ** −0.058 ** −0.006 * 
Two correct answers −0.439 ** 0.054 ** 0.042 ** −0.012 ** −0.076 ** −0.008 ** 
Three correct answers −0.714 ** 0.095 ** 0.054 *** −0.021 ** −0.117 *** −0.011 *** 
Believed deficit −0.098 *** 0.013 *** 0.008 *** −0.003 *** −0.017 *** −0.002 *** 
Believed interest rate 0.022 −0.003 −0.002 0.001 0.004 0.0004 
Believed inflation rate −0.033 0.004 0.003 −0.001 −0.006 −0.001 
Political trust       
Public interest −0.005 0.001 0.001 −0.0002 −0.001 −0.0001 
Long-term orientation −0.019 0.002 0.002 −0.001 −0.003 −0.0003 
Fiscal competence 0.106 * −0.014 * −0.009 * 0.003 * 0.018 * 0.002 * 
Party preference       
Leftist party −0.227 0.029 0.019 −0.007 −0.038 −0.004 
Pirates −0.185 0.024 0.016 −0.005 −0.031 −0.003 
SPD −0.063 0.008 0.006 −0.002 −0.011 −0.001 
Green party −0.072 0.009 0.007 −0.002 −0.012 −0.001 
CDU −0.104 0.013 0.010 −0.003 −0.018 −0.002 
FDP 0.096 −0.011 −0.010 0.002 0.017 0.002 
NPD −0.624 0.091 0.034 *** −0.020 −0.096 * −0.009 * 
Other −0.739 *** 0.111 *** 0.034 *** −0.024 *** −0.111 *** −0.010 *** 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Variables Coefficient 
Average Marginal Effects 
Y = 1  Y = 2  Y = 3  Y = 4  Y = 5  
Education             
Middle second. school −0.059 0.007 0.005 −0.002 −0.010 −0.001 
Higher second. school −0.214 0.028 0.017 −0.006 −0.036 −0.003 
Employment HH head       
Unemployed −0.208 0.027 0.017 −0.006 −0.035 −0.003 
Retired −0.234 0.031 0.019 −0.007 −0.039 −0.004 
Student −0.398 0.055 0.027 * −0.012 −0.064 −0.006 
Jobless other 0.239 −0.027 −0.027 0.006 0.043 0.005 
Further controls       
Age −0.009 ** 0.001 * 0.001 * −0.0003 * −0.001 ** −0.0002 * 
Children −0.125 0.016 0.011 −0.004 −0.021 −0.002 
Female 0.144 −0.019 −0.012 0.004 0.024 0.002 
East German 0.300 ** −0.036 *** −0.029 ** 0.008 *** 0.052 *** 0.005 ** 
Egalitarian attitude −0.086 ** 0.011 ** 0.007 ** −0.002 ** −0.014 ** −0.001 ** 
Risk preference 0.115 −0.015 −0.010 0.003 0.019 0.002 
Living in partnership 0.304 −0.039 −0.026 0.009 0.051 0.005 
Married 0.116 −0.016 −0.009 0.004 0.019 0.002 
Divorced/widowed 0.309 −0.039 −0.027 0.009 0.052 0.005 
Union member −0.129 0.016 0.012 −0.004 −0.022 −0.002 
Household head −0.148 0.019 0.012 −0.004 −0.025 −0.002 
Dummy β −0.369 *** 0.048 *** 0.030 *** −0.011 *** −0.062 *** −0.006 ** 
Dummy δ −0.190 0.024 0.016 −0.006 −0.032 −0.003 
Observations 1942           
Pseudo-R
2
 0.033           
Wald χ2 (43) 165.27 ***           
Note: Results are based on an ordered logit maximum likelihood estimation. The dependent variable is the debt-propensity measure introduced in 
Section 2. White (1980) robust standard errors are used. Average marginal effects for β and δ are calculated based on change of the respective 
variable from the lower to the upper bound of the 66% confidence interval. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
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H1: Economic situation: We find that subjective economic well-being and property 
ownership, our wealth indicator, reveal a statistically significant and theory-consistent 
association with attitudes toward fiscal consolidation. The marginal effects appear to be of 
notable size. A one-unit increase in the subjective assessment of personal economic situation 
increases the likelihood of opting for a large immediate debt reduction by about 2.5 
percentage points (pp) and for an even reduction of debt over time by about 1.7 pp; in 
contrast, the likelihood of opposing a reduction in public debt decreases by more than 3 pp. 
This result supports previous findings by Stix (2013), who reports that well-to-do respondents 
strongly support consolidation efforts. Likewise, homeowners are 3 pp more likely to favour 
immediate consolidation and 4 pp less likely to prefer an unchanged public debt level. 
Household income and the social class indicator have no significant impact on the debt-
propensity indicator. We check the robustness of our finding by considering the monthly net 
personal income of the respondent instead of household income. Moreover, we replace the 
income measures with income quartiles and quintiles to investigate the importance of relative 
income effects. Our results do not change notably. 
H2: Time preference: An increase in β and δ, i.e., lower discount rate and greater 
patience, is associated with a significantly higher likelihood of supporting immediate fiscal 
consolidation as well as an even reduction of debt over time. Respondents with lower 
subjective discount rates and greater short-run impatience are more likely to either oppose 
consolidation efforts or to put off debt reduction to the future. Note that since both β and δ can 
vary only between 0 and 1, common marginal effects are of limited interpretative value since 
they refer to a one-unit increase in the respective right-hand side variable. For this reason, we 
compute marginal effects based on a change from the lower to the upper bound of the 66% 
confidence interval of β and δ (corresponding to a two-standard-deviation increase). A two-
standard-deviation increase in β (δ) increases the likelihood of favouring an immediate debt 
reduction by about 3.5 pp (3 pp); in contrast, the likelihood of opposing such a reduction 
decreases by almost 5 pp (4 pp). Thus, our findings fully confirm hypothesis H2, in which a 
lack of future orientation or myopia is expected to be an important source of voters’ debt 
tolerance. The findings are consistent with findings by Stix (2013), who reports that a higher 
preference for the present is associated with weaker consolidation preferences.
7
 
H3: Information set: We find that respondents who are informed about the (future) 
costs of deficit spending are more debt averse, supporting the fiscal illusion argument. The 
                                                        
7
 Note that Stix (2013) does not account for the possibility that interviewees may be ‘myopic’ and apply quasi-
hyperbolic discounting. Thus, he does not differentiate between the effects of general forward-lookingness and 
short-run impatience.   
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larger the number of correct answers to the three multiple-choice questions, i.e., the better the 
factual knowledge about debt-related economic measures, the greater the respondent’s public 
debt aversion. The effects are of a notable size: respondents giving one/two/three correct 
answers are 3.9 pp/5.4 pp/9.5 pp more likely to support prompt consolidation and 5.8 pp/7.6 
pp/11.7 pp less likely to prefer public debt at its current level.  
H4: Believed fiscal position: Subjective assessment of debt-related economic 
measures appears to be important as well. The larger a person believes the previous year’s 
deficit to be, the more likely she is to support fiscal consolidation. An increase in the 
assessment of the previous year’s deficit by 1 pp involves a 1.3 pp higher likelihood of 
favouring an immediate debt reduction. In contrast, the likelihood of opting for an unchanged 
public debt level decreases by 1.7 pp. Beliefs about the realisations of the interest rate and 
inflation rate exert no statistically significant influence on attitudes toward fiscal 
consolidation. 
H5: Trust in politicians: Concerning the importance of trust in politicians, only the 
evaluation of their fiscal competence matters. People who believe that politicians manage tax 
revenues conscientiously are less likely to favour fiscal consolidation than those who believe 
that taxes are wasted. A one-unit increase in the respective indicator decreases the likelihood 
of supporting immediate debt reduction by 1.4 pp. Opinions about politicians’ motives, 
however, appear to be irrelevant. 
H6: Party preference: The attitudes toward fiscal consolidation held by supporters of 
political parties are not significantly different from those of non-voters, the only exception 
being voters for parties other than those listed. Voters of ‘other’ parties are not only 
significantly more debt averse than non-voters, they are also more likely to support fiscal 
consolidation than are voters for all the parties listed (except NPD voters).
8
 This suggests that 
those who most desire public debt reduction tend to be disappointed by the policy 
programmes of the established parties, which may also help explain the recent success of a 
new party, Alternative für Deutschland, which focuses on this type of macroeconomic policy. 
Linear parameter tests do not indicate any significant differences between supporters of the 
parties listed. 
A few control variables have significant effects: an egalitarian ideology is associated 
with stronger support for fiscal consolidation and East Germans are significantly more likely 
to oppose public debt reduction than are West Germans. 
                                                        
8
 This conclusion is based on linear parameter tests. Results are available on request. 
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To check the robustness of our results and to glean further insights, we apply some 
modifications to our original specification. First, we replace our ordinal dependent variable, 
i.e. the debt propensity measure, by a dummy variable taking on the value 1 if a respondent 
favours public debt reduction and 0 otherwise. The results are presented in Table A1 of the 
Appendix. Most of our findings remain remarkably robust. Interestingly, the effects of the 
time preference indicators β and δ become less significant (δ) or even insignificant (β), 
indicating that time preferences may affect the preferred timing or pace of fiscal 
consolidation, but not the general sentiment toward public debt.
9
  
Finally, we reduce our sample and exclude all respondents who are less than 18 years 
old. At the federal government level in Germany, citizens younger than 18 years of age are 
not entitled to vote, which is why they might lack political interest.
10
 However, excluding this 
age group does not affect our findings
11
  
 
4. Individual Attitudes Toward Alternative Consolidation Policies 
As shown in Section 2, preferences for alternative consolidation policies show remarkable 
variation. In this section, we use two approaches to investigate whether the observed 
differences are associated with specific individual characteristics. First, we consider only the 
respondents’ first choices and estimate a multinominal logit model with ‘tax hike’ as a base 
category. Second, we investigate whether a specific consolidation measure is mentioned at all 
by estimating eight binary choice logit models, one for each consolidation measure. The 
binary dependent variables take the value 1 if the respective measure was mentioned; 0 
otherwise. As regressors, we employ the same variables as in the previous analysis (cf. 
Section 2.3). Our analysis is explorative, as there is no well-defined theory from which 
testable hypotheses can be derived. 
The estimation results are presented in Tables A2 and A3 in Appendix 4. To 
economise on space, we concentrate on the most interesting findings. The respondent’s 
economic situation especially affects the general choice between tax-based and expenditure-
based consolidation. The higher net household income and social class, the greater the 
likelihood of favouring a tax hike over almost any other alternative, irrespective of whether 
we consider only the respondents’ most preferred consolidation policy or all three choices. 
People who are particularly concerned about the present situation oppose a reduction in public 
spending on economic development and defence. The former effect is intuitive as, e.g., 
                                                        
9
 Notethat the coefficient of β is almost significant at the 10% level (p-value: 0.107). 
10
 At the state level, citizens are entitled to vote once they are 16 years old. 
11
 Only 81 respondents in our sample are aged 16 or 17 years. Results are available on request. 
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spending on business cycle stabilisation falls into this category. In other words, this finding 
suggests that people with low discount rates are especially concerned about the present state 
of the economy. 
Trust in politicians has a significant influence on the preferences for different 
consolidation measures. As one might expect, people who do not have confidence in the fiscal 
competence of politicians are less likely to opt for a tax hike than those who believe that the 
government manages tax revenues conscientiously. The distrustful prefer spending cuts, 
especially in the areas of economic development and defence, which can be interpreted as the 
belief that tax revenues are wasted in these categories. The distrustful are significantly less 
likely to favour cutting public spending on social security, which suggests that they do not 
seem to think that tax revenues are wasted in this area. 
The respondents’ political orientation also appears to be important, at least with 
respect to the most preferred consolidation measure. Voters of parties other than those listed 
prefer cutting spending on any policy area over tax hikes in first place. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The poor state of public finances in many countries has led to calls for fiscal consolidation. 
However, debt-reduction plans have often met with stiff public resistance, which is why many 
governments seem to avoid adopting concrete consolidation measures. This paper identifies 
the determinants of individual attitudes toward fiscal consolidation and alternative 
consolidation measures. More precisely, we examine the role of various factors derived from 
theory-informed hypotheses, namely, personal economic well-being, time preference, fiscal 
illusion, trust in politicians, and party preference. 
Our results support many of the conjectures found in the public choice and political 
economy literature. People are more likely to support fiscal consolidation the better their 
economic situation, the more forward-looking and patient they are, the better their knowledge 
about the costs of deficit spending, and the lower their trust in the government’s fiscal 
competence. However, opinions about the ‘appropriate’ fiscal adjustment path diverge widely, 
which is bad news for policy-makers trying to obtain public support for their policies. There is 
no sign, though, that preferences for alternative consolidation measures are significantly 
affected by selfish interests, i.e., well-off people prefer tax hikes over almost any alternative 
consolidation measure, even over spending cuts in social security. 
At least two issues are not addressed in our analysis. First, it is debatable whether all 
respondents who claim to be in favour of public debt reduction can be regarded as ‘serious’ 
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consolidation supporters. Although 70% of the German population supports fiscal 
consolidation, 8% state that the main part of public debt should be reduced at some 
(unspecified) time in the future, and 13% refuse to specify concrete consolidation measures. 
This suggests that about 20% of respondents do not take the public budget constraint into 
account when voicing their opinion, i.e., they support a policy measure only if it involves no 
costs. 
Second, less than 10% of the respondents know the previous year’s budget deficit. 
This suggests that citizens either (i) find it difficult to acquire this information, (ii) are not 
overly concerned about acquiring information about public deficits, or (iii) do not believe this 
specific information to be particularly important for their well-being. Further research is 
needed to differentiate between these alternative interpretations.  
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Appendix 
A.1. Explanatory Variables 
 
HH income 
Monthly net household income in €1,000. In the raw dataset, 
households are sorted into one of 11 income classes. In the 
empirical analysis, we consider the centre of each class. 
Subjective well-being 
Subjective assessment of personal economic well-being, ranging 
from 1 (absolutely dissatisfied) to 5 (absolutely satisfied). 
Social class 
Indicator combining information about respondents’ relative 
income and occupational status and ranging from 1 (lower class) 
to 5 (upper class). 
Property 
Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent lives in her 
own house or flat and 0 if the house/flat is rented. 
Believed deficit 
Measure of the respondent’s assessment of 2012’s federal budget 
deficit (four potential realisations; measured in percentage 
points). This variable is computed based on the following 
question: 
How large was the budget deficit of the federal government in 
2012? 
1% □ 3% □ 5% □ 7% □ 
Believed interest rate 
Measure of the respondent’s assessment of the interest rate on 
government bonds with a maturity of 10 years (four potential 
realisations; measured in percentage points). This variable is 
computed based on the following question: 
What is the current interest rate on long-term government bonds 
(maturity 10 years), approximately? 
1.5% □ 3% □ 5.5% □ 10% □ 
Believed inflation rate 
Measure of the respondent’s assessment of 2012’s inflation rate 
(four potential realisations; measured in percentage points). This 
variable is computed based on the following question: 
How large was the inflation rate in 2012, approximately? 
0% □ 2% □ 5% □ 10% □ 
Knowledge/number of 
correct answers 
Variable measuring the number of correct answers to the three 
multiple-choice questions about 2012’s deficit, the interest rate 
on government bonds, and 2012’s inflation rate. 
Public interest 
Most politicians in 
Germany act in line with 
the general public’s 
interest 
vs. 
Most politicians in 
Germany only serve the 
interests of particular 
groups 
+2: □ +1: □ 0: □ −1: □ −2: □ 
Long-term orientation 
Most politicians are 
concerned about the 
country’s long-term well-
being 
vs. 
Most politicians are only 
concerned about the next 
elections 
+2: □ +1: □ 0: □ −1: □ −2: □ 
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Fiscal competence 
The government 
manages tax revenues 
conscientiously 
vs. 
The government wastes 
tax revenues  
+2: □ +1: □ 0: □ −1: □ −2: □ 
Education 
Education level of the respondent, differentiating between lower 
secondary education (reference category), middle secondary 
education, and upper secondary education. 
Employment HH head 
Employment status of the household head, differentiating 
between regularly employed (reference category), unemployed, 
retired, student, and jobless for other reasons. 
Age Respondent’s age in years. 
Children 
Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent has children 
(0 otherwise). 
Female 
Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent is female (0 
otherwise). 
East German 
Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent lives in East 
Germany (0 otherwise). 
Egalitarian attitude 
The state should ensure 
equal living conditions 
vs. 
The state should not 
interfere with people’s 
living conditions 
+2: □ +1: □ 0: □ −1: □ −2: □ 
Risk preference See Section 3.2. 
Family status 
Family status of respondent, differentiating between single 
(reference category), living together with a partner, married, and 
divorced/widowed. 
Union member 
Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent is a union 
member (0 otherwise). 
Household head 
Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent is the head 
of the household she lives in (0 otherwise). 
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A.2. Measurement of Risk and Time Preferences 
 
Questionnaire wording: Next, we would like to conduct some experiments concerned with 
financial decisions. In the first experiment, you make your decisions according to the 
following table (Interviewer: Please show the table below). In each row you see two 
alternatives. You can choose between a certain payoff and participation in a lottery, which 
follows the principle ‘all or nothing’: You have a 50% chance of winning €1,000 and a 50% 
chance of winning €0. 
You start in row 1 and then proceed row by row. In each row, please choose between the 
certain payoff (column A) and participation in the lottery (column B). The lottery remains the 
same in all rows. Only the certain payoff increases from row to row. 
 
 You get…  You get… 
 
Safe 
 
€1,000 or nothing 
Chance of winning 50:50 
 A or B 
1 €0   Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
2 €100   Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
3 €200   Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
4 €300   Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
5 €400   Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
6 €500   Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
7 €600   Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
8 €700   Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
9 €800   Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
10 €900   Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
 
Interviewer: Please start with row 1 and the question ‘What do you choose? €0 safe or 
chance of winning €1,000/€0?’. If the interviewee chooses option B, please proceed to row 2 
and the question ‘What do you choose? 100€ or a chance of winning 1,000€/0€?’. The 
experiment ends when the interviewee chooses option A for the first time. Please write down 
the number of the row where the respondent chose option A for the first time. 
 
Option A was first chosen in row number: 
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Questionnaire wording: In the next experiment you decide according to the following table 
(Interviewer: Please show the table below). In each row, you see two alternatives. You can 
choose between a certain payoff of €1,000, which is paid to you immediately and a higher 
certain payoff, which will be paid to you in 6 months. 
You start in row 1 and then proceed row by row. In each row, please choose between the 
payoff of €1,000 to be paid immediately (column A) and the higher payoff to be paid in 6 
months (column B). The payoff on the left remains the same in all rows. Only the payoff on 
the right increases from row to row. 
 
 You get…  You get… 
 Immediately  In 6 month 
 A or B 
1 €1,000  €1,000 
2 €1,000  €1,010 
3 €1,000  €1,020 
4 €1,000  €1,030 
5 €1,000  €1,050 
6 €1,000  €1,075 
7 €1,000  €1,100 
8 €1,000  €1,150 
9 €1,000  €1,200 
10 €1,000  €1,300 
11 €1,000  €1,400 
12 €1,000  €1,500 
13 €1,000  €1,750 
14 €1,000  €2,000 
 
Interviewer: Please start with row 1 and the question ‘What do you choose? €1,000 
immediately or €1,000 in 6 months?’. If the interviewee chooses option A, please proceed to 
row 2 and the question ‘What do you choose? €1,000 immediately or €1,010 in 6 months?’. 
The experiment ends when the interviewee chooses option B for the first time. Please write 
down the number of the row where the interviewee chose option B for the first time. 
 
Option B was first chosen in row number: 
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Questionnaire wording: In the last experiment, you decide according to the following table 
(Interviewer: Please show the table below). In each row, you see two alternatives. You can 
choose between a certain payoff of €1,000, which is paid to you in 6 months and a higher 
certain payoff, which will be paid to you in 12 months. 
You start in row 1 and then proceed row by row. In each row, please choose between the 
payoff of €1,000 to be paid in 6 months (column A) and the higher payoff to be paid in 12 
months (column B). The payoff on the left remains the same in all rows. Only the payoff on 
the right increases from row to row. 
 
 You get…  You get… 
 In 6 months  In 12 months 
 A or B 
1 €1,000  €1,000 
2 €1,000  €1,010 
3 €1,000  €1,020 
4 €1,000  €1,030 
5 €1,000  €1,050 
6 €1,000  €1,075 
7 €1,000  €1,100 
8 €1,000  €1,150 
9 €1,000  €1,200 
10 €1,000  €1,300 
11 €1,000  €1,400 
12 €1,000  €1,500 
13 €1,000  €1,750 
14 €1,000  €2,000 
 
Interviewer: Please start with row 1 and the question ‘What do you choose? €1,000 in 6 
months or €1,000 in 12 months?’. If the interviewee chooses option A, please proceed to row 
2 and the question ‘What do you choose? €1,000 in 6 months or €1,010 in 12 months?’. The 
experiment ends when the interviewee chooses option B for the first time. Please write down 
the number of the row where the interviewee chose option B for the first time. 
Option B was first chosen in row number: 
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A.3. Checks for Robustness 
Table A1: Determinants of individual attitudes toward fiscal consolidation—binary choice 
logit estimation 
Variables Coefficient Standard Error 
Average marginal 
effect 
Economic situation       
HH income 0.054 0.086 0.009 
Subjective well-being 0.214 *** 0.061 0.038 
Social class 0.108 0.092 0.019 
Property 0.260 ** 0.116 0.046 
Time preferences    
β 0.556 0.345 0.036 
δ 0.398 * 0.232 0.035 
Knowledge    
One correct answer 0.038 0.176 0.007 
Two correct answers 0.196 0.228 0.035 
Three correct answers 0.747 ** 0.354 0.115 
Believed deficit 0.102 *** 0.037 0.018 
Believed interest rate −0.010 0.032 −0.002 
Believed inflation rate 0.004 0.033 0.001 
Political trust    
Public interest 0.022 0.069 0.004 
Long-term orientation 0.056 0.070 0.010 
Fiscal competence −0.165 ** 0.071 −0.029 
Party preference    
Leftist party 0.120 0.239 0.021 
Pirates −0.166 0.384 −0.032 
SPD 0.002 0.158 0.000 
Green party −0.058 0.183 −0.011 
CDU 0.152 0.171 0.027 
FDP 0.035 0.319 0.006 
NPD 1.063 0.730 0.150 
Other 1.078 *** 0.340 0.151 
Education    
Middle second. school 0.302 ** 0.134 0.054 
Higher second. school 0.291 0.199 0.053 
Employment HH head    
Unemployed 0.492 ** 0.231 0.082 
Retired 0.300 * 0.179 0.052 
Student 1.018 ** 0.441 0.155 
Jobless other −0.189 0.334 −0.036 
Observations 2042   
Pseudo-R2 0.061   
Wald χ2 (42) 133.64 ***   
Note: Results are based on a logit maximum likelihood estimation. Coefficients of control 
variables are omitted to save space. The dependent variable is a dummy with value 1 if the 
respondents favours public debt reduction (0 otherwise). White (1980) robust standard errors 
are used. Average marginal effects for β and δ are calculated based on change of the 
respective variable from the lower to the upper bound of the 66% confidence interval. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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A.4. Individual Attitudes Toward Alternative Consolidation Policies 
Table A2: Determinants of individual attitudes toward different fiscal consolidation measures—multinominal logit estimation 
Variables Social Security Public Safety Education Infrastructure Econ. Develop. Defence Other Areas 
Economic situation               
HH income −0.503 ** −0.816 ** −0.384 −0.726 ** −0.583 ** −0.601 *** −0.561 ** 
Subjective well-being −0.114 −0.237 −0.221 −0.015 −0.199 −0.160 −0.290 
Social class −0.619 ** −0.485 −0.532 −0.407 −0.661 ** −0.569 ** −0.667 ** 
Property 0.642 * 1.046 * 0.479 1.348 ** 1.275 *** 0.689 ** 0.661 ** 
Time preferences         
β −0.435 2.496 −2.638 * 0.926 1.151 0.191 −0.492 
δ 1.634 ** 2.189 * 0.646 1.477 2.582 *** 1.686 ** 1.410 * 
Knowledge         
One correct answer −1.253 ** −0.745 −1.382 * −0.946 −0.706 −0.530 −0.513 
Two correct answers −1.376 ** −2.098 ** −0.389 −2.235 ** −1.543 ** −0.854 −0.999 
Three correct answers −2.170 ** −1.259 −0.900 −1.088 −1.060 −1.264 −1.654 * 
Believed deficit −0.151 −0.421 *** −0.099 −0.203 −0.045 −0.145 * −0.166 * 
Believed interest rate −0.052 0.082 0.043 0.151 0.046 −0.007 0.044 
Believed inflation 0.160 0.173 0.199 0.235 0.141 0.126 0.190 * 
Political trust        
Public interest 0.079 −0.232 0.246 −0.005 0.274 −0.077 0.049 
Long-term orientation −0.272 0.010 0.185 0.069 −0.244 −0.137 −0.062 
Fiscal competence 0.012 −0.029 −0.096 −0.233 −0.351 * −0.230 −0.267 
Party preference        
Leftist party −2.744 *** −0.785 −1.911 −16.231 *** −1.019 −1.059 ** −1.038 * 
Pirates −15.470 *** −15.143 *** 0.886 1.787 0.748 0.289 0.707 
SPD −0.376 0.362 0.664 0.780 −0.163 −0.127 −0.156 
Green party −0.730 −0.319 −1.645 0.092 −0.148 −0.121 −0.449 
CDU −0.061 0.023 −0.324 0.249 −0.277 −0.248 −0.329 
FDP 1.867 * 1.130 −14.545 *** 1.508 0.946 0.764 0.342 
NPD 14.377 *** −1.661 * 15.609 *** −1.243 14.881 *** 13.787 *** 14.957 *** 
Other 14.951 *** 14.585 *** 14.651 *** 15.689 *** 14.458 *** 14.766 *** 15.289 *** 
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Table A2 (continued) 
Variables Social Security Public Safety Education Infrastructure Econ. Develop. Defence Other Areas 
Education               
Middle second. school −0.220 −0.036 −1.168 ** −0.037 −0.531 −0.076 −0.618 * 
Higher second. school −0.191 0.089 −0.884 0.324 −1.201 ** −0.017 −0.440 
Employment HH head        
Unemployed −0.266 0.703 −0.384 −1.198 −0.289 0.220 −1.253 
Retired −0.926 * −1.285 * 0.875 −0.261 −1.034 ** −0.765 * −0.726 
Student −0.707 0.684 −1.683 1.162 0.474 −0.021 0.252 
Jobless other 0.602 −0.066 0.577 −15.200 *** 1.026 −0.239 0.389 
Further controls        
Age 0.002 −0.008 −0.057 ** −0.029 0.017 0.012 −0.002 
Children 0.460 0.468 0.319 0.458 0.562 0.457 0.835 ** 
Female −0.195 −0.094 0.007 −0.284 −0.196 −0.251 −0.560 * 
East German −0.242 −0.362 0.616 0.509 −0.565 −0.217 −0.314 
Egalitarian attitude −0.361 *** −0.265 −0.311 0.089 −0.228 0.028 −0.082 
Risk preference −0.530 ** 0.155 −0.606 * −0.464 −0.089 −0.307 −0.254 
Living in partnership 0.807 0.735 −0.140 0.691 −0.709 0.245 0.350 
Married −0.414 −0.506 0.398 0.522 −0.546 −0.159 −0.224 
Divorced/widowed −0.471 0.492 0.361 0.220 −0.467 −0.010 −0.172 
Union member −0.016 0.823 0.533 0.429 −0.383 0.410 −0.018 
Household head 0.160 0.797 0.178 0.718 0.375 0.622 0.427 
Dummy β 0.300 0.100 0.089 1.043 0.539 0.759 ** 0.511 
Dummy δ −0.578 −0.768 −1.419 ** −1.700 ** −0.995 ** −0.817 ** −0.723 * 
Constant 4.080 −1.119 5.139 −0.466 0.116 2.375 3.552 
Observations 1525       
Pseudo-R
2 0.106       
Note: Results are based on a maximum likelihood, multinominal logit estimation. The reference category is ‘tax hike’. White (1980) robust standard 
errors are used. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table A3: Determinants of individual attitudes toward different fiscal consolidation measures—binary choice logit estimation 
Variables Tax Hike Social Security Public Safety Education Infrastructure Econ. Develop. Defence Other Areas 
Economic situation                 
HH income 0.030 * −0.005 −0.006 0.008 −0.024 0.005 0.023 −0.016 
Subjective well-being 0.008 0.016 −0.017 ** −0.005 0.005 −0.021 0.011 −0.012 
Social class 0.031 * −0.012 −0.007 0.002 −0.018 0.003 −0.003 −0.035 
Property −0.025 −0.033 −0.000 0.010 −0.015 0.063 ** −0.035 −0.006 
Time preferences          
β 0.030 0.079 0.006 −0.012 0.021 0.080 *** 0.123 *** 0.043 
δ −0.052 * −0.008 0.003 0.008 0.023 0.029 0.030 −0.008 
Knowledge          
One correct answer −0.013 −0.055 −0.009 −0.050 *** −0.039 −0.001 0.114 *** 0.043 
Two correct answers −0.023 −0.073 −0.025 −0.011 −0.054 −0.016 0.091 * 0.031 
Three correct answers −0.064 −0.082 0.003 0.013 −0.061 0.057 0.146 ** 0.071 
Believed deficit −0.009 0.001 −0.006 0.002 −0.002 0.015 * 0.012 0.012 
Believed interest rate −0.007 −0.013 ** 0.002 0.002 0.008 −0.007 −0.016 ** −0.008 
Believed inflation −0.023 *** 0.005 −0.001 0.001 −0.008 0.010 −0.001 −0.002 
Political trust         
Public interest 0.010 −0.023 * 0.014 0.007 0.000 0.039 *** 0.001 0.009 
Long-term orientation −0.005 −0.011 −0.005 0.010 0.015 −0.013 −0.037 *** −0.025 
Fiscal competence 0.024 * 0.030 ** 0.012 0.003 −0.007 −0.035 ** −0.027 * −0.032 ** 
Party preference         
Leftist party 0.070 −0.037 −0.032 −0.010 −0.039 0.073 0.043 0.145 ** 
Pirates 0.012 −0.001 0.033 0.049 −0.089 ** 0.028 −0.062 0.207 ** 
SPD −0.001 0.001 0.011 0.006 0.036 0.057 0.006 0.086 ** 
Green party −0.037 −0.031 −0.022 −0.054 *** 0.044 0.040 0.014 0.042 
CDU 0.014 0.057 0.004 −0.017 −0.019 −0.005 −0.002 0.094 ** 
FDP 0.011 0.288 *** −0.007 −0.017 −0.010 −0.006 0.035 −0.021 
NPD 0.122 0.016 0.047 0.030 −0.005 −0.045 −0.003 0.101 
Other −0.050 0.025 −0.039 −0.011 0.016 −0.009 −0.165 *** 0.043 
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Table A3 (continued) 
Variables Tax Hike Social Security Public Safety Education Infrastructure Econ. Develop. Defence Other Areas 
Education                 
Middle second. school 0.015 0.021 0.006 −0.019 0.003 0.033 0.058 * 0.029 
Higher second. school 0.093 ** 0.039 −0.002 −0.036 0.004 0.044 0.091 ** −0.033 
Employment HH head         
Unemployed 0.082 −0.034 0.066 * −0.014 0.021 −0.035 0.107 *** −0.048 
Retired 0.056 −0.015 0.034 0.050 * 0.017 0.001 −0.026 −0.065 
Student 0.023 −0.077 −0.043 −0.063 *** 0.055 0.120 −0.054 −0.124 
Jobless other −0.002 −0.017 0.011 −0.037 0.073 0.030 −0.045 0.034 
Further controls         
Age −0.001 0.0003 −0.001 * −0.003 *** −0.001 0.002 0.002 ** −0.0002 
Children 0.016 −0.0001 −0.055 ** −0.010 0.0002 −0.052 −0.017 0.083 ** 
Female 0.000 −0.028 0.003 0.021 −0.020 −0.055 * −0.023 −0.044 
East German 0.033 0.028 0.005 0.044 * 0.038 −0.080 *** 0.018 0.026 
Egalitarian attitude 0.005 −0.031 *** −0.006 −0.005 0.019 ** −0.004 0.032 *** 0.010 
Risk preference −0.006 −0.011 0.001 −0.002 −0.030 ** −0.003 −0.020 0.019 
Living in partnership −0.013 −0.014 0.017 −0.024 0.002 0.065 −0.003 −0.137 ** 
Married 0.004 −0.053 0.038 0.031 0.011 0.042 −0.002 −0.021 
Divorced/widowed −0.038 −0.060 0.005 0.017 0.027 0.121 ** 0.044 −0.015 
Union member 0.039 −0.006 0.019 0.019 0.030 −0.003 0.052 −0.027 
Household head −0.020 0.005 −0.020 −0.043 *** 0.044 * 0.074 ** 0.020 0.028 
Dummy β −0.019 −0.013 0.008 0.005 0.030 0.021 0.039 0.030 
Dummy δ 0.087 ** 0.044 −0.038 * −0.036 ** −0.011 0.047 0.092 *** 0.043 
Observations 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 
Pseudo-R
2 0.052 0.048 0.063 0.103 0.046 0.038 0.078 0.037 
Wald χ2 (42) 68.59 *** 73.62 *** 69.23 *** 80.96 *** 54.60 * 66.53 *** 132.76 *** 72.37 *** 
Note: Results are based on a binary choice, logit maximum likelihood estimation. The table contains average marginal effects. The dependent 
variable equals 1 if the respective consolidation measure was mentioned; 0 otherwise. White (1980) robust standard errors are used. Average 
marginal effects for β and δ are calculated based on change of the respective variable from the lower to the upper bound of the 66% confidence 
interval. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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The Debt Brake in the Eyes of the German Population 
 
 
Abstract 
In response to the recent sovereign debt crisis, the member states of the European Union 
agreed to enact balanced budget rules in their national legislation. However, little is known 
about the public’s opinion of balanced budget rules. To fill this gap, we conducted a survey 
among 2,000 representatively chosen German citizens. Our findings suggest that 61% of the 
German population supports the debt brake, whereas only 8% oppose it. However, approval 
rates differ notably among various subgroups of the population. The debt brake enjoys greater 
support among high-income earners and among those well-informed about the future costs of 
deficit spending. People who do not trust politicians would like to see the government’s hands 
tied even more tightly. Opinions about the debt brake also differ markedly across the 
supporters of different political parties. 
 
JEL: E02; E62; H62; H63 
Keywords: Debt brake; balanced budget rule; European Fiscal Compact; survey; Germany. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent financial crisis and associated economic downturn have imposed a huge burden on 
the public finances of most developed countries. Between 2007 and 2012, the average debt-to-
GDP ratio increased from 59% to 85% in EU countries and from 74% to 111% in OECD 
countries.1 This development has driven quite a number of European countries to the brink of 
insolvency and raised serious concerns about the stability of the euro area. A popular proposal 
aimed at restoring investor confidence and ensuring sustainable public finances is to limit 
governments’ discretionary leeway by committing to rule-based fiscal policy. Debt brakes are 
believed to be an especially effective and credible commitment device (e.g., Poterba and 
Rueben, 2001; Alesina and Bayoumi, 1996). As a response to the sovereign debt crisis, most 
member states of the European Union signed the European Fiscal Compact, which mandates 
the enactment of a balanced budget law in their national legislation.2 
Debt brakes are not without controversy, however. On the one hand, debt brakes 
appear to be frequently undermined by creative accounting practices. For example, von Hagen 
and Wolff (2006) report that EU countries frequently use stock-flow adjustments to hide 
budget deficits in order to comply with the criteria of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Keynesian economists are generally critical of debt brakes, given that this school of thought 
emphasises the benefits of expansionary fiscal policies, especially during economic 
downturns (e.g., Hein and Truger, 2013). Warnings about the perils of balanced budget rules 
are particularly vehement in the context of the European Monetary Union, as fiscal policy 
remains the only national macroeconomic instrument for offsetting asymmetric shocks across 
countries. Moreover, balanced budget rules may have an adverse effect on economic growth, 
as they could trigger huge fluctuations in aggregate economic activity (Schmitt-Grohé and 
Uribe, 1997). 
Germany recently adopted a balanced budget law via constitutional amendment (Art. 
109(3) Grundgesetz). From 2016 onward, the public budget deficit at the federal government 
level must not exceed 0.35% of GDP. Exceptions can be made only in times of economic 
crises or in the event of a natural disaster. The German state governments (Bundesländer) are 
required to balance their budgets beginning in 2020; the same exceptions applicable at the 
federal level also apply to at this level of government. 
                                                        
1 OECD Economic Outlook No. 95. 
2 Exceptions are the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic, which did not sign the European Fiscal Compact. 
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There is a large literature evaluating the effectiveness of fiscal rules.3 However, 
despite the far-reaching consequences debt brakes have for fiscal policy and the potential 
perils they pose, there is a lack of evidence on how the electorate evaluates debt brakes. A 
balanced budget rule ties the hands of elected politicians who are supposed to represent their 
voters’ interests and hence also constrains the electorate’s scope for decision-making. Thus, 
people should not be indifferent about the implementation of such a rule. To elicit the German 
public’s attitude toward the debt brake, we designed a survey that was carried out by the GfK, 
a private survey institute. In the first quarter of 2013, roughly 2,000 German citizens aged at 
least 14 were interviewed face-to-face with the help of pen pads. 
Our findings suggest that a vast majority of the German population supports the 
balanced budget rule in its current form; the share of proponents is roughly 61%. Only 8% of 
the respondents oppose a debt brake; 17% do not think that the current debt brake is a strong 
enough constraint, believing that government should not incur any additional debt at all. Our 
dataset contains additional information about the respondents, allowing us to examine the 
correlates of people’s attitudes toward the debt brake. Results based on cross-tabulations and 
multinominal regression analysis indicate that support for the balanced budget rule is stronger 
among high-income respondents and those well-informed about the costs of deficit spending. 
People who do not trust politicians would like to see the government’s hands tied even more 
tightly. Opinions about the debt brake also differ notably across the supporters of different 
political parties. People who vote for the CDU and FDP, for example, are more likely to 
approve the debt brake in its current form than are non-voters or people who vote for ‘fringe’ 
parties. However, hardly any subgroup of the German population opposes introduction of a 
balanced budget rule in general. 
Our paper relates to several studies that use survey data to elicit public attitudes 
toward fiscal deficits and fiscal consolidation. Hayo and Neumeier (2013), as well as 
Heinemann and Henninghausen (2012), investigate determinants of individual attitudes 
toward fiscal consolidation in Germany, Stix (2013) focuses on Austria, and Blinder and 
Krueger (2004) employ survey data from the United States. However, this strand of the 
literature evaluates public attitudes toward the ad hoc implementation of fiscal consolidation 
measures. In contrast, debt brakes do not grant much flexibility, as compliance with the rule is 
mandatory. Thus, supporting consolidation efforts occasionally is not the same as opting for a 
                                                        
3 For example, Poterba (1994), Bohn and Inman (1996), and Alesina and Bayoumi (1996) provide evidence for 
US states, Imbeau and Tellier (2004) for Canada, Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) and Guichard et al. (2007) for 
OECD countries, and Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) as well as de Haan et al. (1999) for EU countries.  
5 
rule committing politicians to engage in fiscal policy at all times. To the best of our 
knowledge, only Blinder and Holtz-Eakin (1984) study people’s attitudes toward a balanced 
budget rule. The authors use data from two public opinion polls conducted in the United 
States to elicit the population’s opinion on a proposed balanced budget amendment to the 
constitution. However, their dataset contains only a few socio-demographic variables, thus 
providing only limited insight into the correlates of people’s attitudes toward balanced budget 
rules. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section introduces the 
survey instrument and presents some descriptive statistics; it also contains an examination of 
the correlates of individual attitudes toward the German debt brake by means of cross-
tabulations. Section 3 presents the results of a multinominal logit estimation, which allows us 
to take potential collinearity between our covariates into account. Section 4 concludes. 
  
2. The German Public’s Opinion on the Debt Brake and its Correlates 
Our survey data are based on a novel questionnaire of our own design that was conducted by 
the GfK, one of the biggest private survey institutes in Germany. Fieldwork was done in 
February 2013, at which time a total of 2,042 representatively chosen German citizens aged at 
least 14 were interviewed face-to-face with the help of pen pads. 
As part of the survey, interviewees were asked about their opinion on the German debt 
brake, which was introduced in 2009 in the form of a constitutional amendment. According to 
this amendment, the German federal government is not allowed to run an annual structural 
deficit of more than 0.35% of GDP from 2016 onward. To simplify matters for the 
respondents, we refrained from using the term ‘structural deficit’ and from mentioning 
‘0.35% of GDP’ when designing the wording of the item. Instead, we stated that the 
government can take on ‘almost no additional public debt’. The English translation of the 
exact wording of the question is as follows: 
In 2016 the federal debt brake comes into force. From this moment on, the federal 
government can take on almost no additional public debt. Exemptions are allowed 
only in times of economic crises or natural disasters. What is your opinion on the 
debt brake? 
The respondents could choose between four answers: (1) ‘I am against the debt brake—the 
incurrence of public debt should not be restricted’, (2) ‘I am in favour of the debt brake in the 
aforementioned form’, (3) ‘The debt brake is still not enough—the government should not be 
allowed to incur public debt at all’, or (4) ‘Don’t know’. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of 
answers. 
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Figure 1: Public attitudes toward the German debt brake—distribution of answers 
 
 
We find that the German debt brake enjoys wide public support: 61% of our 
respondents approve the balanced budget rule in its current form and only 8% oppose a 
balanced budget rule in general; 17% even think that the debt brake does not go far enough, 
believing that the government should not incur any additional debt. Only 14% have no 
opinion, indicating high public interest in what is a potentially complicated topic. Thus, the 
idea of tying the government’s hands in order to prevent it from accumulating public debt has 
many proponents. 
However, the aggregate data paint an incomplete picture, as various subgroups of the 
population may differ with respect to their view on the debt brake. Public debt incurrence can 
serve very different purposes; it can provide a means to redistribute resources over time and 
groups of people, it can work to stabilise the business cycle, it can be employed strategically 
by opportunistic policymakers, and so forth. The public choice and political economy 
literature makes several conjectures about correlates of people’s attitudes toward public debt 
incurrence. Similarly, attitudes toward a rule compelling the government to balance the 
budget could vary along similar dimensions, as people may have different opinions about the 
advantages of discretionary fiscal policy or benefit to different degrees from public debt 
incurrence. Our dataset allows us to empirically test several of these conjectures, as we also 
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containing conditional distributions of answers. In each case, we also report Pearson’s χ2 to 
evaluate the statistical significance of the correlations. 
 
2.1. Economic Well-Being 
According to Cukierman and Meltzer (1989), public debt incurrence is an instrument for 
reallocating resources over time or even generations. An interesting conclusion of their 
analysis is that people who are relatively worse-off may be less reluctant to live at the expense 
of future generations and more likely to favour deficit spending. Hayford (1989) emphasises 
the importance of capital market restrictions. In a neo-Ricardian world, public debt is a way 
for the current generation of consumers to circumvent a binding credit constraint. Arguably, 
people with low income and low asset endowment are more likely credit constrained and thus 
more in favour of public debt incurrence. To evaluate the importance of the interviewees’ 
economic situation to their attitudes toward the debt brake, we collected information on (i) the 
respondent’s net monthly household income (in €1,000), (ii) a household’s real assets (i.e., a 
dummy indicating whether the respondent lives in a self-owned flat/house or a rented 
house/flat), and (iii) the respondent’s subjective assessment of his or her economic situation, 
ranging from 1 (absolutely dissatisfied) to 5 (absolutely satisfied). 
Table A1 in the Appendix illustrates the association between attitude toward the debt 
brake and the respondent’s economic situation. To measure the influence of household 
income, we group our respondents into three categories: low-income households with a net 
monthly income of less than €1,500; medium-income households with incomes between 
€1,500 and €3,500; and high-income households with income above €3,500. Our results show 
that economic well-being increases approval of the debt brake: 55% of low-income 
respondents support the balanced budget rule; for high-income respondents, the share is 68%. 
The association with the respondents’ subjective assessment of their personal well-being is 
even stronger. Only 41% of those who state that they are absolutely dissatisfied with their 
economic situation support the debt brake, whereas those who are satisfied or absolutely 
satisfied have an approval rate of above 60%. Comparing house owners and renters, we find a 
similar result: the approval rate for the debt brake is 62% for the former group and 59% for 
the latter. However, we must emphasise that people reporting low income, no house 
ownership, or low economic well-being do not generally oppose a balanced budget rule—
quite the reverse: they are more likely to opt for an even stricter balanced budget rule that 
would prevent the government from incurring any additional public debt at all. This is strong 
8 
empirical evidence against the hypothesis put forward in the literature that poor people are 
more prone toward deficit spending. 
 
2.2. Economic Literacy 
There is a great deal of evidence in the public choice literature supporting the idea that 
attitudes toward deficit spending are related to economic literacy. People who suffer from 
‘fiscal illusion’, that is, who lack information about the costs associated with public debt 
incurrence, are believed to be more tolerant of fiscal deficits (e.g., Buchanan and Wagner, 
1977). Based on this reasoning, we expect that economically ‘literate’ people are more likely 
to support a balanced budget rule so as to prevent the government from incurring public debt. 
To elicit the respondents’ economic literacy, we employed three indicators assessing the 
interviewees’ knowledge about public-debt-related economic measures. We asked about (i) 
the size of the federal government’s budget deficit in 2012 (in relation to GDP), (ii) the 
current interest rate on government bonds with a maturity of 10 years, and (iii) 2012’s 
inflation rate. In each case, respondents could choose between four answers. As an indicator 
of the respondents’ degree of economic literacy, we count the number of correct answers. We 
expect that better-informed respondents are more likely to favour a balanced budget rule, as 
they have a better understanding of the costs related to public debt incurrence. 
In line with our prior, our findings suggest that higher economic literacy is associated 
with a greater likelihood of supporting the debt brake (see Table A2 in the Appendix). The 
approval rate among the interviewees who gave one, two, or three correct answers is, 
respectively, 10 percentage points (pp), 13 pp, and 7 pp larger compared to that of those who 
gave no correct answer. Thus, the relationship between knowledge and support appears to be 
nonlinear. About 20% of those who are poorly informed did not express an opinion about the 
debt brake, indicating that this relationship may be mediated by a lack of political interest. 
Only one-third of our respondents gave at least two correct answers; given that the expected 
number of correct answers is one if interviewees simply guess randomly, this result suggests 
that the public’s knowledge about debt-related economic measures is somewhat weak. 
 
2.3. Believed Fiscal Position 
Subjective assessment of economic conditions may play a crucial role in people’s attitude 
toward the debt brake as people tend to act on the information set they have, at least as long as 
they believe it to be accurate. Thus, if a person thinks that the government is spending beyond 
its limits and debt-servicing costs are high, she may be more likely to support a debt brake. 
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We use the answers to the multiple-choice knowledge questions as an indicator for the 
respondents’ beliefs about the realisation of debt-related economic measures, irrespective of 
whether they are actually correct. 
The results are outlined in Table A3. The answers to all three multiple-choice 
questions are significantly related to attitudes toward the debt brake. Respondents who believe 
the past year’s deficit and current interest rate to be particularly large are less likely to oppose 
the debt brake and more likely to opt for an even stricter balanced budget rule. Only 184 (9%) 
of our respondents knew that the federal government’s budget deficit in 2012 was about 1%, 
indicating again that German citizens are not well-informed about fiscal policy. The 
association between attitudes toward the debt brake and the believed inflation rate is less 
clear. People who falsely believe that 2012’s inflation rate was particularly low are less likely 
to support the debt brake than are those who falsely believe it to equal 5%, but more likely to 
approve it than those who think it was extraordinarily large (i.e., 10%). 
 
2.4. Time Preferences 
According to Barro’s (1979) tax-smoothing hypothesis, benevolent governments ought to 
incur fiscal deficits during recessions and consolidate the public budget in times of economic 
recovery. However, whether such a course of fiscal policy is in the (representative) voter’s 
interest, strongly depends (inter alia) on her time preferences. The crucial assumption here is 
that the discount function applied by the (representative) individual to evaluate the welfare 
effect of future fiscal policies corresponds to the yield curve of government bonds. There are 
two frequently observed anomalies in intertemporal decision-making that challenge this view. 
First, people’s subjective discount factors between two consecutive periods are typically 
larger than the corresponding interest rate, indicating that they are less forward-looking than 
they are assumed to be. Second, people are especially impatient in the short run, commonly 
referred to as ‘myopia’ (e.g., Thaler and Shefrin, 1981; Ainslie, 1975). We expect that people 
who are less forward-looking (i.e., who apply lower discount rates) and particularly impatient 
in the short run show will be less supportive of a balanced budget rule (cf. Huber and Runkel, 
2008). 
The survey contained two experiments that allow us to assess the interviewees’ time 
preferences.4 In the first experiment, respondents were asked to choose between a safe payoff 
                                                        
4 A detailed description of these experiments is provided in Hayo et al. (2014). The setup and wording of the 
experiments are taken from the questionnaire of the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP), where the 
experiment was incentivised. Since the distribution of answers in our data is very similar to the one in the SOEP 
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of €1,000 paid immediately and a higher payoff of €Xi,6 paid in six months. In the second 
experiment, the choice is between a safe payoff of €1,000 paid in six months and a higher 
payoff of €Xi,12 paid in 12 months. The respondents’ choices of Xi,6 and Xi,12 are then used to 
compute (i) the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution between two consecutive future 
periods, i.e., ߚ ൌ  1,000/X௜,ଵଶ, and (ii) the respondents’ degree of short-run impatience, 
defined as ߜ ൌ  X௜,ଵଶ/X௜,଺ (cf. Angeletos et al., 2001; Laibson, 1997). 
In Table A4 of the Appendix, we sort respondents based on their degree of forward-
lookingness, differentiating between low (β ≤ 0.5), medium (0.5 < β ≤ 0.9), and high (β > 0.9) 
future orientation. We further discriminate between myopic (δ < 1) and non-myopic (δ ≥ 1) 
respondents, depending on the realisation of δ. A comparison of the distribution of answers by 
these groups reveals no clear association between time preference and attitude toward the debt 
brake. Respondents with a medium degree of future orientation are more likely to support the 
debt brake than those with low or high future orientation and less likely to state that the debt 
brake is not sufficient. The relationship between our indicator for myopia and attitudes toward 
the debt brake is statistically insignificant. 
 
2.5. Risk Attitudes 
Critics of debt brakes often emphasise that lack of sufficient fiscal leeway may limit the 
government’s scope for fiscal stimuli during economic downturns. The disadvantages of 
balanced budget rules are believed to be particularly severe in the context of the European 
Monetary Union, as fiscal policy is the only national macroeconomic instrument for offsetting 
asymmetric shocks (e.g., Hein and Truger, 2013). Arguably, perception of the perils of a debt 
brake may be related to people’s risk attitudes. People who are highly risk averse, and thus 
likely to be more concerned about adverse economic shocks, might regard sufficient fiscal 
leeway as relatively more important. We thus expect that risk-averse people are more likely to 
oppose a debt brake or favour a less strict balanced budget rule, whereas those who are 
relatively risk prone ought to be more supportive of the notion that the German debt brake is 
insufficient. 
We assessed the interviewees’ risk attitudes by conducting a simple experiment. 
Respondents were confronted with the choice of either receiving a safe payoff of €X or taking 
part in a lottery in which they could win either €1,000 or nothing. The odds are 50:50. The 
                                                                                                                                                                             
data, we are confident that the lack of a material incentive in our version of the experiment had no notable effect 
on the respondents’ choices. 
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choice of X is then used to compute a measure of the respondent’s risk attitude λ, ranging 
from −1 (maximum risk aversion) to +1 (maximum risk propensity).5 
In Table A5 in the Appendix, we sort the respondents into three categories: 
respondents with a risk attitude parameter λ of less than −0.2 are considered to be risk averse, 
those with a parameter value between −0.2 and 0.2 are risk neutral, and those with a value of 
λ of larger than 0.2 are risk prone. Our findings indeed suggest that people who can be 
considered as particularly risk prone are more likely to agree with the notion that the 
government should not incur any additional debt at all. The share of respondents who agree 
with this view is 26% among the risk prone and 15% among the risk averse. In contrast, 65% 
of risk-averse interviewees support the debt brake in its actual form, whereas the share of 
proponents among the risk-prone interviewees is only 56%. 
 
2.6. Trust in Politicians 
Trust in politicians could be a particularly important determinant of individual attitudes 
toward fiscal rules. Several political economy approaches assume that public debt is used as a 
strategic instrument by opportunistic policymakers to pursue selfish interests.6 Arguably, 
voters suspicious of politicians’ motives are more likely to prefer fiscal rules over 
discretionary leeway and thus be in favour of a balanced budget rule. We sought to capture 
different dimensions of trust in politicians by confronting the interviewees with three sets of 
contradictory statements. Specifically, we asked the respondents whether they believe that 
politicians (i) act according to the general public interest vs. only in the interest of particular 
groups, (ii) are concerned about the country’s long-term well-being vs. only care about 
winning the next election, and (iii) manage tax revenues conscientiously vs. are wasteful with 
tax revenues. In each case, the interviewees were asked to use a five-point scale to indicate 
with which statement they most agree. The scale ranges from +2 (indicating strong agreement 
with the positive statement) to −2 (indicating strong agreement with the negative statement). 
To evaluate the association between trust in politicians and approval of the debt brake, 
we compute an average trust score for each respondent. We consider an average trust score of 
equal or less than −1 as low, a score between −1 and +1 as medium, and a score equal or 
larger than +1 as high. Table A6 shows the relationship between trust in politicians and 
attitudes toward the debt brake. In line with our expectations, the distribution of answers 
                                                        
5 The risk attitude parameter λ is computed as (X−500)/500. 
6 Such approaches include political budget cycle theory and rent-seeking approaches, as well as work by Persson 
and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and Tabellini (1990), in which the government is expected to have time-
inconsistent preferences. 
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suggests that people characterised by low trust in politicians tend to regard the current 
balanced budget rule as insufficient; 20% of these respondents opt for a rule that prevents the 
government from incurring any debt at all. In comparison, the share interviewees with 
medium (high) trust who agree with this notion is 12% (16%). 
When looking at each trust measure separately, we find a particularly strong 
association between attitudes toward the debt brake and the first trust measure, that is, the 
notion that politicians are concerned about the general public interest vs. the interest of 
particular groups.7 Twenty per cent of the interviewees who (rather) believe in interest-group 
politicians would like an even stricter balanced budget rule, whereas the share among those 
who believe that politicians are benevolent is only 13%. 
 
2.7. Party Preferences 
Political ideology appears to be an important determinant of individual attitudes toward 
various policy measures. In Germany, the introduction of the debt brake was a source of avid 
public debate, with supporters and opponents typically belonging to different political camps. 
In fact, the political parties in Germany have very different opinions about the perils and 
benefits of a balanced budget rule. The conservative Christian Democratic Party and the 
Liberal Democratic Party favour the debt brake; the Leftist party strictly opposes it. Although 
the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party officially support the debt brake, there are 
opponents among the members of both parties. To glean some insight into the association 
between party preferences and attitudes toward the German balanced budget rule, all 
respondents were asked which party they would vote for if elections were held next Sunday. 
The respondents could choose between seven major German parties: the Social Democratic 
Party (SPD), the Christian Democratic Party (CDU), the Leftist Party, the Green Party, the 
Pirates, the Liberal Democratic Party (FDP), and the National Democratic Party of Germany 
(NPD). Alternatively, the respondents could state that they would vote for a different party or 
not vote at all. 
Table A7 in the Appendix sets out the correlations between party preferences and 
attitudes toward the debt brake. People who vote for the parties regularly represented in the 
federal parliament reveal greater support for the current balanced budget rule. The support is 
the greatest among those who vote for the rather conservative CDU (70%), followed by the 
Green Party (65%), the SPD (63%), and the liberal FDP (63%). In contrast, people who vote 
                                                        
7 Results are not reported here but available on request. 
13 
for parties other than those listed are more likely to want to tie the hands of politicians even 
more tightly by forbidding any additional debt incurrence. Interestingly, less than 8% of 
Leftist Party supporters are explicitly against the debt brake even though the Leftist Party 
officially rejects a balanced budget rule. This share is smaller than for most of the parties that 
officially support the debt brake, for example, the CDU (9%), the SPD (9%), and the Green 
Party (9%). Moreover, 23% of leftist voters call for an even stricter debt brake. There are two 
possible explanations for this. First, the Leftist Party’s positions are far from the political 
‘mainstream’ and the party is strongly critical of both past and present government. Thus, 
people who vote for the Leftist Party may desire to see the government’s hands tied by a 
balanced budget rule. Second, the Leftist Party constantly calls for expansion of the welfare 
state and also tends to make political demands that far outpace budget limits. Thus, it could be 
that its supporters fear that the Leftist Party is incapable of engaging in sound fiscal policy, 
which is why they are in favour of a binding public credit constraint. 
To sum up, despite the fact that support for the debt brake differs notably across 
different subgroups of the population, there is hardly any group that generally opposes a 
balanced budget rule. Within each subgroup, approval of the debt brake in its current form is 
typically the modal value. Nonetheless, approval rates can vary as much as 20 pp across 
subsamples. There is more disagreement about whether the German debt brake is sufficiently 
strong or whether the hands of the government should be tied even more tightly by prohibiting 
any additional debt incurrence at all. 
 
3. Regression Analysis 
Although cross-tabulations are very useful because they do not require assumptions about the 
functional relationship between variables, they do not have a ceteris paribus interpretation, as 
we do not take the joint variation of the covariates into consideration. In this section, we 
account for potential collinear relationships between our covariates by means of regression 
analysis. For this purpose, we estimate a multinominal logit model: 
ሺ1ሻ Prሺݕ௜ ൌ ݇ሻ ൌ
exp ሼݔ௜ᇱߚ௞ሽ
exp ሼݔ௜ᇱߚଵሽ ൅ ⋯ ൅ exp ሼݔ௜ᇱߚ௄ሽ , ݇ ൌ 1, … , ܭ. 
k refers to the potential realisations of the discrete variable ݕ௜, which can take on three values: 
1 if the respondent is against the debt brake, 2 if she favours it, and 3 if she thinks that the 
debt brake is insufficient. Subscript i refers to the interviewee. We estimate the coefficients ߚ௞ 
using maximum likelihood. 
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The vector x contains all variables introduced in Section 3: economic situation,8 
economic literacy, believed fiscal position, time preferences,9 risk preferences, trust in 
politicians,10 and party preferences. Moreover, we control for several additional factors, 
namely, level of education (dummies for those who completed lower (Hauptschule; reference 
category), middle (Realschule), and upper secondary school (Abitur)), dummies for 
employment status (regularly employed (reference category), unemployed, student, retiree, 
trainee/military service, and jobless for other reasons), marital status (singles (reference 
category), people living together with a partner, married people, and those who are widowed 
or divorced), age, sex, propensity toward an egalitarian attitude, and a dummy indicating 
whether the respondent has children.11 Additionally, we include a dummy for the state 
(Bundesland) in which the respondent resides. The results are outlined in Table 1. Since the 
coefficients of a multinominal logit model are of limited interpretative value, we report 
average marginal effects for each realisation of our dependent variable. Generally, it appears 
that a number of conclusions based on the bivariate analyses in Section 3 are affected by 
common variation in our explanatory variables and no longer hold in a multivariate context. 
Among the group of economic controls, only household income reveals a statistically 
significant influence on individual attitudes toward the debt brake when holding other factors 
fixed. In line with our findings from the bivariate analysis, the larger the respondent’s income, 
the lower the likelihood that she opts for an even stricter balanced budget rule. A €1,000 
increase in household income is associated with an almost 3 pp lower likelihood of answering 
that the government should not incur any additional debt at all. 
  
                                                        
8 Unlike in the cross-tabulations, we do not group the respondents into three different income brackets in the 
regression approach; instead, household income enters as a metric variable. 
9 In our sample, a large number of interviewees choose the immediate payment irrespective of the magnitude of 
the offered future payoff. Interestingly, a similar distribution of answers is found in the SOEP. A possible 
explanation for this finding is that respondents who are particularly risk averse choose this option. To control for 
possible spill-over effects and measurement errors, we include additional dummy variables for these categories. 
10 Note that we include each trust measure separately instead of computing the average as done in Section 2. 
11 A detailed description of all variables is provided in Section A.2 of the Appendix. 
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Table 1: Determinants of individual attitudes toward the German debt brake. 
Variables Against Debt Brake Pro Debt Brake Debt Brake Not Enough 
Economic situation       
HH income 0.007 0.019 −0.027** 
Subjective well-being 0.004 0.005 −0.009 
Property −0.017 −0.005 0.022 
Time preferences    
β −0.058 0.012 0.046 
δ −0.034 −0.016 0.051 
Risk attitudes    
λ 0.016 −0.059*** 0.043*** 
Economic literacy    
One correct answer −0.073** 0.062 0.011 
Two correct answers −0.081** 0.075 0.006 
Three correct answers −0.049 0.080 −0.032 
Believed deficit −0.006 0.005 0.001 
Believed interest rate −0.005 0.007 −0.003 
Believed inflation rate −0.008* 0.003 0.004 
Political trust/attitudes    
Public interest −0.001 0.029** −0.028** 
Long-term orientation 0.000 −0.004 0.004 
Fiscal competence 0.000 0.013 −0.013 
Party preference    
Leftist Party −0.044 −0.043 0.087* 
Pirates −0.043 0.012 0.030 
SPD −0.034 0.012 0.022 
Green Party −0.035 0.009 0.026 
CDU −0.043* 0.062* −0.019 
FDP −0.054 0.029 0.025 
NPD 0.030 −0.139 0.109 
Other −0.042 −0.101* 0.143*** 
Education    
Middle second. school −0.003 −0.027 0.030 
Higher second. school 0.011 −0.046 0.035 
Employment     
Unemployed 0.052 −0.018 −0.035 
Retired 0.006 0.026 −0.032 
Student −0.054 0.006 0.049 
Voc. training/military service −0.041* −0.041 0.082 
Housewife/househusband −0.031 −0.006 0.037 
Other controls    
Age −0.002 −0.001 0.002** 
Children −0.001 −0.019 0.020 
Female 0.001 0.025 −0.026 
Egalitarian attitude 0.010 0.023** −0.033*** 
Living in partnership −0.007 −0.012 0.019 
Married 0.027 −0.021 −0.006 
Divorced/widowed 0.057* −0.091* 0.034 
Dummy β −0.036** −0.008 0.044 
Dummy δ −0.010 0.041 −0.030 
Laender dummies yes yes yes 
Observations 1751   
Pseudo-R2 0.070   
Wald χ2 (108) 2053.5***   
Notes: Results are based on a multinominal logit maximum likelihood estimation. Marginal effects based on 
sample averages are reported. White (1980) robust standard errors are used. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
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Economic literacy appears to matter a great deal, even after controlling for the 
influence of several other potentially relevant factors. Respondents who have at least some 
knowledge about debt-related economic indicators are less likely to be opposed to a balanced 
budget rule. The effects are of notable size. Giving one (two) correct answers to the three 
multiple-choice questions reduces the likelihood of expressing disagreement with the debt 
brake by 7 pp (8 pp). In contrast, the subjective assessment of debt-related economic measures 
hardly matters. Only the believed inflation rate is significantly related to attitudes toward the 
debt brake: a 1 pp increase in the subjective assessment of the inflation rate lowers the 
likelihood of opposing the debt brake by almost 1 pp. 
In line with the findings from cross-tabulations, people who are particularly risk prone 
are less likely to agree to the current balanced budget rule and more likely to opt for an even 
stricter one than people who are risk averse. The size of the effects is remarkable. A one point 
hike in the risk attitude parameter λ is associated with a 6 pp lower likelihood of supporting 
the balanced budget rule and a 4 pp higher likelihood of wanting an even stricter rule. 
Among the indicators of trust in politicians, beliefs about politicians’ benevolence 
appear to be important. Supporting our prior, a one point hike in this trust measure decreases 
the probability of choosing an even stricter balanced budget rule by almost 3 pp. Put 
differently, interviewees who think that politicians primarily serve the interests of particular 
groups are more likely to express the opinion that the government should not be allowed to 
incur any debt at all. The reverse is discovered for respondents who have high trust in 
politicians: they are significantly more likely to support the debt brake in its current form. 
With respect to party preferences, particularly strong effects are found for supporters 
of the Leftist Party, the CDU, and other parties not explicitly listed. Supporters of the 
Christian Democratic Party are 4 pp less likely to oppose the debt brake, which is in line with 
our expectations. As already indicated by the cross-tabulations, supporters of the Leftist Party 
are 9 pp more likely to state that the government should not be allowed to run a deficit at all. 
Finally, supporters of parties other than those listed prefer an even stricter balanced budget 
rule with a 14 pp higher likelihood. This finding could indicate that those who desire a 
balanced budget rule the most tend to be disappointed by the fiscal policy programmes of the 
established parties. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The recent financial crisis and associated economic downturn have imposed a huge burden on 
the public finances of many countries, as public debt levels have increased excessively. This 
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development has raised concerns about the solvency of many sovereigns and the stability of 
the Euro area. 
To tackle these problems, the member states of the European Union signed the 
European Fiscal Compact, under which all ratifiers must enact a balanced budget law in their 
national legislation. Debt brakes are often regarded as an effective and credible device for 
ensuring sustainable fiscal policy and regaining credibility. However, debt brakes are not 
without their critics, who point out that because debt brakes tie the hands of fiscal 
policymakers, they can hinder, if not block, appropriate and timely response to economic 
downturns. Moreover, the rules can be circumvented by ‘creative accounting’ within the 
government sector. 
To shed light on the public’s view of balanced budget rules, we designed a survey that 
was carried out in Germany at the beginning of 2013. A representative sample of the German 
population was asked their opinions on the debt brake. Germany is a particularly interesting 
case, as a balanced budget rule was enacted by constitutional amendment even before the 
surge of the European debt crisis. According to this rule, the public budget deficit at the 
federal government level must not exceed 0.35% of GDP from 2016 onward. Exceptions can 
be made only in times of national economic crisis or in the event of a natural disaster. 
Our findings suggest that a vast majority of the German population supports the 
balanced budget rule in its current form; the share of proponents is roughly 61%. Only 8% of 
the respondents oppose a debt brake; 17% think that the debt brake does not go far enough, as 
they believe that the government should not incur any additional debt at all. Studying 
approval rates within different subgroups of the German population, we find that attitudes 
toward the debt brake are associated with several factors. Support for the balanced budget rule 
is greater among high-income earners, those who are well-informed about the costs associated 
with deficit spending, and respondents who consider politicians to be trustworthy. Opinions 
about the debt brake also differ notably across the supporters of different political camps. 
People who vote for the CDU and FDP, for example, are more likely to approve the debt 
brake in its current form than are non-voters or those who vote for ‘fringe’ parties. However, 
no identifiable subgroup of the German population opposes introduction of a balanced budget 
rule in general. 
To conclude, our results imply that the German population strongly supports a rule 
that constrains the government’s fiscal leeway and, thus, the discretionary power of the 
voters’ representatives. What remains unclear, however, is the extent to which the financial 
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and economic crisis and the associated increase in public debt has strengthened the popularity 
of a debt brake in Germany. 
  
19 
Appendix 
A.1. Additional Tables 
Table A1: Attitudes toward debt brake and economic well-being—joint distribution of 
answers  
 Against debt brake 
In favour of 
debt brake 
Debt brake not 
sufficient No answer Total 
Low income (< €1,500) 8.5 54.6 19.3 17.7 
100 
N = 493 
Medium income (bet. 
€1,500 and €3,000) 7.7 61.4 17.2 13.8 
100 
N = 1264 
High income (> €3,500) 9.1 67.7 12.6 10.5 100 N = 285 
Pearson’s χ2 (8) 17.9***     
      
Absolutely dissatisfied 9.3 41.2 28.7 20.2 
100 
N = 129 
Rather dissatisfied 9.0 58.3 19.0 13.8 
100 
N = 290 
Neither/nor 7.3 62.1 13.7 16.9 
100 
N = 765 
Rather satisfied 8.6 63.3 17.6 10.5 
100 
N = 712 
Absolutely satisfied 6.9 61.0 17.8 14.4 100 N = 146 
Pearson’s χ2 (12) 40.2***     
      
No self-owned 
house/flat 9.1 59.1 16.1 15.7 
100 
N = 966 
Self-owned house/flat 7.2 62.0 17.9 12.9 
100 
N = 1076 
Pearson’s χ2 (3) 7.0*     
 
Table A2: Attitudes toward debt brake and economic literacy—joint distribution of answers  
 
Against debt 
brake 
In favour of 
debt brake 
Debt brake not 
sufficient No answer Total 
No correct answer 9.5 52.8 17.5 20.2 
100 
N = 515 
One correct answer 7.0 62.3 17.2 13.6 
100 
N = 906 
Two correct answers 7.8 65.6 17.2 9.5 
100 
N = 529 
Three correct answers 13.0 59.8 12.0 15.2 
100 
N = 92 
Pearson’s χ2 (9) 36.5***     
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Table A3: Attitudes toward debt brake and believed fiscal position—joint distribution of 
answers  
 
Against debt 
brake 
In favour of 
debt brake 
Debt brake not 
sufficient No answer Total 
Deficit = 1% 9.2 62.5 12.5 15.8 
100 
N = 184 
Deficit = 3% 8.8 61.9 17.7 11.6 
100 
N = 874 
Deficit = 5% 7.9 59.6 16.3 16.2 
100 
N = 643 
Deficit = 7% 5.9 58.4 19.1 16.7 100 N = 341 
Pearson’s χ2 (9) 15.1*     
      
Interest rate = 1.5% 8.1 63.6 17.6 10.8 
100 
N = 758 
Interest rate = 3% 8.6 59.8 17.5 14.1 
100 
N = 766 
Interest rate = 5.5% 7.5 59.6 15.0 17.8 
100 
N = 426 
Interest rate = 10% 6.5 47.8 18.5 27.2 100 N = 92 
Pearson’s χ2 (9) 26.7***     
      
Inflation = 0% 6.5 48.4 19.4 25.8 
100 
N = 31 
Inflation = 2% 7.9 63.6 16.6 11.9 
100 
N = 1298 
Inflation = 5% 9.2 58.0 16.7 16.0 
100 
N = 586 
Inflation = 10% 4.7 44.9 22.8 27.6 100 N = 127 
Pearson’s χ2 (9) 39.4***     
 
Table A4: Attitudes toward debt brake and time preferences—joint distribution of answers  
 
Against debt 
brake 
In favour of 
debt brake 
Debt brake not 
sufficient No answer Total 
Low future orientation 
(β ≤ .5) 7.8 59.8 18.0 14.4 
100 
N = 1269 
Medium future 
orientation (.5 < β ≤ .9) 9.5 65.4 12.7 12.5 
100 
N = 505 
High future orientation 
(β > .9) 6.7 55.6 20.9 16.8 
100 
N = 268 
Pearson’s χ2 (6) 16.1**     
      
Myopic (δ < 1) 7.8 56.5 20.1 15.7 100 N = 294 
Non-myopic (δ ≥ 1) 8.1 61.3 16.5 14.0 100 N = 1748 
Pearson’s χ2 (3) 3.3     
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Table A5: Attitudes toward debt brake and public indebtedness—joint distribution of answers  
 
Against debt 
brake 
In favour of 
debt brake 
Debt brake not 
sufficient No answer Total 
Risk averse (λ < −.2) 7.5 65.0 15.2 12.3 100 N = 738 
Risk neutral (−.2 ≤ λ ≤ 
.2) 8.6 60.6 15.0 15.8 
100 
N = 581 
Risk prone (λ > .2) 8.3 56.2 20.6 14.9 100 N = 723 
Pearson’s χ2 (6) 16.9**     
 
Table A6: Attitudes toward debt brake and trust in politicians—joint distribution of answers  
 
Against debt 
brake 
In favour of 
debt brake 
Debt brake not 
sufficient No answer Total 
Low trust 8.6 58.5 20.8 12.2 
100 
N = 1119 
Medium trust 7.8 63.4 12.2 16.7 
100 
N = 839 
High trust 4.8 61.9 15.5 17.9 100 N = 84 
Pearson’s χ2 (6) 32.5***     
 
Table A7: Attitudes toward debt brake and party preferences—joint distribution of answers  
 
Against debt 
brake 
In favour of 
debt brake 
Debt brake not 
sufficient No answer Total 
Would not vote 9.6 51.9 14.6 24.0 
100 
N = 459 
Leftist Party 7.5 53.3 23.3 15.8 
100 
N = 120 
Pirates 8.6 51.4 17.1 22.9 
100 
N = 35 
SPD 8.5 63.3 17.3 10.9 
100 
N = 496 
Green Party 8.5 65.0 15.7 10.4 
100 
N = 280 
CDU 8.9 69.5 14.2 9.8 
100 
N = 459 
FDP 6.5 63.2 18.4 13.2 
100 
N = 76 
NPD 5.3 47.4 36.8 5.3 
100 
N = 19 
Other 6.1 46.9 31.6 15.3 100 N = 98 
Pearson’s χ2 (24) 93.4***     
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A.2. Explanatory Variables 
 
HH income 
Monthly net household income in €1,000. In the raw dataset, 
households are sorted into one of 11 income classes. In the 
empirical analysis, we consider the centre of each class. 
Subjective well-being Subjective assessment of personal economic well-being, ranging from 1 (absolutely dissatisfied) to 5 (absolutely satisfied). 
Property Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent lives in her own house/flat and 0 if the house/flat is rented. 
β Respondent’s marginal rate of substitution between two future consecutive periods (see Section 2.4. and Hayo et al. (2014)). 
δ Measure of the degree of the respondent’s short-run impatience (see Section 2.4 and Hayo et al. (2014)). 
Believed deficit 
Measure of the respondent’s assessment of 2012’s federal budget 
deficit (four potential realisations; measured in percentage 
points). This variable is computed based on the following 
question: 
How large was the budget deficit of the federal government in 
2012? 
1% □ 3% □ 5% □ 7% □ 
Believed interest rate 
Measure of the respondent’s assessment of the interest rate on 
government bonds with a maturity of 10 years (four potential 
realisations; measured in percentage points). This variable is 
computed based on the following question: 
What is the current interest rate on long-term government bonds 
(maturity 10 years), approximately? 
1.5% □ 3% □ 5.5% □ 10% □ 
Believed inflation rate 
Measure of the respondent’s assessment of 2012’s inflation rate 
(four potential realisations; measured in percentage points). This 
variable is computed based on the following question: 
How large was the inflation rate in 2012, approximately? 
0% □ 2% □ 5% □ 10% □ 
Knowledge/number of 
correct answers 
Variable measuring the number of correct answers to the three 
multiple-choice questions about 2012’s deficit, the interest rate 
on government bonds, and 2012’s inflation rate. 
Public interest 
Most politicians in 
Germany act in line with 
the general public’s 
interest 
vs. 
Most politicians in 
Germany only serve the 
interests of particular 
groups 
+2: □ +1: □ 0: □ −1: □ −2: □ 
Long-term orientation 
Most politicians are 
concerned about the 
country’s long-term well-
being 
vs. 
Most politicians are only 
concerned about the next 
elections 
+2: □ +1: □ 0: □ −1: □ −2: □ 
Fiscal competence 
The government 
manages tax revenues 
conscientiously 
vs. The government wastes tax revenues  
+2: □ +1: □ 0: □ −1: □ −2: □ 
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Egalitarian attitude 
The state should ensure 
equal living conditions vs. 
The state should not 
interfere with people’s 
living conditions 
+2: □ +1: □ 0: □ −1: □ −2: □ 
Education 
Education level of the respondent, differentiating between lower 
secondary education (reference category), middle secondary 
education, and upper secondary education. 
Employment 
Employment status of the respondent, differentiating between 
regularly employed (reference category), unemployed, retired, 
student, housewife/househusband, and jobless for other reasons. 
Age Respondent’s age in years. 
Children Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent has children (0 otherwise). 
Female Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent is female (0 otherwise). 
East German Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent lives in East Germany (0 otherwise). 
Risk preference 
Respondents are confronted with the choice of either receiving a 
safe payoff of €X or taking part in a lottery in which they could 
win either €1,000 or nothing (odds are 50:50). The choice of X is 
then used to compute an individual’s risk preference parameter, 
which varies between −1 (maximum risk aversion) and +1 
(maximum risk propensity), i.e., ߣ = (X–500)/500. 
Family status 
Family status of respondent, differentiating between single 
(reference category), living together with a partner, married, and 
divorced/widowed. 
 
  
24 
References 
Ainslie, G. (1975), Specious reward: A behavioral theory of impulsiveness and impulse 
control, Psychological Bulletin 82, 463–496. 
Alesina, A. and Bayoumi, T. (1996), The costs and benefits of fiscal rules: Evidence from US 
states, NBER Working Paper No. 5614. 
Alesina, A. and Tabellini, G. (1990), A positive theory of fiscal deficits and government debt, 
Review of Economic Studies 57, 403–414. 
Angeletos, G.-M., Laibson, D., Repetto, A., Tobacman, J., and Weinberg, S. (2001), The 
hyperbolic consumption model: Calibration, simulation, and empirical evaluation, Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 15, 47–68. 
Barro, R. (1979), On the determination of public debt, Journal of Political Economy 87, 940–
971. 
Blinder, A. S. and Holtz-Eakin, D. (1984), Public opinion and the balanced budget, American 
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 74, 144–149. 
Blinder, A. S. and Krueger, A. B. (2004), What does the public know about economic policy, 
and how does it know it? Brookings Papers in Economic Activity 1, 327–397. 
Bohn, H. and Inman, R. P. (1996), Balanced budget rules and public deficits: Evidence from 
the U.S. states, NBER Working Paper No. 5533. 
Buchanan, J. M. and Wagner, R. E. (1977), Democracy in deficit: The political legacy of Lord 
Keynes, New York: Academic Press. 
Cukierman, A. and Meltzer, A. H. (1989), A political theory of government debt and deficits 
in a neo-Ricardian framework, American Economic Review 79, 713–732. 
De Haan, J., Moessen, W., and Volkerink, B. (1999), Budgetary procedures aspects and 
changes: New evidence for some European countries, in: Poterba, J. M. and von Hagen, J. 
(eds.), Fiscal institutions and fiscal performance, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 265–300. 
Guichard, S., Kennedy, M., Wurzel, E. and André, C. (2007), What promotes fiscal 
consolidation: OECD country experiences, OECD Economics Department Working Paper 
No. 553. 
Hallerberg, M. and von Hagen, J. (1999), Electoral institutions, cabinet negotiations, and 
budget deficits in the European Union, in: Poterba, J. M. and von Hagen, J. (eds.), Fiscal 
institutions and fiscal performance, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 265–300. 
25 
Hayford, M. (1989), Liquidity constraints and the Ricardian equivalence theorem, Journal of 
Money, Credit, and Banking 21, 380–387. 
Hayo, B. and Neumeier, F. (2013), Public attitudes toward fiscal consolidation: Evidence 
from a representative German population survey, MAGKS Discussion Paper No. 51-2013. 
Hayo, B., Neumeier, F., and Uhl, M. (2014), Topics in fiscal policy: Evidence from a 
representative survey of the German population, MAGKS Discussion Paper No. 12-2014. 
Hein, E. and Truger, A. (2013), Fiscal policy and rebalancing in the euro area: A critique of 
the German debt brake from a post-Keynesian perspective, Levy Economics Institute 
Working Paper No. 776. 
Heinemann, F. and Henninghausen, T. (2012), Understanding public debt preferences, Public 
Finance Analysis 68, 406–430. 
Huber, B. and Runkel, M. (2008), Hyperbolic discounting, public debt and balanced budget 
rules, Scottish Journal of Political Economy 55, 543–560. 
Imbeau, L. and Tellier, G. (2004), The political-economy of budget deficits in the Canadian 
provinces, 1968–2000, in: Imbeau, L. and Pétry, F. (eds.), Politics, institutions, and fiscal 
policy: Deficits and surpluses in federated states, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 
Laibson, D. (1997), Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting, Quarterly Journal of Economics 
112, 443–477. 
Perotti, R. and Kontopoulos, Y. (2002), Fragmented fiscal policy, Journal of Public 
Economics 86, 191–222. 
Persson, T. and Svensson, L. E. O. (1989), Why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit: 
Policy with time-inconsistent preferences, Quarterly Journal of Economics 104, 324–345. 
Poterba, J. M. (1994), State responses to fiscal crises: The effects of budgetary institutions 
and politics, Journal of Political Economy 102, 799–821. 
Poterba, J. M. and Rueben, K. S. (2001), Fiscal news, state budget rules, and tax-exempt bond 
yields, Journal of Urban Economics 50, 537–562. 
Schmitt- Grohé, S. and Uribe, M. (1997), Balanced-budget rules, distortionary taxes, and 
aggregate instability, Journal of Political Economy 105, 976–1000. 
Stix, H. (2013), Does the broad public want to consolidate public debt? The role of fairness 
and of policy credibility, Kyklos 66, 102–129. 
Thaler, R. H. and Shefrin, H. M. (1981), An economic theory of self-control, Journal of 
Political Economy 89, 392–406. 
26 
von Hagen, J. and Wolff, G. B. (2006), What do deficits tell us about debt? Empirical 
evidence on creative accounting with fiscal rules in the EU, Journal of Banking and 
Finance 30, 3259–3279. 
White, H. (1980), A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct 
test for heteroskedasticity, Econometrica 48, 817–838. 
 
 
Joint Discussion Paper 
Series in Economics 
by the Universities of 
Aachen · Gießen · Göttingen 
 Kassel · Marburg · Siegen 
ISSN 1867-3678 
 
 
 
No. 57-2014 
 
 
 
 
Bernd Hayo and Florian Neumeier 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public Preferences for Government Spending Priorities: 
Survey Evidence from Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded from 
http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/index_html%28magks%29 
 
Coordination: Bernd Hayo • Philipps-University Marburg 
Faculty of Business Administration and Economics • Universitätsstraße 24, D-35032 Marburg 
Tel: +49-6421-2823091, Fax: +49-6421-2823088, e-mail: hayo@wiwi.uni-marburg.de 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public Preferences for Government Spending Priorities: 
Survey Evidence from Germany 
 
Bernd Hayo and Florian Neumeier 
Philipps-University Marburg 
 
 
 
 
This version: 4 November 2014 
 
 
 
 
Corresponding author: 
Bernd Hayo 
School of Business and Economics 
Philipps-University Marburg 
D-35032 Marburg 
Germany 
Phone: +49⎼6421⎼2823091 
Email: hayo@wiwi.uni-marburg.de 
 
 
 
* Thanks to Edith Neuenkirch and Matthias Uhl for their comments on an earlier version of this 
paper, and to Christian Traxler and Joachim Winter, as well as participants of a brown bag 
seminar at Marburg University for valuable comments on the design of the questionnaire. The 
usual disclaimer applies. 
  
2 
 
Public Preferences for Government Spending Priorities: 
Survey Evidence from Germany 
 
Abstract 
Employing data from a representative survey conducted in Germany, this paper examines public 
preferences for the size and composition of government expenditure. We focus on public attitudes 
toward taxes, public debt incurrence, and public spending in six different policy areas. Our 
findings suggest, first, that the current scope of government is supported by a majority of the 
German population. Second, we find that individual preferences for the composition of 
government spending differ along various dimensions. Specifically, personal economic well-
being, economic literacy, confidence in politicians, political ideology, and time preference are 
significantly related to individual attitudes toward public spending, taxes, and debt. The magnitude 
of the effects is particularly large for time preference, economic knowledge, and party preference. 
Third, public preferences for public spending priorities are only marginally affected when 
considering a public budget constraint. 
 
JEL: E62, H11, H50, H63 
Keywords: Public spending, public preferences, public debt, taxes, survey, Germany. 
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1. Introduction 
The past decade has witnessed an expansion of the public sector in most OECD countries, 
reflected by notably higher public expenditure and tax revenue-to-GDP ratios.1 This trend reached 
a peak after the recent financial and economic crises, when governments around the world 
implemented fiscal stimuli in order to stabilise the business cycle. In the aftermath of this 
expansion, governments are finding it hard to cut back the budget again. Moreover, there has been 
an intensive debate over what some observers call ‘austerity’, the reluctance of some countries 
(e.g., the United Kingdom and Germany) to prolong the period of extensive deficit spending. 
Economists supporting ‘austerity’ often believe that large governments might have a detrimental 
impact on economic growth and social welfare (e.g., Afonso and Furceri, 2010; Fölster and 
Henrekson, 2001; Barro, 1990). Moreover, in the public choice literature, policymakers and 
bureaucrats are typically assumed to be primarily concerned with their personal utility rather than 
public benefit (e.g., Niskanen, 1971; Alesina et al., 1997; Drazen, 2002). In their view, markets 
would supply many currently publicly-provided goods and services more efficiently than do 
governments.2 
From a political perspective, the scope of government in a democracy arguably should 
reflect the electorate’s preferences. However, it seems unlikely that a person’s demand for 
publicly-provided goods and services is primarily driven by concerns about economic welfare per 
se. It is hard to imagine that ‘common’ people (i.e., economic laymen) evaluate fiscal policies 
from a theoretical economics perspective and employ, for instance, Musgrave’s (1959) distinction 
between the main fiscal functions of allocation, distribution, and stabilisation. 
But if not fiscal functions, what does determine the demand for publicly-provided goods? 
We provide an answer to this question based on an empirical analysis of data from Germany. 
Thus, in this paper, we study the correlates of peoples’ attitudes toward public spending in six 
different policy areas, as well as of their views on taxes and public debt. In consideration of the 
various government functions and the implications of different public spending priorities, we 
formulate and test several hypotheses. In our analysis, we pay particular attention to the influence 
of redistribution concerns, confidence in politicians’ competence and motives, economic literacy, 
political leaning, and time preferences. 
For this purpose, we designed a representative survey of the German population. The 
survey was conducted on our behalf by GfK, one of the biggest private survey institutes in 
                                                        
1 According to IMF International Financial Statistics, the expenditure-to-GDP quota in the euro area increased 
between 1991 and 2013 from 43.4% to 50% (on average). In the same period, the revenue-to-GDP ratio rose from 
42.0% to 46.7%. 
2 Throughout this paper, we use the term ‘public good’ for goods characterised by non-rivalry and non-excludability 
and the term ‘publicly-provided good’ for goods that are actually provided by the government, irrespective of whether 
they are characterised by non-rivalry and/or non-excludability. 
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Germany, specialised in market and public opinion research. In the first quarter of 2013, roughly 
2,000 representatively selected German citizens aged 14 or older were interviewed face to face 
using pen-pads. Respondents were asked for which policy areas public expenditure should be 
increased, decreased, or held constant relative to the current level. We consider two different 
scenarios: in the first scenario, respondents are required to take the public budget constraint into 
account; that is, respondents who opt for spending hikes (spending cuts) need to state how this 
hike should be financed or, alternatively, if they opt for spending cuts, to what purpose the 
additional funds should be used. The choice is between changing the level of public spending in 
any other policy area, increasing or decreasing taxes, or incurring or not incurring public debt. In 
this way, we circumvent the so-called ‘more for less’ paradox (Welch, 1985), according to which 
people want more spending but less taxation, and thus overcome a shortcoming found in many 
other surveys, for example, the International Social Survey Programme. In the second scenario, 
there is no binding budget constraint, that is, respondents are asked how additional unexpected 
revenues should be used. These two scenarios allow studying the importance of a budget 
constraint when measuring public support for government activities. 
Surveys are frequently used to elicit public attitudes on fiscal policy measures. Based on 
cross-country data from the World Values Survey and the International Social Survey Programme, 
Alesina and Giuliano (2009), Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003), and Corneo and Grüner (2002) 
analyse individual attitudes toward political redistribution. Stix (2013), Blinder and Holtz-Eakin 
(1984), Blinder and Krueger (2004), and Walstad (1997) employ survey data to evaluate 
individual opinions on fiscal consolidation and public deficits. Hayo and Neumeier (2013) shed 
light on public attitudes toward different fiscal consolidation measures. However, to date, only a 
few studies focus on individual attitudes toward public spending priorities. Based on survey data 
from the United States, Mueller (1963), Welch (1985), Jacoby (1994), and Hansen (1998) evaluate 
public attitudes toward various fiscal programmes, such as public spending on certain welfare 
measures, education, health care, and defence. However, their analyses are primarily descriptive 
and they do not investigate the relationship between individual characteristics and fiscal policies. 
Hockley and Harbour (1983) employ a coupon scale questionnaire to elicit attitudes toward 
different public spending priorities in the United Kingdom. Compared to our study, though, their 
number of covariates is limited, as the authors examine only the effects of age, sex, education, and 
wage. 
Our findings suggest that a large part of the German citizenry supports the current scope of 
government. Put differently, majority voting would yield few changes with regard to the level of 
public spending on diverse policy areas or the composition of public expenditure. The only policy 
area in which a spending cut is preferred by a majority of respondents is defence. In the case of 
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public spending on education, roughly 61% opt for increasing expenditure. We also find that 
preferences for different public spending priorities are relatively stable, irrespective of whether or 
not respondents consider the budget constraint. This means that the share of interviewees who opt 
for a spending hike in any particular policy area if unexpected additional funds become available 
is approximately the same as in the scenario where spending hikes involve costs. With regard to 
the determinants of attitudes toward public spending on the individual level, we find that—inter 
alia—economic well-being, confidence in politicians, economic knowledge, and time and party 
preferences exert a significant and sizable influence on preferences for public spending, tax policy, 
and public debt. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section introduces the survey 
instrument and sets out some important descriptive statistics. Section 3 formulates and tests 
several hypotheses with respect to individual attitudes toward public spending priorities as well as 
toward taxes and public debt. This section also presents our empirical model, along with the 
results from ordered logit estimations. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Survey Instrument and Descriptive Statistics 
The survey started by listing and briefly describing six major policy areas. The current amount of 
public spending devoted to these areas was given both in terms of euros per capita as well as in 
relation to total public spending.3 The six policy areas covered in our survey are those on which 
the German government spends the most: social security, public safety and order, education, 
infrastructure, economic development, and defence. 
We adopted two strategies for eliciting respondents’ preferences for different public 
spending priorities. First, we asked the interviewees in which of the six aforementioned policy 
areas the German government should spend more and in which areas it should spend less. Those 
interviewees who preferred spending hikes or cuts in at least one policy area were then asked how 
the additional public spending should be financed or what the additional funds should be used for, 
respectively. In both cases, three options were available: spending hikes (spending cuts) can be 
financed via (used for) a tax hike (tax cut), public borrowing (public debt reduction), or by a 
decrease (increase) in public spending in another other policy area. We allowed multiple answers, 
that is, the respondents could choose several policy areas in which they would prefer a change in 
spending. Note that the survey instrument is designed in such a way that the interviewees have to 
answer consistently; that is, interviewees who prefer an increase in public spending in any policy 
area and at the same time state that the increase should be financed via a reduction of public 
                                                        
3 The descriptions and figures used in the survey are given in Appendix A.1. 
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spending in another area were obliged to name at least one policy area in which public spending 
should be cut. Before the interview commenced, the scope and sequence of questions was 
introduced by an interviewer and the interviewee was permitted to ask questions at any time 
during the interview. By directly relating public spending to public revenues, we compelled 
interviewees to think about the public budget constraint when making their choices and, thereby, 
circumvented the ‘more for less paradox’ (Welch, 1985). 
Figure 1 illustrates the share of people opting for spending hikes (light columns) and cuts 
(dark columns) in different policy areas, as well as for increases or decreases in taxes and public 
debt, respectively. 
 
Figure 1: Preferences for public spending priorities when accounting for the public budget 
constraint—distribution of answers 
 
Only 18% of the respondents opt for a tax hike or the incurrence of additional public debt 
in order to increase public spending. Generally, expenditure cuts are also unpopular, except for 
defence spending, which more than 60% of the German population would like to see reduced. 
Note, though, that only 2.5% of total public expenditure is devoted to defence. With regard to 
increasing public spending, roughly 60% opt for additional expenditure on education. With respect 
to other policy areas, majority voting would not result in any changes in expenditure. 
Next, we introduce a scenario in which money comes out of the blue and, thus, fiscal 
adjustments are associated with no additional costs. Some people may regard public spending in 
one area as more important than spending in another, but, at the same time, be reluctant to call for 
a spending hike when costs are involved. To obtain some insight into whether and how 
consideration of the public budget constraint affects peoples’ attitudes toward public spending 
priorities, we confronted the interviewees with the latest release of the official tax estimate, 
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according to which the German government is going to collect €23 billion more tax revenues 
between 2013 and 2016 than previously expected. We then asked the respondents how the 
government should use these additional revenues. The choice was between increasing public 
spending in one of the six policy areas listed above, cutting taxes, or repaying public debt. 
Respondents were allowed to mention a maximum of three ordered preferences. Ordering allows 
evaluating the relative importance respondents attach to different fiscal policy measures. The 
distribution of answers is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Preferences for public spending priorities when unexpected funds can be used—
distribution of answers 
 
 
The share of people opting for a spending hike in any particular policy area is roughly 
equal to the scenario in which respondents were required to take the public budget constraint into 
account. Thus, preferences over different public spending priorities appear relatively stable, 
irrespective of whether or not spending hikes involve a budget constraint. However, we see a 
different picture when looking at preferences as to taxes and public debt. In the first scenario, 
about 32% of the interviewees opt for a tax cut. But when unexpected funds are available, more 
than half the respondents prefer to use them to decrease the tax burden. With regard to public debt, 
only 42% prefer consolidation efforts when this implies that spending needs to be cut, as 
compared to 54% when unexpected tax revenues can be used for this purpose. Hence, respondents 
are more willing to cut taxes and repay debt if no costs are involved, indicating that they prefer not 
to reduce the scope of government. 
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3. Determinants of Individual Attitudes Toward Public Spending Priorities 
3.1 Empirical Approach and Research Hypotheses 
We now turn to the individual-level analysis of preferences for different public spending priorities. 
Our investigation consists of two parts. First, we study the determinants of individual attitudes 
toward public spending priorities in the scenario where interviewees’ had to take the public budget 
constraint into account. We set up the following empirical model: 
ሺ1ሻ ݕ௜,௝∗ ൌ ݔ௜ᇱߚ ൅ ߝ௜ 
ݕ௜,௝ ൌ ݇ ݂݅ ߩ௞ିଵ ൏ ݕ௜,௝∗ ൑ ߩ௞ 
where ݕ௜,௝∗  represents a latent continuous variable. The subscript i refers to the interviewee and j to 
the policy area. We estimate eight specifications of Equation (1), one for social security, public 
safety, education, infrastructure, economic development, defence, taxes, and public debt.4 k is a 
placeholder for the potential realisations of the discrete variable ݕ௜,௝ and can take one of three 
values: –1 if the respondent opts for a spending cut in area j (a tax cut/public debt reduction), 1 if 
the respondent chooses an increase (a tax hike/additional public debt incurrence), or 0 if the 
respondent prefers to maintain the current level of spending (tax amount/level of public debt). 
Second, we study variables related to respondents’ relative preferences. In the following 
equation, we focus on the scenario where additional public funds become available unexpectedly. 
ሺ2ሻ ݖ௜,௝∗ ൌ ݔ௜ᇱߜ ൅ ߴ௜ 
ݖ௜,௝ ൌ ݈ ݂݅ ߪ௞ିଵ ൏ ݖ௜,௝∗ ൑ ߪ௞ 
The main difference from Equation (1) is that the discrete variable ݖ௜,௝ can take on one of four 
values: 3 if the respondent chooses the respective policy measure—i.e., a reduction of taxes or 
public debt or a spending hike in any policy area—as his or her first preference, 2 if the 
respondent chooses it as the second preference, 1 if the respondent mentions it as a third 
preference, or 0 if the policy measure is not mentioned at all. We use ordered logit regressions to 
estimate Equations (1) and (2). 
There is not much theoretical or empirical research into variables that are related to 
individual demand for publicly-provided goods and services. Thus, our analysis is to some extent 
explorative and the choice of explanatory variables is thus somewhat conjectural.5 
 
Economic Well-Being: Personal economic situation may affect individual attitudes toward 
public spending in several policy areas. Both theoretical (e.g., Meltzer and Richard, 1981) as well 
as empirical public choice approaches (e.g., Alesina and Giuliano, 2009; Alesina and La Ferrara, 
                                                        
4 Due to its high degree of heterogeneity, we do not use the miscellaneous expenditure category in the regression 
models below.  
5 Details on explanatory variables can be found in the Appendix. 
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2005; Corneo and Grüner, 2002) suggest that those who are relatively better-off tend to prefer less 
public spending on redistributive policies. In this regard, the label ‘redistributive’ is typically 
applied to publicly-provided goods and services that are (i) financed through proportional or 
progressive income tax, (ii) ‘private’ in the sense that they are typically characterised by 
excludability and/or rivalry, and (iii) provided by the government free of charge (e.g., Besley and 
Coate, 1991). Public spending on social security and public education are commonly considered 
prime examples of redistributive policies. Social security spending directly benefits those living in 
poor economic conditions. Public spending on education may reduce social inequality by 
enhancing the educational participation of the lower class and improving its future economic 
prospects. 
In contrast, evidence on the association between personal economic well-being and 
attitudes toward public spending on policies that are not necessarily ‘redistributive’ is absent from 
the literature. Only in the case of public safety is there some empirical evidence based on hedonic 
pricing models. Employing information on housing prices and wages from 113 US cities, Clark 
and Cosgrove (1990) find that willingness to pay for public safety increases with income. Using a 
formal theoretical model, they argue that public safety is a normal good. To summarise, we expect 
that relatively worse-off people are more likely to opt for spending hikes on social security and 
public education, whereas those who are better-off are assumed to call for additional public 
spending on public safety and order. 
We further hypothesise that the well-to-do prefer lower taxes and less public debt. The first 
conjecture is based on the notion that publicly-provided goods and services are primarily financed 
through a progressive income tax. The second claim is supported by several empirical findings 
suggesting that personal economic well-being is positively related to preferences for fiscal 
consolidation (e.g., Heinemann and Henninghausen, 2012; Hayo and Neumeier, 2013; Stix, 2013). 
The survey contains three indicators for respondents’ personal economic well-being: (i) net 
monthly household income (in €1,000), (ii) homeownership as a proxy for the household’s real 
assets (i.e., whether the respondent lives in a self-owned house, self-owned flat, or a rented 
house/flat), and (iii) a subjective assessment of the interviewee’s personal economic situation, 
ranging from 1 (absolutely dissatisfied) to 5 (absolutely satisfied). 
 
Attitudes Toward Politics: Trust in politicians could be an important determinant of 
individual attitudes toward public spending, as people characterised by high trust may be less 
suspicious of government activity. Many political economy approaches assume that policymakers 
manipulate the level and composition of public expenditure in their own self-interest, including 
political budget cycle theory, rent-seeking approaches, and pork-barrel spending models (e.g., 
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Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; Alesina et al., 1997; Lizzeri and Persico, 2001). Arguably, people who 
share this view of politicians’ motives are more likely to oppose public spending hikes and opt for 
a lean state. Accordingly, they should be relatively more likely to call for tax cuts and public debt 
reduction. 
In our survey, we measure interviewees’ attitudes toward politics with four pairs of 
contradictory statements. Three of these capture different dimensions of trust in politicians; the 
fourth assesses preferences for redistribution. We asked whether interviewees believe that 
politicians (i) act according to the general public interest versus only in the interest of particular 
groups, (ii) are concerned about the country’s long-term well-being versus being concerned only 
about the next election, and (iii) manage tax revenues conscientiously versus are wasteful with tax 
revenues. In each case, we inquired with which statement, on a five-point scale, the respondents 
agree most. If people are particularly suspicious of government activity in one or more specific 
policy area, we would expect to see them prefer lower spending. 
Additionally, we asked the interviewees about whether they think that (iv) the state should 
ensure equal living conditions versus the state not interfering in peoples’ living conditions. By 
means of this item, we capture the respondents’ inclination toward an egalitarian attitude. 
Arguably, people characterised by an egalitarian attitude may be more likely to opt for higher 
spending in policy areas that can be considered ‘redistributive’ and that reduce social inequality. 
The most important examples are social security and public education. 
 
Economic Literacy: Following the recent financial and economic crises, many 
governments accumulated large public debt, which implies that many publicly-provided goods and 
services were deficit financed. Arguably, awareness of the future burden associated with deficit 
spending may affect peoples’ attitudes toward public expenditure. Persons who lack information 
about the costs of public indebtedness may be less reluctant to opt for public spending hikes than 
those who are able to assess the future burden of public debt (e.g., Buchanan and Wagner, 1977). 
Our survey contains three multiple-choice questions designed to assess interviewees’ knowledge 
of economic variables that are important for assessing public debt: we asked about (i) the size of 
the federal government’s budget deficit in 2012 (in relation to GDP), (ii) the current interest rate 
on government bonds with a maturity of 10 years, and (iii) 2012’s inflation rate. In each case, the 
interviewees could choose between four answers. To evaluate the influence of knowledge on 
attitudes toward public spending priorities, we employ dummy variables for the number of correct 
answers. Significantly negative effects of the knowledge measure indicate that the better-informed 
respondents’ believe that spending cuts in the respective policy area are particularly suitable for 
fiscal consolidation. 
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Party Preferences: Party preferences might be a particularly important source of variation 
in individual preferences for public spending priorities. There is a wide range of political parties in 
Germany. For instance, leftist parties such as the SPD or the Left Party argue in support of a 
strong welfare state, whereas the FDP is a proponent of the free market. The CDU/CSU stands for 
the conservative political centre, whereas the Green Party reflects a mix of alternative ideas and 
liberal bourgeoisie. To achieve some insight into the association between party preferences and 
preferences for public spending priorities, all respondents were asked which party they would vote 
for if elections were held next Sunday. The respondents could choose between seven major 
German parties: the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Christian Democratic Party (CDU), the 
Leftist Party, the Green Party, the Pirates, the Liberal Democratic Party (FDP), and the National 
Democratic Party of Germany (NPD). Alternatively, the respondents could state that they would 
vote for a different party or that they would not vote at all. 
 
Time Preferences: In theoretical studies, time preferences are believed to be an important 
determinant of attitudes toward public indebtedness (e.g., Huber and Runkel, 2008). As 
consolidation efforts have to be financed, time preferences may also affect preferences for public 
spending priorities. Both theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that people who lack a future 
orientation and are particularly concerned about the present are more likely to support public debt 
incurrence and oppose fiscal consolidation (Hayo and Neumeier, 2013; Stix, 2013). Is there reason 
to suspect that time preferences are linked to preferences for expenditure-based consolidation? 
Arguably, benefits deriving from spending hikes on some items are immediately visible, whereas 
those deriving from other items are realised in the future, perhaps not even benefitting the current 
generation. For instance, increases in social security spending tend to fall into the former category, 
whereas spending hikes on education and infrastructure belong to the latter, as they can be 
considered investments in the economy’s (human) capital stock. Like in other cases of delayed 
rewards, individual preferences for spending hikes and cuts on items belonging to one or the other 
category might be affected by the respondent’s degree of forward-lookingness. Hence, people who 
are particularly concerned about the present may prefer higher spending in areas yielding 
immediate benefits and spending cuts in areas where welfare losses occur sometime in the future. 
And, indeed, empirical evidence indicates that a person’s future orientation or degree of patience 
is positively related to willingness to delay rewards (e.g., Ainslie, 1975; Thaler and Shefrin, 1981). 
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Within the framework of the survey, two ‘experiments’ were conducted to assess 
interviewees’ time preferences.6 In the first experiment, respondents were asked to choose 
between a safe payoff of €1,000 paid immediately and a higher payoff of €Xi,6 paid in six months. 
In the second experiment, the choice was between a safe payoff of €1,000 paid in six months and a 
higher payoff of €Xi,12 paid in 12 months. The respondents’ choices of Xi,6 and Xi,12 are then used 
to compute (i) the marginal rate of substitution between two consecutive future periods, i.e., 
ߚ ൌ  1,000/X௜,ଵଶ, and (ii) the respondents’ degree of short-run impatience, defined as ߜ ൌ
 X௜,ଵଶ/X௜,଺ (Angeletos et al., 2001; Laibson, 1997). The rationale for conducting two ‘experiments’ 
is that people are often found to be more impatient in the short run than in the long run, a 
phenomenon sometimes referred to as ‘myopia’ and one that can cause time-inconsistent 
behaviour. Both theoretical (Huber and Runkel, 2008) and empirical (Hayo and Neumeier, 2013; 
Stix, 2013) evidence suggests that time preferences affect peoples’ attitudes toward fiscal 
consolidation, i.e., the larger the discount rate β and the greater the extent of short-run patience δ, 
the more likely it is that a person will favour public debt reduction.7 
Peoples’ time perspective could also be related to specific sociodemographic 
characteristics. For example, given their shorter remaining lifetime, older respondents may be less 
future-oriented than younger ones. Retired persons may not be very interested in education, as 
they have left the labour market. In addition, given their own need for resources, they may not 
care very much about infrastructure investment, which primarily benefits future generations. 
Moreover, if we define utility maximisation to include caring for other individuals, respondents 
with children may be more future-oriented. Finally, the social science literature provides evidence 
that a person’s future orientation is positively related to level of education (e.g., Trommsdorf, 
1983). Becker and Mulligan (1997: 735) argue that ‘schooling focuses students’ attention on the 
future’. Leigh (1986) empirically analyses the relation between education and future orientation 
using survey data from the United States. His findings suggest that schooling facilitates forward-
lookingness. Hence, we expect that better-educated people opt for additional spending on 
education and infrastructure as well as for public debt reduction. At the same time, well-educated 
people might prefer lower spending on social security, as they are less likely to become 
                                                        
6 The setup of our ‘experiments’ is shown in Appendix A.3. The term ‘experiments’ is placed in quotation marks as 
they were not incentivised. However, both the setup and the wording were taken from the questionnaire of the German 
Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP), where the experiment was incentivised. Since the distribution of answers in our data is 
very similar to the one in the SOEP data, we are confident that the lack of a material incentive in our version of the 
experiment had no notable effect on interviewees’ choices. 
7 In our sample, we observe an unexpectedly high number of interviewees who choose the immediate payment 
irrespective of what future payoff they are offered. Interestingly, a similar distribution of answers is found in the 
SOEP data. A possible explanation for this finding is that respondents who are particularly risk averse chose this 
option. To control for possible spill-over effects and measurement errors, we include additional dummy variables for 
these categories. 
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beneficiaries of the social safety net. To capture these effects, we include corresponding 
sociodemographic variables as additional covariates in our model. 
 
Other Controls: Our empirical model contains several additional explanatory variables. We 
control for the respondent’s employment status (regularly employed (reference category), 
unemployed, student, retiree, or homemaker), marital status (single (reference category), living 
with a partner, married, or widowed or divorced), and sex. Our empirical model also includes 
dummies indicating in which state (Bundesland) the respondent resides. Finally, we assessed the 
interviewees’ risk preferences by means of an ‘experiment’. We confronted the interviewees with 
the choice of either receiving a safe payoff of €X or taking part in a lottery in which they could 
win either €1,000 or nothing (odds are 50:50). The choice of X is then used to compute an 
individual’s risk preference parameter, which varies between −1 (maximum risk aversion) and +1 
(maximum risk propensity). 
Table 1 summarises our hypotheses. A ‘+’ signifies that we expect a positive association, 
‘−’ an inverse relationship, and ‘?’ that we do not have a prior. 
 
Table 1: Summary of research hypotheses 
 Social 
Security 
Public 
Safety Education
Infra-
structure
Economic 
Develop. Defence Taxes 
Public 
Debt
Economic well-being − + − ? ? ? − − 
Trust in politicians ? ? ? ? ? ? + + 
Egalitarian attitude + ? + ? ? ? ? ? 
Economic literacy ? ? ? ? ? ? − − 
Leftist ideology + − + ? ? − + + 
Future orientation − ? + + ? ? ? − 
Age ? ? − − ? ? ? + 
Retirement ? ? − − ? ? ? + 
Children ? ? + + ? ? ? − 
Education − ? + + ? ? ? − 
 
3.2. Results 
Table 2 shows the results for Equation (1), i.e., the scenario where respondents have to take the 
public budget constraint into account. Average marginal effects for the different realisations of the 
dependent variable are contained in Table A1 of the Appendix. 
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Table 2: Determinants of individual attitudes toward public spending priorities—accounting for 
the public budget constraint 
Variables Social Security 
Public 
Safety Education
Infra-
structure
Economic 
Develop. Defence Taxes Public Debt 
Economic situation            
HH income −0.161 *** 0.017  0.090  0.027  0.005  0.026  0.131 ** −0.120 ** 
Subjective well-being −0.104 ** 0.141 ** 0.068  0.010  0.057  0.037  0.072  −0.030  
Property 0.114  −0.189 * −0.191 * −0.123  −0.091  −0.039  −0.169  −0.158  
Time preferences         
β −0.748** −0.267 −0.361 −0.461 −0.413 −0.113 0.282 −0.671** 
δ −0.031 −0.142 −0.147 −0.279 −0.104 −0.037 0.173 −0.269 
Economic literacy         
One correct answer 0.101 0.077 0.122 0.109 −0.011 −0.325*** 0.035 −0.093 
Two correct answers −0.015 0.027 0.285** 0.139 0.069 −0.536*** 0.220 −0.200 
Three correct answers 0.302 −0.496* 0.344 0.005 −0.271 −0.373 0.458* −0.557** 
Politic. trust/attitudes         
Public interest 0.082 0.082 −0.024 0.022 −0.041 0.037 0.033 −0.015 
Long-run orientation −0.005 0.052 0.011 0.014 0.109* 0.118** −0.043 0.013 
Fiscal competence −0.058 −0.175***−0.158** 0.028 0.057 0.112* 0.272*** −0.016 
Egalitarian attitude 0.270*** 0.015 0.199*** 0.065 −0.004 −0.147*** 0.038 0.016 
Party preference         
Leftist Party 0.070 0.133 0.010 −0.223 −0.315 −0.397 0.620*** −0.385* 
Pirates 0.170 0.026 −0.266 0.433 −0.008 −0.074 0.244 −0.552 
SPD −0.028 0.211 0.002 −0.060 0.027 −0.199 0.350** −0.056 
Green Party −0.091 −0.070 0.214 −0.436** −0.260 −0.433** 0.536*** −0.437*** 
CDU −0.285** −0.111 0.109 −0.048 0.103 0.013 −0.036 −0.011 
FDP −0.999*** 0.060 0.138 −0.108 0.168 −0.021 −0.121 −0.284 
NPD −0.309 1.098** 0.661 0.231 −0.422 0.923* −0.134 −1.271** 
Other −0.344 −0.113 −0.226 −0.111 0.101 0.227 −0.214 −0.677*** 
Education         
Middle sec. school −0.043 0.131 0.531*** 0.287** 0.274** −0.340*** 0.175 −0.225** 
Higher sec. school −0.302** −0.121 0.909*** 0.762*** 0.033 −0.500*** 0.238* −0.497*** 
Employment          
Unemployed 0.336 −0.017 −0.352 −0.426* 0.168 −0.440* 0.129 −0.394* 
Retired 0.263 0.240 0.036 −0.521***−0.284* −0.097 0.449*** −0.110 
Student −0.110 −0.408 0.234 −0.768* −0.405 0.273 −0.188 −0.346 
Vocational training −0.363* 0.130 0.567** 0.223 0.174 −0.112 0.271 0.323 
Homemaker 0.228 −0.032 0.264 −0.436 −0.060 0.040 0.098 0.135 
Other controls         
Age −0.005 0.007 −0.011** 0.009 −0.004 −0.007 0.010** −0.016*** 
Children 0.045 0.055 0.380*** 0.167 0.077 0.065 0.167 0.062 
Female 0.055 0.247** 0.120 −0.302***−0.175* 0.063 0.101 0.090 
Risk preference 0.118 −0.121 −0.129* 0.081 −0.002 −0.052 0.007 0.008 
Living in partnership −0.100 0.038 −0.535***−0.037 0.053 −0.150 −0.341* 0.023 
Married 0.187 0.103 −0.174 0.126 −0.149 −0.237 −0.480*** 0.124 
Divorced/widowed 0.021 −0.179 −0.220 0.128 −0.059 −0.082 −0.564*** 0.202 
Dummy β 0.105 0.008 0.065 0.278* −0.082 −0.310** −0.041 −0.166 
Dummy δ −0.383*** 0.008 −0.028 −0.234 −0.099 0.152 0.331** −0.118 
State dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Pseudo-R2 0.062 0.054 0.076 0.043 0.030  0.057 0.048  0.038 
Note: Results are based on ordered logit maximum likelihood estimation. The dependent variable is 1 if a respondent 
opts for a hike in the respective policy measure, 0 if no change is preferred, and −1 if a decrease is favoured. White 
(1980) robust standard errors are used. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
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Economic well-being exerts a significant influence on individual attitudes toward public 
spending priorities. In line with our prior, people who are comparably worse-off—i.e., those with 
low household income and a negative assessment of their personal economic situation—tend to 
opt for an increase in social security spending, whereas the well-to-do prefer a spending cut in this 
area. A €1,000 increase in net monthly household income (a one-point increase in subjective 
economic well-being) is associated with a 3.6 percentage point (pp) (2.3 pp) lower likelihood of 
opting for a spending hike on social security and a 1.6 pp (1.0 pp) greater likelihood of calling for 
a welfare spending cut. It appears that the well-to-do would like to use the money saved primarily 
on public safety and reducing public debt. A one-point increase in the subjective assessment of 
personal economic well-being is associated with a 2.8 pp greater likelihood of preferring a 
spending hike on public safety, whereas a €1,000 rise in household income makes it 2.8 pp more 
likely to call for public debt reduction. We also find some evidence that the wealthy prefer a 
reduction in spending on education, as indicated by the significant negative impact of our property 
indicator. High-income respondents are also significantly more likely to opt for a tax hike and 
significantly less likely to call for a tax cut than those with low income. Previous findings indicate 
that this result may be mediated by public debt aversion: Blinder and Krueger (2004), for the 
United States, and Hayo and Neumeier (2013), for Germany, report that richer people have a 
stronger preference for tax-based fiscal consolidation. 
Supporting our conjecture, time preference appears to be an important determinant of 
individual attitudes toward public debt incurrence. The greater a person’s concern about the future, 
the more likely he or she is to a call for public debt reduction. The effect is of considerable 
magnitude: a one-point increase in the discount parameter β implies a 15.5 pp greater likelihood of 
favouring a public debt cut. Cutting public spending on social security appears to be the most 
preferred consolidation measure of the forward-looking respondents. A one-point hike in β 
invokes a 7.5 pp higher likelihood of opting for a welfare spending cut and a 16.5 pp lower 
likelihood of calling for more spending in that area. Older people and retirees prefer less spending 
on education and infrastructure, whereas respondents with children strongly support an increase in 
education expenditure. The latter effect is of especially notable size: having children increases the 
likelihood of calling for additional spending on education by 8.1 pp and reduces the likelihood of 
opting for less spending in this area by 7.8 pp. We also obtain particularly large estimates for our 
education indicators. Respondents who completed higher secondary school (Abitur) are 19.7 pp 
more likely to call for additional spending on education and 11.5 pp more likely to opt for an 
increase in infrastructure investment than are interviewees with a lower secondary school degree 
(Hauptschule; reference category). At the same time, the better educated have a 11.5 pp higher 
likelihood of supporting fiscal consolidation. 
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In line with our prior, economic literacy is strongly related to individual attitudes toward 
public indebtedness and to public spending priorities. Respondents who are perfectly informed 
about debt-related economic measures—i.e., who answered all three knowledge questions 
correctly—are 13 pp more likely to support public debt reduction. Cutting public spending on 
defence appears to be the most preferred consolidation measure of the well-informed, as they are 
roughly 10 pp more likely to favour lower public expenditure in this area. 
The effects of our trust indicators reveal that people who lack confidence in politicians 
appear to be particularly concerned about government expenditure on economic development and 
defence, whereas spending on public safety and education is viewed with less suspicion. 
Interviewees who consider the government to be wasteful with tax revenues would like to see less 
public spending on defence, but more spending on public safety and education, indicating the 
belief that tax money may be better spent in these areas. Those who regard politicians as fiscally 
incompetent strongly opt for a tax cut. Specifically, a one-point decrease in the respective 
indicator (implying stronger support for the notion that the government is wasteful with tax 
revenues) raises the probability of supporting a tax cut by 5.5 pp. Despite the fact that the German 
welfare system has been permanently under reform during the past decades and the subject of 
heated public debate, the confidence in politicians’ motives and competence does not reveal a 
statistically significant influence on attitudes toward spending on social security. Propensity 
toward egalitarianism exerts a notable influence on attitudes toward public spending in policy 
areas that tend to reduce social inequality. In line with our conjecture, respondents with an 
egalitarian attitude have a 6 pp and 4 pp higher probability of supporting more spending on social 
security and education, respectively. In contrast, more egalitarian respondents prefer lower 
spending on defence and economic development. 
Supporters of different political parties differ notably in their attitudes toward welfare 
spending. In line with our conjecture, voters for the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) and the 
Liberal Democratic Party (FDP) are significantly less likely than non-voters (reference group) as 
well as voters for the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Green Party to prefer a spending hike on 
social security. FDP voters are especially reluctant to support an expansion of the welfare state; 
they are 12.8 pp more likely to opt for a cut in social security spending and 20.5 pp less likely to 
call for a welfare spending hike compared to non-voters. The difference between FDP voters and 
voters for the Leftist Party or the Pirates is even larger. In contrast, differences between political 
camps with respect to public spending on other areas are generally negligible. Supporters of the 
Green Party are significantly more likely to opt for spending cuts on infrastructure, economic 
development, and defence than are non-voters. However, they do not differ significantly from 
those who vote for most of the other parties. There are some notable differences regarding public 
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revenues, though. Supporters of the left-wing parties, i.e., SPD, the Leftist Party, and the Green 
Party, are significantly more likely to call for a tax hike than are non-voters and those who vote for 
right-wing parties, i.e., the CDU and FDP, indicating that they would like to see an expansion of 
the public sector. Yet again, differences between political camps with regard to attitudes toward 
public debt incurrence or reduction, respectively, are less pronounced than differences between 
voters and non-voters. 
Next, we turn to the estimation results for Equation (2), i.e., the scenario in which 
unexpected additional funds can be used to increase public spending in any policy area, cut taxes, 
or repay public debt. To conserve space, we only report the coefficients of the latent variable 
model in Table A2 in the Appendix. We find that the estimates explaining individual attitudes 
toward public spending in various policy areas are very similar, both in terms of signs and p-
values, to the scenario assuming a fiscal budget constraint. Thus, people’s attitudes toward public 
spending are not affected by a public budget constraint. 
To confirm this impression and test whether the results across Equations (1) and (2) are 
statistically different, we apply seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimation. For each 
different policy area, we estimate two binary SUR equations, which differ only with respect to the 
dependent variable. In the first equation, the binary dependent variable refers to the scenario in 
which the public budget constraint must be taken into account. In the second equation, the binary 
dependent variable refers to the scenario in which unexpected additional funds become available. 
The left-hand-side variables take the value 1 if the interviewee opts for a spending hike in the 
respective policy area (or a decrease in taxes or public debt, respectively) and 0 if she prefers not 
to change public spending in that area or even advocates for a spending cut (or no change/an 
increase in taxes or public debt). We then test—for each policy area separately—whether the 
coefficients in both equations are equal. Our findings indicate that the impact of our explanatory 
variables on individual attitudes toward public spending priorities is the same across both 
scenarios. For each single policy area, the null hypothesis that all coefficients are indistinguishable 
cannot be rejected at any reasonable level of significance. This conclusion also holds with respect 
to public debt reduction. Only with regard to tax cuts do the coefficients differ statistically 
significantly between the two scenarios.8 
This finding is not only interesting in the current context but has more general implications for 
survey methodology. It is important to realise that the two scenarios are notably different in terms 
of their complexity and the intellectual demand they place on interviewees. Forcing respondents to 
                                                        
8 This result is driven by the trust indicators. The null that the coefficients of the trust measures are equal across both 
equations can be rejected at the 1% level (p = 0.0084). People who have confidence in politicians’ motives and 
competence are more reluctant to opt for a tax cut if there is a budget constraint. 
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consider the public budget constraint not only makes designing the survey instrument more 
difficult but also has consequences for the form in which the interviews are conducted. For 
instance, a scenario assuming a budget constraint is less suited for a telephone survey, as the 
resulting complexity can be more easily dealt with by using of computer-assisted face-to-face 
interviews. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Following the financial crisis, public expenditure-to-GDP ratios increased greatly in most 
developed countries. This paper examines the demand for public spending in several policy areas 
using a unique dataset from a representative household survey carried out in Germany at the 
beginning of 2013. The interviewees were asked about their attitudes toward public spending in 
different areas (social security, public safety, education, infrastructure, economic development, 
defence, and miscellaneous) as well as about their views on taxation and public indebtedness. Our 
findings suggest that majority voting would yield very few changes in the level of public spending 
in diverse policy areas or in the composition of public expenditure, respectively. The only policy 
area in which a spending cut is preferred by a majority of respondents is defence. In the case of 
public spending on education, roughly 61% opt for higher expenditures. 
Our dataset contains detailed information about the interviewees, allowing us to investigate 
the factors associated with individual attitudes toward different fiscal policy measures. Using 
theoretical and empirical findings from the literature, we develop a number of testable conjectures 
and find that individual preferences for public spending differ notably across respondents. 
Economic well-being, confidence in politicians, economic knowledge, and time and party 
preferences all exert a statistically significant influence on preferences for public spending, tax 
policy, and public debt. The magnitude of the effects is particularly large for time preference, 
economic knowledge, and party preference. A one-point increase in the discount parameter 
implies an almost 16 pp greater likelihood of favouring a public debt cut and an almost 17 pp 
lower likelihood of calling for higher social security spending. Respondents who completed higher 
secondary school (Abitur) are 20 pp more likely to prefer additional spending on education and 
almost 12 pp more likely to favour more infrastructure investment than are interviewees with a 
lower secondary school degree. Respondents who are very well informed about debt-related 
economic variables, i.e., have good economic knowledge, are 13 pp more likely to support public 
debt reduction. Voters supporting the liberal party FDP are almost 21 pp less likely to call for a 
welfare spending hike compared to non-voters. Thus, the common assumption made in public 
choice research that voters differ only along a single dimension does not appear to be realistic. 
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Moreover, we find that preferences for public spending are almost unaffected by 
consideration of the public budget constraint. Hence, the share of respondents who opt for 
additional spending in any particular policy area is approximately the same, irrespective of 
whether spending hikes involve costs (such as decreasing spending in another policy area or 
increasing taxes or public debt) or unexpected additional funds are available. This finding has 
important implications for survey methodology, as it suggests that it may not be necessary to 
design complicated survey questions and use expensive interview methods to obtain people’s 
preferences toward public expenditure. 
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Appendix 
A.1. Description of policy areas and spending figures 
Policy area Description Spending per 
capita 
Proportion on 
total 
Social security e.g., unemployment compensation, 
social welfare, family and youth 
welfare 
€7,660 56.6% 
Education e.g., public schools and universities €1,125 8.3% 
Public safety e.g., police, justice system €455 3.3% 
Infrastructure e.g., road and town construction €350 2.6% 
Economic development e.g., promotion of small and 
medium-sized companies, 
investment allowances, financial 
support for disadvantaged regions 
€335 2.5% 
Defence e.g., military equipment, service 
pay, defence administration 
€335 2.5% 
Total  €10,260 75.8% 
 
 
A.2. Explanatory variables 
HH income 
Monthly net household income in €1,000. In the raw dataset, 
households are sorted into one of 11 income classes. In the 
empirical analysis, we consider the centre of each class.  
Subjective well-being Subjective assessment of personal economic well-being ranging from 1 (absolutely dissatisfied) to 5 (absolutely satisfied). 
Property Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent lives in her own house or flat and 0 if the house/flat is rented.  
Time preference See Section A.3. 
Deficit 
Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent can 
correctly state 2012’s federal budget deficit (0 otherwise). 
How large was the budget deficit of the federal government in 
2012? 
1% □ 3% □ 5% □ 7% □ 
Interest rate 
Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent can 
correctly state the interest rate on government bonds with a 
maturity of 10 years (0 otherwise). 
What is the current interest rate on long-term government bonds 
(maturity 10 years) approximately? 
1.5% □ 3% □ 5.5% □ 10% □ 
Inflation 
Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent can 
correctly state 2012’s inflation rate (0 otherwise). 
How large was inflation in 2012 approximately? 
0% □ 2% □ 5% □ 10% □ 
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Public interest 
Most politicians in 
Germany act in line with 
the general public’s 
interest 
vs. 
Most politicians in 
Germany only serve the 
interests of particular 
groups 
+2: □ +1: □ 0: □ −1: □ −2: □ 
Long-run orientation 
Most politicians in 
Germany are concerned 
about the country’s long-
term well-being 
vs. 
Most politicians are only 
concerned about the next 
elections 
+2: □ +1: □ 0: □ −1: □ −2: □ 
Fiscal competence 
The state manages tax 
revenues conscientiously vs. 
The state is wasteful with 
tax revenues 
+2: □ +1: □ 0: □ −1: □ −2: □ 
Party preference 
Party for which respondent would vote if elections were held 
next Sunday: Social Democratic Party (SPD), Christian 
Democratic Party (CDU), Leftist Party, Green Party, Pirates, 
Liberal Democratic Party (FDP), and National Democratic Party 
of Germany (NPD). Alternatively, the respondents could state 
that they would vote for a different party or that they would not 
vote at all. 
Education 
Education level of the respondent, differentiating between lower 
secondary education (reference category), middle secondary 
education, and upper secondary education. 
Employment HH head 
Employment status of the household head, differentiating 
between regularly employed (reference category), unemployed, 
retired, student, and jobless for other reasons. 
Age Respondent’s age measured in years. 
Children Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent has children (0 otherwise). 
Female Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent is female (0 otherwise). 
Egalitarian attitude 
The state should ensure 
equal living conditions vs. 
The state should not 
interfere in peoples’ 
living conditions 
+2: □ +1: □ 0: □ −1: □ −2: □ 
Risk preference See Section A.3. 
Family status 
Family status of respondent, differentiating between single 
(reference category), living with a partner, married, or 
divorced/widowed. 
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A.3. Measurement of risk and time preferences 
 
Next, we would like to conduct some experiments concerned with financial decisions. In the first 
experiment you make your decisions according to the following table (Interviewer: Please show 
the table below). In each row you see two alternatives. You can choose between a safe payoff and 
participation in a lottery which follows the principle ‘all or nothing’: You have a 50% chance of 
winning 1,000 Euro and a 50% chance of winning 0 Euro. 
You start in row 1 and then proceed row by row. In each row, please choose between the safe 
payoff (column A) and participation in the lottery (column B). The lottery remains the same in all 
rows. Only the safe payoff increases from row to row. 
 
 You get …  You get … 
 Safe  €1,000 or nothing 
Chance of winning 50:50 
 A or B 
1 €0 safe  Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
2 €100 safe  Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
3 €200 safe  Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
4 €300 safe  Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
5 €400 safe  Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
6 €500 safe  Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
7 €600 safe  Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
8 €700 safe  Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
9 €800 safe  Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
10 €900 safe  Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
 
Interviewer: Please start with row 1 and the question ‘How do you choose? €0 safe or chance of 
winning €1,000/€0?’. If the interviewee chooses option B, please proceed with row 2 and the 
question ‘How do you choose? €100 safe or chance of winning €1,000/€0?’. The experiment ends 
when the interviewee chooses option A for the first time. Please write down the number of the row 
in which the respondent chose option A for the first time. 
 
Option A was first chosen in row number: 
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In the next experiment you decide according to the following table (Interviewer: Please show the 
table below). In each row you see two alternatives. You can choose between a safe payoff of 
€1,000 which is paid to you immediately and a higher safe payoff which will be paid to you in 6 
months. 
You start in row 1 and then proceed row by row. In each row, please choose between the safe 
payoff of €1,000 to be paid immediately (column A) and the higher safe payoff to be paid in 6 
months (column B). The payoff on the left remains the same in all rows. Only the payoff on the 
right increases from row to row. 
 
 You get …  You get … 
 Immediately  In 6 months
 A or B 
1 €1,000   €1,000  
2 €1,000   €1,010  
3 €1,000   €1,020  
4 €1,000   €1,030  
5 €1,000   €1,050  
6 €1,000   €1,075  
7 €1,000   €1,100  
8 €1,000   €1,150  
9 €1,000   €1,200  
10 €1,000   €1,300  
11 €1,000   €1,400  
12 €1,000   €1,500  
13 €1,000   €1,750  
14 €1,000   €2,000  
 
Interviewer: Please start with row 1 and the question ‘How do you choose? €1,000 immediately or 
€1,000 in 6 months?’. If the interviewee chooses option A, please proceed with row 2 and the 
question ‘How do you choose? €1,000 immediately or €1,010 in 6 months?’. The experiment ends 
when the interviewee chooses option B for the first time. Please write down the number of the row 
in which the interviewee chose option B for the first time. 
 
Option B was first chosen in row number: 
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In the last experiment you decide according to the following table (Interviewer: Please show the 
table below). In each row you see two alternatives. You can choose between a safe payoff of 
€1,000 which is paid to you in 6 months and a higher safe payoff which will be paid to you in 12 
months. 
You start in row 1 and then proceed row by row. In each row, please choose between the safe 
payoff of €1,000 to be paid in 6 months (column A) and the higher safe payoff to be paid in 12 
months (column B). The payoff on the left remains the same in all rows. Only the payoff on the 
right increases from row to row. 
 
 You get …  You get … 
 In 6 months  In 12 months
 A or B 
1 €1,000   €1,000  
2 €1,000   €1,010  
3 €1,000   €1,020  
4 €1,000   €1,030  
5 €1,000   €1,050  
6 €1,000   €1,075  
7 €1,000   €1,100  
8 €1,000   €1,150  
9 €1,000   €1,200  
10 €1,000   €1,300  
11 €1,000   €1,400  
12 €1,000   €1,500  
13 €1,000   €1,750  
14 €1,000   €2,000  
 
Interviewer: Please start with row 1 and the question ‘How do you choose? €1,000 in 6 months or 
€1,000 in 12 months?’. If the interviewee chooses option A, please proceed with row 2 and the 
question ‘How do you choose? €1,000 in 6 months or €1,010 in 12 months?’. The experiment ends 
when the interviewee chooses option B for the first time. Please write down the number of the row 
in which the interviewee chose option B for the first time. 
Option B was first chosen in row number: 
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A.4. Additional results 
Table A1: Determinants of individual attitudes toward public spending priorities—average marginal effects 
Variables Social Security Public Safety Education Hike No Change Cut Hike No Change Cut Hike No Change Cut 
HH income −0.036*** 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.003 −0.003 0.000 0.019 −0.018 −0.001 
Subjective well-being −0.023** 0.013** 0.010** 0.028** −0.025 ** −0.004** 0.014 −0.014 −0.001 
Property 0.025 −0.014 −0.012 −0.038 0.033 0.005 −0.041* 0.039* 0.002 
β −0.165** 0.090** 0.075** −0.053 0.047 0.007 −0.077 0.074 0.003 
δ −0.007 0.004 0.003 −0.028 0.025 0.004 −0.031 0.030 0.001 
One correct answer 0.022 −0.012 −0.010 0.016 −0.014 −0.002 0.027 −0.025 −0.001 
Two correct answers −0.003 0.002 0.002 0.005 −0.005 −0.001 0.061** −0.059** −0.003* 
Three correct answers 0.067 −0.039 −0.028 −0.090** 0.074 ** 0.016 0.073 −0.070 −0.003 
Public interest 0.018 −0.010 −0.008 0.016 −0.014 −0.002 −0.005 0.005 0.000 
Long-term orientation −0.001 0.001 0.000 0.010 −0.009 −0.001 0.002 −0.002 0.000 
Fiscal competence −0.013 0.007 0.006 −0.035*** 0.031 *** 0.004*** −0.034** 0.032** 0.001** 
Egalitarian attitude 0.060*** −0.032*** −0.027*** 0.003 −0.003 0.000 0.043*** −0.041*** −0.002*** 
Leftist Party 0.016 −0.010 −0.006 0.027 −0.024 −0.003 0.002 −0.002 0.000 
Pirates 0.039 −0.024 −0.015 0.005 −0.005 −0.001 −0.059 0.056 0.003 
SPD −0.006 0.004 0.003 0.043 −0.038 −0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Green Party −0.020 0.012 0.009 −0.014 0.012 0.002 0.045 −0.044 −0.002 
CDU −0.064** 0.035* 0.029* −0.022 0.019 0.003 0.023 −0.022 −0.001 
FDP −0.205*** 0.077*** 0.128*** 0.012 −0.011 −0.002 0.030 −0.028 −0.001 
NPD −0.069 0.037 0.031 0.244** −0.227 ** −0.018*** 0.133 −0.128 −0.005 
Other −0.076* 0.041* 0.035 −0.022 0.019 0.003 −0.050 0.047 0.002 
Middle second. school −0.010 0.006 0.004 0.027 −0.024 −0.003 0.120*** −0.114*** −0.005*** 
Higher second. school −0.066** 0.034** 0.032** −0.024 0.020 0.003 0.197*** −0.189*** −0.008*** 
Unemployed 0.075 −0.044 −0.031* −0.003 0.003 0.000 −0.078 0.074 0.004 
Retired 0.059 −0.034 −0.025* 0.049 −0.043 −0.006 0.008 −0.008 0.000 
Student −0.025 0.014 0.011 −0.075 0.062 0.013 0.054 −0.051 −0.003 
Vocational training −0.077* 0.034** 0.043 0.026 −0.023 −0.003 0.116** −0.111** −0.004** 
Homemaker 0.051 −0.029 −0.022 −0.006 0.005 0.001 0.056 −0.054 −0.002 
Age −0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.000 −0.002** 0.002** 0.000* 
Children 0.010 −0.005 −0.005 0.011 −0.010 −0.001 0.081*** −0.078*** −0.004** 
Female 0.012 −0.007 −0.005 0.049** −0.043 ** −0.006** 0.026 −0.025 −0.001 
Risk preference 0.026* −0.014* −0.012 −0.024 0.021 0.003 −0.028* 0.027* 0.001 
Living in partnership −0.022 0.011 0.011 0.008 −0.007 −0.001 −0.116*** 0.111*** 0.005** 
Married 0.041 −0.023 −0.019 0.021 −0.018 −0.003 −0.037 0.035 0.001 
Divorced/widowed 0.005 −0.002 −0.002 −0.034 0.029 0.005 −0.047 0.045 0.002 
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Table A1 (continued) 
Variables Infrastructure Economic Development Defence Hike No Change Cut Hike No Change Cut Hike No Change Cut 
HH income 0.004 −0.002 −0.002 0.001 0.000 −0.001 0.000 0.005 −0.006 
Subjective well-being 0.001 −0.001 −0.001 0.009 −0.002 −0.007 0.001 0.007 −0.008 
Property −0.017 0.010 0.008 −0.014 0.003 0.012 −0.001 −0.008 0.009 
Β −0.065 0.036 0.029 −0.065 0.012 0.054 −0.002 −0.023 0.025 
Δ −0.039 0.022 0.017 −0.017 0.003 0.014 −0.001 −0.007 0.008 
One correct answer 0.015 −0.008 −0.007 −0.002 0.000 0.001 −0.006** −0.067*** 0.073*** 
Two correct answers 0.019 −0.011 −0.009 0.011 −0.002 −0.009 −0.009*** −0.109*** 0.118*** 
Three correct answers 0.001 0.000 0.000 −0.040 0.001 0.038 −0.006 −0.077 0.083 
Public interest 0.003 −0.002 −0.001 −0.007 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.008 −0.008 
Long-term orientation 0.002 −0.001 −0.001 0.017* −0.003 * −0.014* 0.002* 0.024** −0.026** 
Fiscal competence 0.004 −0.002 −0.002 0.009 −0.002 −0.007 0.002* 0.023* −0.024* 
Egalitarian attitude 0.009 −0.005 −0.004 −0.001 0.000 0.000 −0.002*** −0.030*** 0.032*** 
Leftist Party −0.031 0.017 0.014 −0.046 0.001 0.045 −0.006* −0.080* 0.085* 
Pirates 0.072 −0.051 −0.021 −0.001 0.000 0.001 −0.001 −0.015 0.016 
SPD −0.009 0.005 0.004 0.004 −0.001 −0.003 −0.003 −0.041 0.044 
Green Party −0.057** 0.027** 0.030** −0.039* 0.002 0.036 −0.006** −0.087** 0.093** 
CDU −0.007 0.004 0.003 0.017 −0.004 −0.013 0.000 0.003 −0.003 
FDP −0.016 0.009 0.006 0.028 −0.008 −0.020 0.000 −0.004 0.005 
NPD 0.037 −0.025 −0.012 −0.060 −0.002 0.062 0.025 0.186 −0.211* 
Other −0.016 0.009 0.007 0.017 −0.004 −0.013 0.004 0.047 −0.052 
Middle second. school 0.038** −0.019** −0.019** 0.044** −0.009 ** −0.035** −0.006*** −0.070*** 0.075*** 
Higher second. school 0.115*** −0.074*** −0.042*** 0.005 0.000 −0.005 −0.008*** −0.101*** 0.109*** 
Unemployed −0.059* 0.031** 0.027 0.029 −0.009 −0.020 −0.006** −0.086** 0.092** 
Retired −0.070*** 0.035*** 0.035** −0.043* 0.004 0.039* −0.002 −0.020 0.021 
Student −0.070** −0.007 0.077 −0.053 −0.010 0.063 0.006 0.057 −0.063 
Vocational training 0.037 −0.026 −0.011 0.030 −0.009 −0.020 −0.002 −0.023 0.024 
Homemaker −0.060* 0.032** 0.028 −0.010 0.002 0.008 0.001 0.008 −0.009 
Age 0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.001 0.001 
Children 0.023 −0.013 −0.011 0.012 −0.002 −0.010 0.001 0.013 −0.014 
Female −0.043*** 0.024** 0.018*** −0.028* 0.005 0.023* 0.001 0.013 −0.014 
Risk preference 0.011 −0.006 −0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.001 −0.010 0.011 
Living in partnership −0.005 0.002 0.002 0.009 −0.002 −0.006 −0.003 −0.031 0.033 
Married 0.017 −0.010 −0.008 −0.024 0.004 0.019 −0.004 −0.048 0.052 
Divorced/widowed 0.018 −0.010 −0.008 −0.010 0.002 0.007 −0.001 −0.017 0.018 
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Table A1 (continued) 
Variables Taxes Public Debt Hike No Change Cut Hike No Change Cut 
HH income 0.008** 0.018** −0.026** −0.008 −0.020** 0.028** 
Subjective well-being 0.005 0.010 −0.014 −0.002 −0.005 0.007 
Property −0.011 −0.023 0.034 −0.010 −0.026 0.036 
Β 0.018 0.039 −0.057 −0.044 −0.111** 0.155** 
Δ 0.011 0.024 −0.035 −0.017 −0.044 0.062 
One correct answer 0.002 0.005 −0.007 −0.006 −0.015 0.021 
Two correct answers 0.014 0.030 −0.044 −0.013 −0.033 0.046 
Three correct answers 0.033 0.055** −0.088* −0.032 −0.099** 0.130** 
Public interest 0.002 0.005 −0.007 −0.001 −0.003 0.004 
Long-term orientation −0.003 −0.006 0.009 0.001 0.002 −0.003 
Fiscal competence 0.017*** 0.037*** −0.055*** −0.001 −0.003 0.004 
Egalitarian attitude 0.002 0.005 −0.008 0.001 0.003 −0.004 
Leftist Party 0.044** 0.076*** −0.120*** −0.024 −0.065* 0.090* 
Pirates 0.015 0.036 −0.050 −0.033 −0.097 0.129 
SPD 0.022** 0.049** −0.071** −0.004 −0.009 0.013 
Green Party 0.037*** 0.069*** −0.105*** −0.027 −0.075*** 0.102*** 
CDU −0.002 −0.006 0.008 −0.001 −0.002 0.002 
FDP −0.006 −0.020 0.026 −0.019 −0.047 0.066 
NPD −0.007 −0.022 0.029 −0.057 −0.234** 0.291*** 
Other −0.011 −0.037 0.047 −0.038 −0.121*** 0.159*** 
Middle second. school 0.011 0.025 −0.036 −0.016 −0.036** 0.051** 
Higher second. school 0.015 0.033* −0.048* −0.031 −0.084*** 0.115*** 
Unemployed 0.008 0.019 −0.027 −0.022 −0.070* 0.093* 
Retired 0.030** 0.058*** −0.089*** −0.007 −0.019 0.025 
Student −0.010 −0.030 0.040 −0.023 −0.057 0.080 
Vocational training 0.017 0.038 −0.055 0.024 0.048 −0.073 
Homemaker 0.006 0.015 −0.020 0.009 0.021 −0.031 
Age 0.001** 0.001** −0.002** −0.001 −0.003*** 0.004*** 
Children 0.011 0.023 −0.034 0.004 0.010 −0.014 
Female 0.006 0.014 −0.020 0.006 0.015 −0.021 
Risk preference 0.000 0.001 −0.001 0.001 0.001 −0.002 
Living in partnership −0.026* −0.037 0.064 0.001 0.004 −0.005 
Married −0.035** −0.057*** 0.092*** 0.008 0.021 −0.029 
Divorced/widowed −0.040*** −0.070*** 0.109*** 0.013 0.033 −0.046 
Notes: The table contains average marginal effects based on ordered logit estimation of Equation (1). White 
(1980) robust standard errors are used. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
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Table A2: Determinants of individual attitudes toward public spending priorities—using 
unexpected additional revenues 
Variables Social Security 
Public 
Safety Education
Infra-
structure
Economic 
Develop. Defence Taxes 
Public 
Debt 
Economic situation            
HH income −0.114 ** 0.008  0.148 *** 0.128  0.036  −0.299 ** −0.041  0.068  
Subjective well-being −0.130 ** 0.097  0.122 ** −0.031  −0.026  −0.234  −0.070  0.044  
Property −0.143  −0.303 ** −0.172 * 0.005  −0.210  0.346  0.148  0.155  
Time preferences         
β −0.668** 0.334 −0.256 −0.189 −0.130 0.520 0.045 1.099***
δ 0.405* −0.043 −0.138 0.359 0.063 −0.170 0.082 0.051 
Economic literacy         
One correct answer 0.113 −0.080 0.102 0.241 0.230 −0.487 −0.158 0.060 
Two correct answers −0.022 −0.119 0.184 0.203 0.354** 0.004 −0.387*** 0.284**
Three correct answers 0.328 −0.163 0.287 0.173 −0.286 −15.839*** −0.426* 0.442**
Politic. trust/attitudes         
Public interest −0.014 0.000 0.061 0.047 0.044 0.138 0.005 0.000 
Long-run orientation 0.032 −0.008 −0.031 −0.122 −0.003 0.027 0.009 −0.023 
Fiscal competence −0.024 −0.037 −0.107* 0.051 0.078 0.226 −0.080 0.028 
Egalitarian attitude 0.173*** −0.002 0.119*** 0.001 −0.098* −0.060 −0.065* −0.015 
Party preference         
Leftist Party 0.236 0.356 0.218 −0.371 −0.456 −0.595 −0.254 0.012 
Pirates −0.331 −0.327 −0.372 −0.275 0.617 0.462 0.147 0.195 
SPD 0.182 0.203 −0.024 0.490** −0.043 −0.183 −0.267* 0.120 
Green Party −0.132 0.112 0.287* −0.175 −0.173 −0.384 −0.543*** 0.382**
CDU −0.151 0.049 −0.028 −0.101 0.318 −0.430 −0.065 0.255* 
FDP −0.570* −0.076 0.131 0.435 0.318 −1.207 −0.199 0.050 
NPD −0.028 1.070** −0.217 −0.062 0.865* −15.889*** −0.237 0.205 
Other −0.267 0.109 −0.230 −0.613 0.105 −0.321 −0.398* 0.376* 
Education         
Middle sec. school 0.084 −0.031 0.418*** 0.241 0.283* −0.245 −0.432*** 0.136 
Higher sec. school 0.247 0.249 −0.286 −0.977 −1.079 0.931 0.047 0.060 
Employment          
Unemployed −0.028 0.185 −0.072 −0.704* 0.319 0.109 −0.620*** 0.143 
Retired 0.180 0.357** 0.132 −0.197 −0.388* −0.159 −0.453*** 0.164 
Student −0.123 −0.398** 0.797*** 0.601*** 0.139 −0.071 −0.587*** 0.282**
Vocational training −0.563** 0.005 0.590*** 0.414 0.104 −0.470 −0.716*** 0.100 
Homemaker −0.234 0.127 −0.081 0.143 −0.419 0.280 0.014 0.353 
Further controls         
Age −0.002 0.006 −0.008* 0.008 0.005 0.017 −0.019*** 0.011**
Children −0.020 −0.065 0.291** −0.001 −0.144 −0.384 −0.042 0.180 
Female 0.210** 0.198* 0.306*** −0.178 −0.160 −0.367 −0.203** −0.213**
Risk preference 0.047 −0.117 −0.094 0.193* 0.175* 0.001 −0.137* −0.098 
Living in partnership 0.126 0.268 −0.559*** −0.357 0.036 0.043 0.244 0.002 
Married 0.169 0.312 −0.426*** 0.152 −0.091 −0.134 0.442*** −0.254 
Divorced/widowed 0.102 0.102 −0.380** 0.241 0.120 0.230 0.366** −0.321* 
Dummy β 0.254* −0.122 0.066 0.379* 0.029 −0.703 −0.126 0.133 
Dummy δ −0.349** 0.181 0.074 −0.212 −0.034 0.473 −0.006 0.267* 
State dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Pseudo-R2 0.039 0.037 0.047 0.048 0.053  0.092 0.043  0.026 
Note: Results are based on ordered logit maximum likelihood estimation. The dependent variable is 3 if a 
respondent puts the respective policy measure in first place, 2 if it is ranked second, 1 if it is ranked third, and 0 
otherwise. White (1980) robust standard errors are used. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively.  
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